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DIVIDED WE STAND?  





This thesis undertakes an analysis of the UK’s territorial constitution, specifically the ways 
devolution decentralises constitutional authority within the state. It analyses the UK’s territorial 
history, especially its rejection of federalism, a concept which it suggests has been sorely excluded 
from its constitutional conscience in preference for incremental, piecemeal development. It 
suggests that devolution, which itself has changed much in its short life, constitutes a fundamental 
shift for the UK’s constitution. This fundamentality, however, is not completely recognised in the 
political realm, even though the judiciary have found normative space to allow it institutional 
respect. Although mechanisms for self rule, and some mechanisms for shared rule, do exist, 
neither—especially the latter—can achieve their full benefits so long as a unitary, sovereignty-
endorsing perspective prevails at Westminster. This perspective appears to unjustifiably deny the 
significance of the devolved institutions, preferring to subordinate and disregard them, asserting 
instead its own institutional hierarchy and proving capable of manipulating the flexible procedures 
that devolution has put in place. Federalism once properly understood as constitutionally 
accommodating and encouraging diversity within a community, rather than a prescriptive state-
form, will provide for the necessary respect for institutions in order to allow the UK’s shared rule 
dynamics to prosper. The cooperative opportunities of the constitution can and should be realised 
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‘THE BEGINNING OF SOMETHING’ 
‘[T]he question is not only about what the United Kingdom might become, 
but also about what it already is.’ 1 
 
What is the optimal structure of the modern constitutional state? How can architecture, power 
structures and systems of interaction between the different levels of the state define—and be 
defined by—its constitutional vision? There are many possible answers to these questions, and 
many more possible directions of enquiry beside them. Research on constitutional structures is 
neither new, nor rare, but it is of fundamental importance: it can help comprehend and prescribe 
the basic pressures and responses of modern constitutional government; those of state formation, 
secession, union, disunion, cooperation, frustration and conflict. In the United Kingdom the 
crucial importance of constitutional architecture, and therefore the value of scholarship which can 
understand it, is on the rise. This rise in importance is aptly summed up by the leader of the 
Scottish National Party in the House of Commons who, following his ejection from the chamber 
after protesting about the lack of time being given to debate of Brexit’s devolution issues, said 
simply: ‘This is the beginning of something, not the end.’2 
 
The United Kingdom’s long and often troubled relationship with territorial governance, despite 
its sometimes-lacklustre scholarly attention, is among the most important and defining elements 
of the UK constitution’s past, present and future. Beyond simply outlining the shape the UK takes 
and the land it occupies, the architecture of the UK constitution reflects the deeper divisions, 
 
1 Nicholas Aroney, ‘Reserved Matters, Legislative Purpose and the Referendum on Scottish Independence’ [2014] 
Public Law 422, 423. 
2 Ian Blackford MP, quoted in Pippa Crerar, Peter Walker and Libby Brooks, ‘SNP MPs Walk out of Commons in 
Protest over Brexit Debate’ The Guardian (14 June 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jun/13/snp-
mps-walk-out-of-commons-in-protest-over-brexit-debate> accessed 9 May 2019. The point is also made above: 
Aroney, ‘Reserved Matters, Legislative Purpose and the Referendum on Scottish Independence’ (n 1). 
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commonalities and relationships within the state and between the levels of government inside—
and beyond—its borders, understanding of which may be crucial to the survival of the UK and, 
certainly, in recalibrating its relationship with the individuals it represents. This thesis unpicks the 
internal architecture of the UK in order to make sense of the relationships between the highest 
interior levels of government3 to highlight their challenges and provide for possible new ways 
forward. It is not the intention of this work to simply understand the devolution arrangements as 
they currently exist; there have been numerous attempts to do this and each can be quickly 
outdated.4 Nor is it this work’s aim to simply describe the theoretical undercurrent at play in pursuit 
of labelling the UK ‘unitary’, ‘federal’ or ‘something else’; this is of little value if its real implications 
are not understood. Much modern public law scholarship is devoted to rights issues rather than 
structural concerns and this is no bad thing: rights matter, but architecture matters too. 
Constitutional structures are not disconnected from these other issues either, for example the 
separation of powers doctrine clearly impacts on how rights are handled within a constitutional 
order and, by extension, which rights exist and who can exercise them. However, even so, and 
with considerable scholarly attention being diverted to questions about judicial overreaching,5 or 
engaging with the endless perplexities of Brexit itself,6 the nature and shape of our power structures 
themselves—let alone as actual policy choices by peoples and governments—are sometimes 
neglected. As this thesis shows, such an analysis can bear tremendous fruit in helping understand 
the constitution and its future, as well as being able to provide simple and focused answers to 
many of the pressing questions of our time.  
 
 
3 Local government, though important, is not the central focus of this piece. 
4 For example, many of Kenneth Campbell QC’s predictions in have been disavowed in R (Miller) v Secretary of State for 
Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5: Kenneth Campbell, ‘The “Scotland Clauses” and Parliamentary Supremacy’ 
(2015) 3 Juridical Review 259. Equally, though it remains influential, Bogdanor’s seminal piece has not retained perfect 
contemporary accuracy: Vernon Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom (OUP 1998). 
5 See for instance, Policy Exchange, ‘Judicial Power Project’ <https://judicialpowerproject.org.uk> accessed 29 
September 2019. See also Ran Hirschl, ‘The Fuzzy Boundaries of (Un)Constitutionality: Two Tales of Political 
Jurisprudence’ (2012) 31 University of Queensland Law Journal 319. 
6 See, among others, Mark Elliott, Jack Williams and Alison Young (eds), The UK Constitution after Miller: Brexit and 
Beyond (Hart Publishing 2018). 
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The argument of this thesis is threefold; firstly, it is that federalism, once it is properly understood 
as a deeper claim beyond ‘state-form’, is less out of step with the UK’s constitution (especially 
given its history) than its critics might suggest. Secondly, devolution has institutionalised and 
constitutionalised the ‘self-rule’ element of federalism such that it can no longer be ignored by 
Westminster: the fundamentality of the change in territorial constitutionalism may have been 
downplayed because of its implementation, but this has not deterred the courts—nor should it 
deter the political institutions—from recognising the significance of devolution. Thirdly, the 
suggestion that federalism is a ‘mentality’ means that it can help reflect the problems with the UK’s 
decentralisation programme, and the nature of the intergovernmental relationships that have 
formed as a result. The suggestion here is that, though some institutions do exist to realise that 
other core element of federalism, shared rule, the absence of a federal mentality at Westminster 
that accepts (or even encourages) the fundamentality of the devolved institutions and respects 
their views, mean that the full benefit of shared rule is not yet realised. This is especially so given 
the dominance of political mechanisms throughout the settlement, and Westminster’s retention of 
significant, if perhaps only de jure power. And, it is contended, the benefits this mindset are 
considerable. 
 
In terms of structure, this thesis is formed of three chapters, the first of which has two core 
functions. Firstly, it undertakes an analysis of federalism, and secondly it is a genealogical enquiry 
into the UK’s constitutional past. It is important at the outset, since this thesis alludes to it 
throughout, to undertake an assessment of what federalism means, and what some have thought 
it might mean. It will be seen that a proper understanding of the concept warrants far more interest 
in the UK than it has been given and makes its rejection—especially in the 19th Century—
unjustified. It suggests that federal scholarship is moving away from the limited ‘state-form’ 
approach and towards a deeper, more flexible (in some cases normative) approach to the concept. 
It also sews the seeds of the aspects of devolution that might be considered in some way ‘federal’. 
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Following its analysis of the better and worse understandings of federalism, this first chapter will 
consider how the union came to be, and what that might mean for present practices. Notably, it 
suggests that the UK has not been as stable as some might assume; it has been marked by 
important attempts at decentralisation and has always battled with competing understandings of 
the state but, for various reasons, has navigated these without asking the more existential questions 
about the union’s purpose or its nature resulting in the rejection of federalism and its benefits. In 
the second chapter, devolution will be explored as a legal-political structure that has, along with 
increasing ‘constitutionalisation’ in the UK more generally, fundamentally changed the UK in a 
way that requires recognition at the centre. At its core, devolution is a recognition that the 
territories have a right to their own views, both of themselves and, by extension, of their place in 
the union. Devolution means therefore that such views cannot be denied, especially by 
Westminster, if it is to continue to persuade the territories that they are ‘better together’.7 Taken 
together these chapters show that, despite the fundamental shifts in the UK’s territorial 
constitution, reform that might reshape the UK as a whole has not been forthcoming. Leyland 
suggests that even that most recent attempt at reconstitution—devolution—‘was not undertaken 
as part of a wider strategy of constitutional transformation’, but rather ‘represented a distinct and 
pragmatic attempt to solve particular problems and aspirations’.8 This pragmatism has been a 
persistent and powerful force throughout the UK’s history, allowing the influence of the less 
welcome forces of short-sightedness and limited political ambition. That the UK’s constitution 
can be altered by mere political weather or climate is one of its defining features,9 yet it is also one 
of its most destabilising. It is arguable that no real constitutional ‘thinking’ or ‘conscience’ has ever 
gone into reforming the architecture of the state, and that, instead, it has been tweaked or 
overturned in pursuit of what is most convenient for those in or seeking power. Having already 
 
7 This phrase was the slogan of the ‘No’ campaign during the Scottish Independence Referendum. 
8 Peter Leyland, ‘The Multifaceted Constitutional Dynamics of U.K. Devolution’ (2011) 9 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 251, 251–252. 
9 I am grateful to Dr Benedict Douglas for his interesting distinction between ‘constitutional climate change’ and the 
more temporary, changeable (and far less dangerous) ‘constitutional weather’. 
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outlined what federalism has come to mean, and how the concept speaks to deeper claims about 
the accommodation of diversity rather than prescription of institutional forms, the final chapter 
considers what lessons of federalism—when properly understood—can benefit the institutions 
and interactions at the heart of the UK’s territorial constitution. It will be seen that the focus on 
unitary sovereignty obscures engagement with different perspectives and deters rather than 
encourages shared rule which, will be seen, is the most significant benefit of federal ‘thinking’.  
 
Now that the structure of the piece has been determined it is worth taking the time to outline 
some core themes and argumentative ‘threads’ that run through it. Possibly the strongest of these 
are the themes of diversity, respect and subordination, and cooperation. In the first chapter it will 
be seen that federalism is itself the acceptance—and the pursuit of accommodating—diversity. 
Federal ‘thinking’ suggests that constitutional structures can allow for the distribution of authority 
along the lines of the diversities within a community; for instance, along the lines of sub-state 
national ‘units’. It suggests that the exchange of the perspectives of these institutions should be 
encouraged and they should be respected. The first chapter, however, demonstrates how this 
respect and exchange was not at the heart of the UK’s foundation, which was marred by England’s 
subjugation and subordination of those other nations and their ideas of the union. However, this 
chapter also demonstrates that the union is, itself, a demonstration of the (attempted) 
accommodation of diversity, at the very least being a battleground for different conceptions of the 
state. In chapter 2 it will be seen that this accommodation reaches new heights of 
constitutionalisation. It is through devolution that these diversities are finally enshrined by both 
political and legal mechanisms, and cooperation between them becomes significant. This chapter 
will also demonstrate that Westminster’s subordinating approach—arguably informed by, again, 
the UK’s preference for piecemeal development over existential re-constitution—does not do 
justice to the federal characteristics of the union or the significance of the role now played by the 
devolved institutions, something which has in fact been well recognised by the courts. It will be 
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seen that this unitary approach to the territorial constitution harms the cooperative opportunities 
offered by devolution and this cooperation is the central focus of the third chapter which 
demonstrates the advantages of adopting a cooperative, accommodating perspective of the union, 
one that must be adopted by Westminster in order to be effective. 
 
It is hoped that this work can provide an informative, interesting and (with luck) useful addition 
to scholarship in an area that’s importance necessitates far more exploration than it is currently 
gifted. This thesis will not be able to answer every question it raises, and, though there is value 
nonetheless in raising awareness of the problems facing the constitution, it is hoped that this work 
will help shape new enquiries and responses in this field of law; indeed this thesis, it is hoped, 
















10 Crerar, Walker and Brooks (n 2). 
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CHAPTER 1 
FROM INTEGRATION TO AUTONOMY? 
‘The only direct utility of legal history… lies in the lesson that each generation has an  
enormous power of shaping his own laws. I don’t think that the study of legal history would  
make men fatalists; I doubt it would make them conservatives: I am sure it would free them  





The UK constitution has, throughout its long history, undergone considerable change. Though its 
salient constitutional fundamentals are often regarded as unchanging, for instance: the separation 
of the courts and Parliament,12 the political accountability of ministers to Parliament and, of course, 
parliamentary sovereignty itself. Yet equally, much of the constitution has historically been in an 
almost perpetual state of flux. The UK’s is a constitution that is not ‘amended’ in the same way 
that codified ones can be. Instead, its constitutional shifts are more subtle, less explosive or 
revolutionary, but no less fundamental. Much like many other constitutions in the world, the UK’s 
can transform by interpretation alone, or under the noses of even those charged with its care. The 
territorial constitution is no exception, having perhaps undergone the most transformative, far-
reaching and constant changes in the UK’s constitutional history. Territorial constitutional change 
has found expression in terms not only of the shifting shape of the UK itself, but also in 
understandings of its nature and its practical operation. Before considering the constitutional 
history of the UK, this chapter will consider the most significant theory for accommodating 
constitutional diversity: federalism. It briefly considers the history of the theory and reveals why 
 
11 Letter from Frederic Maitland to Albert Venn Dicey (13 July 1909); Hugh Tulloch, ‘A. V. Dicey and The Irish 
Question: 1870-1922’ (1980) 15 Irish Jurist 137, 164. 
12 This principle is ‘embodied’ in Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 according to R (HS2 Action Alliance Limited) v The 
Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3, [2014] 1 WLR 324 [79] (Lord Reed). 
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this ‘state-form’ assumption took hold. It then considers what federalism is coming to mean, in 
line with a new school of thinking that sees it as a flexible, perhaps even normative concept that 
can better inform constitutional practice—and even deeper sociological realities—than the legalist 
definition ever could.  
 
This chapter then seeks to outline the genealogy of the territorial constitution; it suggests that the 
UK has often found difficulty in reconciling its centralised vision of sovereignty with communities’ 
desires for self-rule, with theory (especially in England) more obviously being constructed to 
support the former over the latter. It briefly traces the beginnings of the UK, formed through 
blood, conquest and treaty, before turning to the next significant question for the territorial 
constitution: Irish Home Rule. This, mapping closely onto questions about the future of the 
Empire led to a great deal of thought on the layers of legitimate authority and, ultimately, the 
circumvention of an existential crisis. As this is unpacked it will become clear that competing 
notions of constitutionalism, assumptions about rigidity and stability, along with the avoidance of 
such existential questions has led also to the unnecessary rejection of federalism. This rejection of 
federalism, it will be suggested, can also be partly blamed on a misconstruction of the concept as 
a prescriptive, legalist mechanism that’s requirements are beyond accommodation in the UK, as 
well as the dominance of English perspectives of the union. 
 
The evasion of the territorial question raises its head again in the next section, the first, ill-fated 
attempts at devolution under the Labour Government of the 1970s, with referendums introduced 
in 1979. It will be seen that the fact that no grand planning permeates reform of the UK does not 
mean to say that there has been no thematic development or traceable trajectory. It will here be 




THE IDEA OF FEDERALISM 
 
Before undertaking an exploration of the UK’s own history, it is necessary to consider federalism, 
one of the central ideas in multilevel constitutionalism. This is necessary in order to highlight those 
elements of the UK’s history, and its current constitutional settlement that have federal 
characteristics, as well as in order to make sense of the misunderstanding, considered later in this 
chapter, that led to federalism’s neglect in the UK. To put the point at its glibbest, federalism is 
complicated.13 It is an idea that has consumed a great deal of historical, legal and political theory 
for centuries and, along with it, ideas of state-form and constitutionalism in the round. The UK’s 
own relationship with federalism has been uneasy, marred by mistiming, theoretical dogma and its 
apparent incompatibility with parliamentary sovereignty. Federalism, it will be seen, was quickly 
dismissed in British constitutional thought; it was neither instrumental during the creation of the 
United Kingdom, nor influential on its development, being denied a role to play in Irish Home 
Rule and generally seen as out of step with the UK’s history: Wales subsumed, the Scottish 
Parliament abolished, and Ireland conquered; not quite the alliance seemingly required by the fœdus 
at federalism’s core. The theory has also struggled to win supporters in the contemporary 
constitution where parliamentary sovereignty reigns, and the relations between the tripartite 
separation of powers are seemingly more worthy of attention than the territorial layers of 
governance.14 Further, the dominance of England, both in terms of democratic representation and 
of political ideology, seems to make a balanced allocation of powers between territories 
unsustainable. These stumbling blocks have, however, not silenced scholars who consider time 
focussed on the UK’s relationship with ‘the federal idea’ not to be time wasted.15 However, it also 
continues to draw scholarly crowds who find it useful both as a way of defining what the UK has 
 
13 ‘Conceptualising federalism is contentious and difficult.’: Nicholas Aroney, The Constitution of a Federal Commonwealth: 
The Making and Meaning of the Australian Constitution (CUP 2009) 17.  
14 Although, for an interesting commentary on the relationship between the two principles, see Jessica Bulman-Pozen, 
‘Federalism as a Safeguard to the Separation of Powers’ (2012) 112 Columbia Law Review 459. 
15 A formidable example of such attention, from which this phrase is also drawn, can be found in the form of Robert 
Schütze and Stephen Tierney (eds), The United Kingdom and the Federal Idea (Hart Publishing 2018). 
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become in the wake of its new territorial constitution, and as a way of understanding what further 
changes might be needed. Federalism seems, in these instances, to be consigned to tasks to which 
it, on a proper assessment of the theory, it is not wholly suited: definition and prescription. It often 
fails on both counts: that ‘federalism still encounters strong resistance from British political parties, 
who claim its complete extraneousness to the peculiar political conditions of the United 
Kingdom’16 is a common theme to be detected in literature of both scholarly and policy design. 
However, it is here suggested that federalism has more to offer than merely definition and 
prescription; rather, it can be useful for us to understand how the UK operates and how its 
problems might be better tackled, by thinking in federal terms. The following discussion will 
therefore explore what federalism really means and how a proper understanding of it does not 
warrant its exclusion from constitutional thinking in the UK. 
 
What is federalism? The first thing that must be noted is the lexicological minefield that surrounds 
the concept: federalism, federation, confederation, federacy, quasi-federal, among others, all seem 
very clearly to be talking in federal terms, but about subtly different things.17 Indeed, it will be seen 
that it was not always clear what people meant when they said federalism or, indeed, if they meant 
the same thing, and this was a death-knell for the theory’s popularity at the time of the Irish Home 
Rule crisis. However, this problem continues to persist, with scholars disagreeing on exactly what 
federalism is, and each seeming to have their own definition, or even their own terminology; 
‘federality’, for instance, is the term uniquely used by Henry Sidgwick, of which he thought the US 
 
16 Simone Pelizza, ‘“What Federalism Is Not”: British Imperialists and Ireland, 1910-22’ (History Postgraduate 
Colloquium, University of Leeds 2012) 11. 
17 This linguistic ambiguity is not helped by Constitutions themselves: ‘It should be added that the original text [of the 
Swiss Constitution] even in a single language is by English standards carelessly drafted. The same expression (e.g. 
‘Federal supervision’) is occasionally used to describe different things, while the same thing (e.g. ‘within the Federal 
competence alone’) is rendered by a number of different expressions… without plan and without consistency between 
the French and German text. Swiss jurists, however, in general refrain from making distinctions where the authors of 
the Constitution intended none, unless for good cause… The German text uses the words ‘Bund’ and 
‘Eidgenossenschaft’ indifferently, and these are both usually translated by Confédération in French, with the adjective 
fédéral. ‘Eidgenossenschaft’ means literally ‘oath-fellowship’, that is to say, a society formed by oath rather than, for 
example, contract.’: Christopher Hughes, The Federal Constitution of Switzerland (Clarendon 1945) 1–2. 
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constituted the ‘decisive model’.18 Much time and ink has been spent trying to define the concept, 
and the work often begins at the origins of the word itself.19 From the Latin term ‘fœdus’, meaning 
‘pact’, ‘federal’ seems to have its origins in a voluntary agreement between states to unify. Despite 
its Latin origins, ‘there was no theory of federalism in antiquity; and in the medieval world,20 the 
federal principle found but little light to grow. Modern federalism emerged [(perhaps ironically)] 
with the rise of the European State system.’21 As for the ancient world, ‘[i]n Greek political 
philosophy, the federation or koinon is overshadowed by the city-state or polis,[…]. In Imperial 
Rome, the foedus was a treaty of alliance by which imperial Rome secured its aggrandizement. The 
political communities sworn into alliance—the con-federati—would promise help in times of 
emergencies and crisis.’22 
 
The origins of the theory have been studied by lawyers and political scientists alike, yet it is the 
lawyerly approach to the concept which is demonstrated in its most conventional definition: 
 
‘The basic idea is that of a political system in which governmental power is divided between 
two territorially defined levels of government, guaranteed by a written constitution and 
arbitrated by an institution independent of the two spheres of government, usually a court of 
final jurisdiction.’23 
 
In the English-speaking world, examples of support for this definition, or something very similar, 
are not difficult to obtain. The most influential is probably KC Wheare’s which he outlined in his 
 
18 Henry Sidgwick, The Development of the European Polity (Macmillan and Company 1903) 430. 
19 For instance, Solomon Rufus Davis, The Federal Principle: A Journey through Time in Quest of a Meaning (University of 
California Press 1978); R Koselleck, ‘Bünd-Bündis, Föderalismus, Bundesstaat’ in O Brunner, W Conze and R 
Koselleck (eds), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, vol 1 (Klett 
Verlag); Murray Forsyth, Unions of States: The Theory and Practice of Confederation (Leicester University Press 1981); B 
Voyenne, Histoire de l’idée Federalist: Les Sources (Presses d’Europe, 1973). 
20 ‘The Middle Ages preferred adding the prefix ‘con’ to ‘federal’. This was a pleonasm designed to underline that an 
association was formed by men ‘with’ other men,’: Robert Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing 
Structure of European Law (OUP 2009) 14. 
21 ibid. 
22 ibid. 




in his seminal work entitled Federal Government. This work, in which he attempted to unpick the 
American experience of federalism and contrast it to that of the UK, defined ‘the federal principle’ 
as ‘the method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each within a 
sphere co-ordinate and independent’.24 This is not dissimilar from the approaches of Dicey or 
Bryce,25 and has been popular with others such as Finer, Bodganor and Rudden.26 Dicey made the 
claim that ‘[f]ederalism, lastly, means legalism’27 and that ‘[m]odern federalism is indeed little short 
of a discovery or invention in the art of constitutional architecture, and may be looked upon as a 
curious and complicated legal mechanism.’28 Clearly this legalistic definition has appeal, perhaps at 
least ‘on account of its simplicity and scope’,29 and that as a formula it is broad, general and ‘is 
thought to capture an important set of features of a wide range of political systems that are 
commonly regarded as being ‘federal’ in nature.’30 However, this approach seems somewhat 
circular, and simultaneously both too broad and too narrow. Aroney, for instance, criticises this 
conventional approach for its failure to account for the modern ‘marble-cake’ operation of 
federalism, and that it fails to provide for any particular power allocation.31  
 
The ‘federal principle’ then quickly ‘comes to represent a legal structure which attempts to find 
“unity in diversity”’.32 The evolution of the theory, in collision with geo-political circumstances—
such as wars of independence (or not)—pushed the theory into three distinct waves.33 The first 
 
24 KC Wheare, Federal Government (4th edn, OUP 1963) 11. Tierney calls this the ‘classical test’: Stephen Tierney, 
‘Drifting Towards Federalism? Appraising the Constitution in Light of the Scotland Act 2016 and Wales Act 2017’ in 
Robert Schütze and Stephen Tierney (eds), The United Kingdom and the Federal Idea (Hart Publishing 2018) 107. 
25 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th edn, Macmillan 1920) 134–67, 476–80; James Bryce, 
The American Commonwealth (Macmillan 1914) i, 432. 
26 Samuel Finer, Vernon Bogdanor and Bernard Rudden, Comparing Constitutions (Clarendon Press 1995) 6, 372–6; 
Aroney, The Constitution of a Federal Commonwealth: The Making and Meaning of the Australian Constitution (n 13) 17. 
27 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (9th edn, Macmillan 1939) 175. 
28 AV Dicey, ‘Federal Government’ (1885) 1 Law Quarterly Review 80, 80 (emphasis added); Pelizza (n 16) 4. 
29 Aroney, The Constitution of a Federal Commonwealth: The Making and Meaning of the Australian Constitution (n 13) 17. 
30 ibid 18. 
31 ibid. 
32 Schütze (n 20) 14. 
33 For this observation I am grateful to Professor Schütze. For a far more thorough and insightful account of 
federalism’s evolution than can be offered here, see ibid 15–40. 
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prioritised the idea of indivisible sovereignty, but this could not do justice to certain ‘constitutional 
oddities’: ‘In order to bring Federal Unions into line with the new idea of State sovereignty… they 
were forced into a conceptual dichotomy: they were either an international (con)federation or a 
sovereign unitary State’.34 This reading saw federalism as a contractual relationship between 
independent states and pushed the concept into the international plane leading to philosophers 
like Kant to suggest that peace should be ‘formally instituted’ in a federation on that plane.35 From 
this came an intermediate second stage, the result of the intensity of the theoretical challenge posed 
by the American Union, which saw federalism as a “middle ground’ between international and 
national organisational principles.’36 Here, a dramatic terminological transformation took place in 
order to realise ‘the mad ‘project of visionary young men’’37 to create a ‘more perfect union’ distinct 
from the earlier attempt which was clearly (albeit with some caveats)38 in the form of the first, 
international reading of federalism. In that first iteration of the US Constitution, the ‘Articles of 
Confederation and Perpetual Union’, ‘[e]ach state retains its sovereignty, freedom and 
independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation 
expressly delegated […]’.39 Madison, through formidable linguistic and analytical footwork, argued 
that the new Union would be distinct from the old in being more of a ‘constitution’ than a treaty, 
ratified by people(s) rather than governments;40 it would have a majority-voting amendment 
procedure, representatives of both the states themselves and their peoples, and provide for the 
federal government to have powers of limited scope (and therefore not of ‘national’, unlimited 
scope, even though the nature of the powers themselves would be of national character). This 
 
34 ibid 17. 
35 Immanuel Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’ in HS Reiss (ed), Political Writings (CUP 1991) 98, 102–4. 
36 Schütze (n 20) 15. 
37 Pacificus [FS Oliver], ‘The Constitutional Conference - VI: Federal Home Rule’ The Times (1910) 9; Pelizza (n 16) 
8. 
38 See Schütze (n 20) 22. 
39 Articles of Confederation 1777 Article II. Schütze (n 20) 22. 




‘mixed character’ of the new Union41 came to define federalism, with the American experience 
remaining influential even in the contemporary.42 The meaning of the word ‘federal’ changed hands 
from a disintegrated, international contract to a more ‘middle-ground’ idea, one which divided 
sovereignty between the States and the Union itself, and where ‘[t]wo sovereignties are necessarily 
in presence of each other’.43 However, this, upon its importation across the Atlantic, was too much 
for nineteenth century Europe’s ‘obsession with sovereign States’44 and, in its third stage, 
federalism became embroiled in the European traditions of indivisible sovereignty and, as a 
consequence, the equivocation of federalism with a particular kind of state: ‘Federation here came 
to mean Federal State.’45 
 
Federalism as a state-form (whether called ‘federation’ or not) has a degree of magnetism: it allows 
us to distinguish between different types of governance structures, the degree of centralisation or 
of decentralised authority, as well as allowing us to make sense of the territorial structure of the 
state, for instance whether or not it recognises regional diversities. However, it is clear that the 
binary distinction between unitary states and federal ones is an oversimplification. What about 
those constitutions that have territorial structures, constitutionally recognised, but not to the extent 
of a divided sovereignty? Spain, Italy and the UK for instance all pose challenges for this binary 
system, weakening its analytical value. What about those unions also that are far ‘looser’, requiring 
unanimity for constitutional amendment and perhaps providing for unilateral secession of the 
 
41 James Madison, ‘No. 39’ in Terence Ball (ed), Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist (CUP 
2003) 185. 
42 See for instance, Kalypso Nicolaidis and Robert Howse (eds), The Federal Vision (OUP 2001); which compares the 
European experience to the definitive one of the US. 
43 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol 1 (Phillips Bradley ed, Vintage 1954) 172. 
44 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (CUP 2005) ch 4; Schütze (n 20) 30. 
45 The result, Schütze suggests, is the distinction between confederation and federation: Schütze (n 20) 15. He also 
notes that ‘[o]riginally, the two concepts were synonyms.’: ibid 30. Martin Diamond, ‘The Federalist’s View of 
Federalism’ in George CS Benson (ed), Essays in Federalism (Claremont College Press 1962) 1274: ‘The Federalist and 
the whole founding generation saw no more difference between confederalism and federalism than we see, say, 




component territories? This latter question has been considered at length in the literature, with 
scholars grappling with the distinction between a ‘federal state’ (Bundesstaat) and a ‘confederation’ 
(Staatenbund). This distinction, for some time, seemed to rest of the location of supremacy within 
the system. As Hughes puts it, ‘[t]he claim that the Cantons are sovereign stands or falls with the 
claim that the Constitution is a contract’46 owing itself to this distinction between confederation 
and federation. 
 
However, this categorisation of states into federations, confederations and unitary states is not as 
persuasive as its simplicity might suggest. When one is aware of the variations, the degrees to 
which each category can vary, and the extent one bleeds into another, it becomes very difficult to 
sustain. It is certainly conceivable that at the extremes of the spectrum of integration there are 
definitive characteristics: at one extreme lies an homogenous unit with one locus of authority and 
of sovereignty; at the other a disintegrated collection of ‘states’, similar to the international order, 
each with their own legally equal independent spheres of government. Despite it not being 
necessitated by the European idea of indivisible sovereignty,47 ‘[w]hile American federalism 
accepted gradations on the spectrum between a (con)federation and a unitary State, semantic 
fluidity was unacceptable to European conceptual legal science (Begriffsjurisprudenz).’48 For Kelsen, 
though, ‘[w]hat distinguished the one from the other was only their degree of (de)centralization.’49 
To him, there is little value in trying to distinguish between those systems that inhabit the middle-
ground: they all exist on a spectrum, exhibiting varied characteristics and satisfying various 
theoretical requirements, transcending any useful intermediary boundaries. Any system that exists 
between the extremes of unitarism or disintegration must, on Kelsen’s logic, be ‘federal’, that is to 
say that they, to some extent, divide power amongst recognised composite communities. Schmitt 
 
46 Hughes (n 17) 3. 
47 See Hans Kelsen, Das Problem Der Souveränität Und Die Theorie Des Völkerrechts (Mohr 1920) 64–6. 
48 Schütze (n 20) 32; where Kelsen’s ideas are explored at length. 




pushed this question further in pursuit of undermining ‘the tautological nature of European federal 
thought’,50 looking to the federal principles behind the ‘two’ concepts. For him, the more useful 
question is not what a federation is, but what federalism is, since this was what informed ‘both’ ideas 
(of federation and confederation).51 For Schmitt, it was the ‘dualism’ endorsed by federalism that 
was key: federalism meant a foundational treaty that was both international and national in 
character, law that existed on both levels, and a dual political existence: ‘In each federal union, two 
kinds of political bodies co-exist: the existence of the whole federation and the individual existence 
of each federal member. Both kinds of political existence must remain coordinate in order for the 
federal union to remain alive.’52 For Schmitt, the sovereignty question was necessarily suspended 
in a federal union too.53 
 
Clearly, embarking on an analysis that sees federalism as a simple state-form is no easy task, since 
it quickly becomes entangled in ideas of statism and sovereignty that make its crucial endorsement 
of a ‘halfway house’ difficult to explain or justify.54 And so scholars must, as Schmitt did, consider 
what these federal characteristics are. Certainly, modern scholarship is quickly endorsing a view of 
federalism as a deeper principle than simply a descriptive claim about how power is distributed 
within a state.55 This claim has been made through an illumination, as before, of the terminological 
distinctions at play. Some of these are highlighted by Burgess: firstly, between the federal ‘principle’ 
 
50 ibid 38. 
51 See generally ibid. 
52 Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (Robert Schütze tr, Duncker & Humblot 2003) 376–8; Schütze (n 20) 39. 
53 Schmitt (n 52) 376–8; Schütze (n 20) 39–40. 
54 Daniel Elazar makes the following claim, noteworthy for its distinction between federalism and federation: 
‘Federation, indeed, is federalism applied to constitutionally defuse power within the political system of a single nation. 
Federation became synonymous with modern federalism because the modern epoch was the era of the nation-state 
when, in most of the modern world, the ideal was to establish a single centralized state with indivisible sovereignty to 
serve single nations or peoples.’: Daniel J Elazar, Constitutionalizing Globalization: The Postmodern Revival of Confederal 
Arrangements (Rowman & Littlefield 1998) 39. Elazar’s contention is that federalism can be applied beyond just the 
state, and that federalism is not necessarily followed by federation.  
55 See Raffaele Bifulco, ‘Federalism’ in Roger Masterman and Robert Schütze (eds), The Cambridge Companion to 
Comparative Constitutional Law (CUP 2019). 
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and the federal ‘spirit’, and secondly, between ‘federalism’ and ‘federation’.56 The broadness of the 
stroke to define federalism as including all of these aspects is troublesome, and is the reason that 
scholars like Burgess have gone to such lengths to distinguish between them. This distinction is 
not new, even Dicey referred to ‘the federal spirit’ as ‘the principle of definition and limitation of 
powers harmonises so well with the federal spirit that it is generally carried much farther than is 
dictated by the mere logic of the constitution’.57 The claim of this branch of scholarship, however, 
is that federalism is clearly something deeper than a state-form. Not only this, but it is surely 
something that can inform things other than just states.58 There are, it can easily be claimed, ‘federal 
dynamics’ existent in systems and structures beyond states. For instance, international 
organisations can be in some way federal,59 and there are, in just the same way, federal dynamics 
in states that might not obviously regard themselves as federal (or apparently federal states that do 
not exhibit federal characteristics).60 
 
Some scholars have taken the concept much further, suggesting that federalism is a social 
phenomenon recognised (and enhanced) by these organisational structures, rather than simply 
being a way of understanding those structures themselves. To these scholars, the crux of federalism 
is a kind of territorial (or even sociological) plurality. This means that what others recognise as 
federal institutions—dual or cooperative governments, federal and territorial legislatures and 
 
56 Of the first, see Michael Burgess, In Search of the Federal Spirit: New Comparative, Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives 
(OUP 2012). Of the second, see Michael Burgess, Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice (Routledge 2006). 
57 Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (n 25) 152 (emphasis added). 
58 See Armin Cuyvers, ‘The EU as a Confederal Union of Sovereign Member Peoples: Exploring the Potential of 
American (Con)Federalism and Popular Sovereignty for a Constitutional Theory of the EU’ (PhD, Leiden University 
2013). 
59 See Roger Masterman, ‘Federal Dynamics of the UK/Strasbourg Relationship’ in Robert Schütze and Stephen 
Tierney (eds), The United Kingdom and the Federal Idea (Hart Publishing 2018). 
60 Jan Erk, ‘Austria: A Federation Without Federalism’ (2004) 34 Publius: The Journal of Federalism 1. The debate 
over the federal nature of the European Union one is not an unfamiliar one to many, but to Professor Schütze at least, 
‘[t]he European Union is indeed based on a conception of divided sovereignty and in strictness neither international 
nor national, ‘but a composition of both’. It represents an (inter)national phenomenon that stands on—federal—
middle ground.’ Schütze (n 20) 73; Alan Dashwood, ‘The Relationship between the Member States and the European 
Union/Community’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 355, 356: ‘a federation of sovereign States’; Tanja Börzel 
and Thomas Risse, ‘Who Is Afraid of European Federation? How to Constitutionalise a Multi-Level Governance 




administrations, differing legal rules across and within the State and clearly enforced or recognised 
boundaries within the State—are reflective of deeper sociological undercurrents. To scholars such 
as Livingstone and Elazar, these ‘instrumentalities’, as the former calls them,61 are separate from 
the characteristics of a State (‘diversities’) that make them necessary.  To Livingstone particularly, 
‘[t]he student of federalism must probe deeper than the institutional patterns, for these are but the 
products of the diversities in the society; it is to the pattern of these diversities that we must go if 
we would assess the federal qualities of the society.’62 However, this is not to suggest that the 
examination purely of legal structures is ink wasted,63 rather, as he rightly suggests, the legal 
structures in place are illustrative (but not definitive) of federal characteristics. Livingstone 
intriguingly suggests that these characteristics are likely to have a powerful symbiotic relationship 
with a state’s institutional forms (its ‘instrumentalities’): ‘The Constitution, which endows the 
states with the characteristics of diversity, treats them indiscriminately and thus tends to create 
diversity where none previously existed.’64 And so it is that not only can federal structures 
themselves encourage federal attitudes, as has arguably been the case in Wales,65 but also that the 
very existence and support for these institutions is something which forms a considerable part of 
these federal attitudes. Thus, ‘[i]t is no longer merely an instrumentality serving to protect and 
articulate the diversities; it has itself become a part of that complex of values which is the pattern 
 
61 Livingstone’s use of ‘instrumentalities’ is broad, he suggests that ‘the word includes not only the constitutional forms 
but also the manner in which the forms are deployed; it includes the way in which the constitution and its institutions 
are operated. Beyond this, moreover, it includes many things that are far from constitutional in importance in the 
ordinary sense of the word. It includes things such as habits, attitudes, acceptances, concepts and even theories.’ 
Essentially the distinction is between the social distinctiveness of a territory, and how it finds formal expression; the 
former being what he terms ‘diversities’ and the latter being the ‘instrumentalities’: William S Livingstone, ‘A Note on 
the Nature of Federalism’ (1952) 67 Political Science Quarterly 81, 91. 
62 ibid 95. 
63 Livingstone does acknowledge the problem here: ‘Thus the problem of the student of federalism is made much 
more difficult, for he cannot clearly distinguish between society and the instrumentalities it employs.’: ibid. 
64 He uses the US as an example: ‘Although at the time of their entry these later states may not have been sufficiently 
diversified to justify such special treatment, they rapidly acquired such consciousness of individuality that they would now 
be unwilling to part with the instrumentalities that permit the expression of that individuality. It is doubtful that the 
two Dakotas warranted the dignity of separate statehood at the time of their entry into the union; but who can deny 
now that, having lived as states for a number of years, they would look with disfavour upon any proposal to deprive 
them of their individuality by merging them into one?’ ibid (emphasis added). 
65 Initial support for Welsh devolution was very low, whereas now the support of its continued existence and the 
enhancement of it is considerable. 
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of diversities and which determines the pattern of the instrumentalities.’66 The creation of federal 
structures therefore directly affects the existence, or otherwise, of federal sensibilities within a 
community.67 Aroney has used Australia as a good example of this, with the formative base of the 
federal mentality going on to directly orchestrate the creation and functioning of the federal system 
there.68 It is unwise to think that emboldening regional institutions will not embolden regional 
senses of individuality, alert them to the benefits of self-government, or that they will not change 
the shape or essence of the union itself, or the various interpretations of it. Indeed, it is federalism’s 
ability to allow for such distinctions and continue to justify continued union that is one of its 
greatest magnetisms.  
 
A crucial lesson of this is federalism’s recognition of difference, of diversity and of change: ‘Society 
is never static but changes constantly in accordance with the interplay of the various dynamic 
forces within it’.69 That a constitution evolves to continue to represent these changes is a key raison 
d’être, especially—it is famously known—in the UK. It might seem that federalism points against 
flexibility, requiring, as Dicey recognised, a codified constitution.70 But this is to conflate, 
legalisation with federalism. Though constitutional rigidity might be necessary to ensure the stable 
division of powers, it is not a necessary precondition of federalism. This, of course, does not mean 
that federalism is a panacea for managing and balancing diversities and internal divisions—it causes 
far too much political discord and litigation to support such a claim—but it does provide a way of 
framing the questions.71 Debates follow about how much diversity can be accommodated, whether 
 
66 Livingstone (n 61) 95. 
67 Livingstone notes the problem ‘of the statesman; he cannot devise means to accomplish new ends without 
disturbing the old relationship, for the old means have themselves become ends and the old techniques have become 
values.’: ibid. 
68 Aroney, The Constitution of a Federal Commonwealth: The Making and Meaning of the Australian Constitution (n 13) 63. 
69 Livingstone (n 61) 93. 
70 It is important to avoid ‘[t]he intellectual error of supposing that a change or improvement in the form of the 
Constitution would remove evils due to social and economic causes’: Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution (n 25) 141, 175. Livingstone also, when demarking the traditional boundaries of scholarly engagement with 
federalism, notes how it seems to require that ‘the constitution must be rigid’: Livingstone (n 61) 82. 
71 AV Dicey, England’s Case Against Home Rule (3rd edn, John Murray 1887) 129. 
 
 26 
a territory is so distinct as to warrant its secession, where sovereignty lies within the system and 
how to reform or improve it, as well as the more pressing legal questions about who has what 
power, informed by dual or cooperative approaches to governance. These can be provided 
structure, frame and, in many cases, response flexibility by federalism. This might have an 
unsatisfactory obscurity to it, but it is important since the problem is then reframed as a political 
one, regaining the essential involvement of multiple perspectives, (the existence of which is a 
precondition for federalism itself), rather than silencing or dismissing as subordinate the views of 
minorities or peripheries, even where they clash with the views of the centre: 
 
These two demands or forces—the one impelling toward autonomy and independence for 
the component units, the other impelling toward centralization and the suppression of 
diversity—meet each other head on; the result of their conflict is the federal system. The 
federal system is thus an institutionalization of the compromise between these two demands, 
and the federal constitution draws the lines of this compromise.72 
 
Some academics, such as Livingstone and Aroney, have perhaps gone a little too far in broadening 
the definitional net of federalism such that it becomes difficult to find circumstances that do not 
meet its requirements. Their contention that federalism is borne from basic sociological realities is 
well-placed,73 but this is where federalism comes from, not what it is. If the principle is to be 
applied with any utility, it must be precise, and federalism especially has surely suffered enough at 
the hands of ambiguity and conceptual contestation. If it is to be of relevance as a constitutional 
theory, it must be clarified in those terms: the coexistence of multiple layers of legitimate authority 
within a single territory must be its essential claim. Subsidiarity is a principle which is quick to 
follow but this is a way of understanding the relationships between those authorities; it therefore 
requires that they exist, but federalism predicates their existence before subsidiarity can prescribe 
 
72 Livingstone (n 61) 90. 




how they should interact. It is often suggested that federalism lacks a distinctive, well-developed 
definition as a constitutional theory,74 and present discussion has perhaps done little to mitigate 
those challenges. But, as Tierney suggests, and in line with the recent trajectory of scholarship,75 it 
has been seen that federalism ‘is a more flexible device than it is often taken to be in British 
debates’.76 Rather than being a state form, it is an idea, ‘a variable template for different, but related 
forms of political practice’.77 This is not an uncontentious claim, and there are those who remain 
sceptical; Kyle Scott for instance, contends that ‘there is no theory of federalism’78 even though 
the problem is surely that there are too many theories of it. However, as modern scholarship has 
abandoned the ‘somewhat static and legalistic interpretation’ of Wheare and Dicey79 it has moved 
to understanding what federalism is for, beyond institutional forms, and what sociological 
phenomena it seeks to make sense of. It may go too far to suggest federalism is ‘innate’ in human 
relations, but it can surely be accepted that it is a way of encouraging and legitimising dualities that 
do exist within systems, at the very least as they find expression in institutional forms. It is this 
institutional recognition of pluralism and coexistence that is the core of federalism, and it is a 
recognition that the UK is sorely in need of. The claim that follows is simply this: the UK’s 
rejection of federalism is unjustified; it is based on a conception of federalism that extends to (and 
only to) a certain state-form when this clearly does not do the concept justice. However deep into 
 
74 Anna Gamper, ‘A “Global Theory of Federalism”: The Nature and Challenges of a Federal State’ (2005) 6 German 
Law Journal 1297, 1299; Tierney (n 24) 106. To Michael Burgess, there is ‘no fully fledged theory of federalism. At 
best there is a partial theory based upon rigorous conceptional analysis and the pursuit of terminological precision. At 
worst there is crass empiricism rooted in the failure to develop concepts and define the key terms.’: Burgess, 
Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice (n 56) 1. 
75 See Dimitrios Karmis and Wayne Norman (eds), Theories of Federalism (Palgrave-Macmillan 2005). 
76 Tierney (n 24) 106. 
77 ibid. 
78 Kyle Scott, Federalism; A Normative Theory and Its Practical Relevance (Continuum 2011) 1; See also Malcolm Feeley and 
Edward Rubin, On Federalism: Political Identity and Tragic Compromise (University of Michigan Press 2008). 
79 Michael Burgess, ‘Federalism and Federation’ in Michael Burgess and Alain Gagnon (eds), Comparative Federalism and 
Federation: Competing Traditions and Future Directions (Harvester Wheatshead 1993) 3–14; Dicey believed that federalism 
was merely (or at least primarily) about the definition and division of powers: Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law 




sociological waters one thinks the theory might extend,80 it is clear that it cannot be simply a state-
form81 and it therefore follows that its lessons, its ideas and its normative persuasions can be applied 
to the UK, since outright rejection can no longer be tenable. It is certainly the pursuit of homogony 
that rejects federalism, and the endorsement of pluralism that accepts it, whatever the given 
reasons (legitimate or otherwise) of this perceived homogeneity. 
 
Despite the perceived extraneousness of federalism to the UK the UK’s history has not been the 
pursuit of homogeneity and has borne the scars of a long conflict between its union and unitary 
conceptions. However, British thinking has been slow to realise the deeper meanings of federalism 
as the institutional accommodation of plurality, preferring instead the more prescriptive ‘state-
form’ approach which, coupled with disagreement about what exactly it prescribed, led to its 
marginalisation; a marginalisation that, it will be argued, is not fitting with either its constitutional 
past or present. 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL BEGINNINGS: THE UNITED KINGDOM(S) 
 
What exactly the United Kingdom is, was, or might become is a topic of furious debate amongst 
scholars, politicians, lawyers and citizens, from all parts of the UK. It is a question that is as 
important as it is old but this is not to suggest it is enigmatic—most of those groups seem to have 
an idea about what the UK is, or, at least what they think it ought to be, but it seems that they do 
not often agree.82 The ‘United Kingdom’ is not an ancient union, only taking its current form in 
 
80 That federalism (or unitarism) spoke to some deeper sociological phenomena was not lost on Dicey who, ‘perhaps 
unawares, imbibed Freeman’s racial justification for this methodology, that of proving the innate and unique capacity 
of Anglo-Saxon stock for spontaneous and ordered self-government’: Tulloch (n 11) 145.  
81 Even the early supporters of imperial federalism had adopted a notion of federalism that went beyond prescriptive 
state-form. For a comprehensive list of proponents and opponents, see Ged Martin, ‘Empire Federalism and Imperial 
Parliamentary Union, 1820-1870’ (1973) 16 The Historical Journal 65, 67–8. 
82 Although it is worth noting that there is some confusion about what exactly the UK means: ‘probe a little way and 
you find that what everyone thinks they know about the Union is decidedly fuzzy—especially in England. People in 
England have a lot of trouble with the nouns England, Britain, and United Kingdom and with the adjectives English 
and British. For a start, there are three nouns but only two adjectives—Tom Nairn's coinage Ukanian has never caught 
on.’ Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan, State of the Union (OUP 2005) 2. 
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1921 when the Irish Free State left the union. However, a United Kingdom had existed in these 
Islands long before. The apparently distinct cultural identities of Wales and England were the first 
to come to constitutional heads, as McLean and McMillan explain: 
 
Wales was unilaterally incorporated into England in 1536. It had never been a political unit. 
Eastern Wales, like eastern Ireland, had been governed by marcher lords licensed by English 
kings to control their western frontiers by whatever means they saw fit. But the writ of the 
barons of Ludlow or Montgomery never ran into northern and western Wales. Edward I 
conquered it and set up the massive castles at Caernarfon, Harlech, Beaumaris, and Conwy to 
keep the Welsh subdued. But Owain Glyndwr's revolt against English rule broke out in the 
early fifteenth century. Where Edward I had failed, Henry VIII, whose father had been a 
Welsh baron, succeeded. All institutions of separate Welshness disappeared, except the 
language and the culture. The Welsh language is still concentrated in the pockets of north and 
west Wales that Edward I found hardest to subdue.83 
 
Wales was, indeed, ‘subdued’ and assimilated rather than being accommodated as a separate 
constitutional entity.84 That England expanded to consume Wales as a Principality is represented 
by Wales’ lack of representation on both the union flag and the various official coats of arms of 
the UK.85 As will be seen, the impact of the lack of clearly defined historic ‘Wales’, and any 
constitutionally recognised distinction from England has had an impact on the territorial 
relationship between the two.86  
 
The story has been very different, however, for Scotland. Unlike Wales, Scotland has an historic 
claim to a monarchy, a Parliament, and what are regarded as core elements of nationhood such as 
 
83 ibid 1–2. 
84 See the seminal work, Frederic William Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (First Published 1908, CUP 
2008). 
85 Interestingly, however, ‘[i]n Scotland a different version of the Royal Standard is used, with two Scottish quarterings 
instead of two English quarterings’ ‘[n]ot a lot of people know that last fact.’: McLean and McMillan (n 82) 1. 
86 For instance, England and Wales have long been regarded as having the same legal system, though this may be 
changing: Richard Rawlings, ‘The Strange Reconstitution of Wales’ [2018] Public Law 62; Gwynedd Parry, ‘Is Breaking 




a permanent population, a defined territory, government and capacity to enter into relations with 
other states, as well as a legal system and a church.87 Though it was conquered by England, Scottish 
victory at the battle of Bannockburn in 1314 ensured this was not a permanent subjugation. Only 
when Queen Elizabeth I died and left no heir was King James VI of Scotland also crowned King 
James I of England.88 This ‘Union of the Crowns’ was merely a personal union and the Acts of 
Union of 1707 would be the real genesis of the more fundamental shift in the constitutional 
relationship between the two ‘states’.89 Before this union could be established, however, it needed 
to be necessary. Scotland’s economic fortunes had not been as strong as in its past: it had attempted 
to compete with English colonial designs with its own colony on Panama, but this failed at great 
economic cost and added to other economic pressures that made Scotland incapable of resisting 
the English pursuit of union.90 Though there was lively debate on either side of the border, the 
conclusion for the majority of politicians on both was that a Treaty of Union should be drafted, 
as it was in 1706, uniting the two states into one, and given domestic effect by an Act of Union in 
each Parliament.91 Scotland and England had differing ideas about how this union might work and 
what it might look like:  
 
 
87 The first four of these criteria are owed to Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention 1933, the latter two were crucial 
elements protected in the Acts of Union. See JD Ford, ‘The Legal Provisions in the Acts of Union’ (2007) 66 
Cambridge Law Journal 106. 
88 Despite his predecessor having his mother executed. This also means that the current Queen is only Queen 
Elizabeth I of Scotland, which has been something of a sore point for some Scottish nationalists: David McLean, 
‘Lost Edinburgh: The Queen and the Exploding Post Box’ The Scotsman (Edinburgh, 3 September 2014) 
<https://www.scotsman.com/lifestyle-2-15039/lost-edinburgh-the-queen-and-the-exploding-post-box-1-3529276> 
accessed 6 June 2019. Indeed it was the basis of the litigation in MacCormick v Lord Advocate [1953] SC 396. 
89 It is worth at this juncture indicating that the modern ‘state-centric’ system, with its basis in sovereignty and 
territorial control, as well as shared identification of borders, is often thought to have originated at the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648, but nonetheless the ideas of ‘statism’ and sovereignty were not as developed, or as universally 
recognised as they are today, see: Derek Croxton, ‘The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty’ 
(1999) 21 International History Review 569. 
90 ‘The Darien Scheme’ (so-called because it was established on the Gulf of Darien) was run by the Company of 
Scotland and backed by approximately 1/5th of all the money in Scotland, meaning its collapse was a catastrophe for 
the Scottish economy. The land that constituted it remains almost completely uninhabited. See Lord Sumption, ‘The 
Disunited Kingdom: England, Ireland and Scotland’ (Denning Society, Lincoln’s Inn, 5 November 2013) 10. 
91 King William had written as early as 1702 that ‘nothing can contribute more to the present and future peace, security, 
and happiness of England and Scotland than a firm and entire union between them.’: cited ‘Lords Journals xxii, p 57’ 
in AV Dicey and RS Rait, Thoughts on the Union between England and Scotland (Macmillan 1920) 125. 
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Scotland generally favoured a ‘federal’ union with two independent parliaments, while the 
federal idea was deeply irritating to England. For not only had seventeenth century English 
constitutional theory come to insist that sovereignty could not be divided; in political practice, 
there was no English appetite to ‘share’ power on equal terms.92 
 
In practice, however, the political dominance of England meant that the incorporating union 
presided, but the political and national identity of Scotland remained strong. Crucially, one 
Parliament was created to replace both of its predecessors, representing the united will of the 
nation(s).  Prominent supporters of the Union on both sides of the border suggested that the Acts 
were supreme, quasi-entrenched documents, semi-constitutional in their nature. Defoe, for 
example, suggested, 
 
[N]othing is more plain than that the articles of the Treaty…cannot be touched by the 
Parliament of Britain; and that the moment they attempt it, they dissolve their own 
Constitution; so it is a Union upon no other terms, and is expressly stipulated what shall, and 
what shall not, be alterable by the subsequent Parliaments. And, as the Parliaments of Great 
Britain are founded, not upon the original right of the people, as the separate Parliaments of 
England and Scotland were before, but upon the Treaty which is prior to the said Parliament, 
and consequently superior; so, for that reason, it cannot have power to alter its own 
foundation, or act against the power which formed it, since all constituted power is 
subordinate, and inferior to the power constituting.93 
 
This is reinforced by the text of the Acts themselves, which are at pains to ensure the permanence 
of the Union between the two nations. However, because of the dominance of the peculiarly 
English approach to constitutionalism, the status of the Acts of Union remains unclear. With its 
tradition of parliamentary sovereignty,  
 
 
92 Schütze and Tierney (n 15) 3; James Hodges, The Rights and Interests of the Two British Monarchies (Caledonia Coffee-
House 1703) 2–4, 8; Andrew Fletcher, State of the Controversy Betwixt United and Separate Parliaments (1706 — reprinted 
for the Saltire Society by Blackwood Publishing 1982); JR Tanner, English Constitutional Conflicts of the Seventeenth Century, 
1693–1689 (CUP 1962). 




[n]either the Act of Union with Scotland nor the Dentists Act, 1878, has more claim than the 
other to be considered a supreme law… each can be legally altered or repealed by 
Parliament… Should the Dentists Act, 1878, unfortunately contravene the terms of the Act 
of Union, the Act of Union would be pro tanto repealed.94  
 
Dicey’s ideas about the unrestricted remit of the Westminster Parliament are well known,95 but 
there were not so widely accepted at the time of the Acts. Scotland also had a different tradition 
of sovereignty to that of England, based on notions of popular sovereignty and,96 by Dicey’s own 
admission, division of sovereignty between the church and state.97 So it might seem that, not only 
are the Acts of Union (at least semi-) constitutional documents in Scottish eyes, protected from 
repeal, but they also suggest that the union is a consensual coming together of two sovereign 
nations who, by their ability to withdraw from the Treaty at the Acts’ core, can secede—in obvious 
contrast to Wales which had any sovereignty it previously might have possessed evaporated by its 
integration into England. However, though some have argued that Scotland might be able to 
unilaterally secede from the Union,98 this is not conventional wisdom.99 It is complicated by the fact 
that the Scottish Parliament, despite a brief period of consideration of separate, dual parliaments 
in Scotland and England,100 and much like its subsequent Irish equivalent, legislated for its own 
dissolution and for it to be replaced by a combined UK Parliament in Westminster (albeit in 
 
94 Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (n 27) 141. There is also suggestion within the Articles that 
they form part of a higher law, beyond the reach of Parliament itself: Union with England Act 1707 Art XXV: ‘That 
all Laws and Statutes in either Kingdom so far as they are contrary to or inconsistent with the Terms of these Articles 
or any of them shall from and after the Union cease and become void and shall be so declared to be by the respective 
Parliaments of the said Kingdoms. It is interesting to note that this declarative power is bestowed on the Parliaments 
rather than the courts. 
95 The oft-cited phrase being ‘Parliament… has the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further that no 
person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of 
Parliament.’ Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (n 27) 39–40. 
96 ‘the principle of unlimited sovereignty of Parliament is a distinctively English principle and has no counterpart 
in Scottish constitutional law.’: MacCormick v Lord Advocate (n 88) (Lord Cooper). 
97 Dicey and Rait (n 91) 21–22. 
98 Aroney, ‘Reserved Matters, Legislative Purpose and the Referendum on Scottish Independence’ (n 1). 
99 When this question arose in 2014 in the form of whether the Scottish Parliament had competence to initiate the 
referendum on its independence, the question was avoided by an Order in Council that gave Holyrood the competence 
for the referendum, if it did not already possess it.  
100 Dicey and Rait (n 91) 123–4. 
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exchange for additional representation there). However, the English Parliament also dissolved 
itself and was reestablished as the British Parliament on the same site;101 there was clear ambition 
to ensure that the union was ‘complete and intire’102 and this was to be achieved by making the 
island ‘subject to one Sovereignty and represented by one Parliament’.103 Therefore, it is 
predominantly the view (in England at least) that the Acts of Union, read together with the Articles, 
dissolved the old states and created a new one. The outcome was a situation where ‘[n]either the 
English nor Scottish Parliament could legislate for the new state of Great Britain.’104 Instead, this 
state, though it inherited characteristics of the old,105 was a new nation, and has in practice since 
preferred the Diceyan understanding of sovereignty. That said, Lord Cooper famously had 
‘difficulty in seeing why it should have been supposed that the new Parliament of Great Britain 
must inherit all the peculiar characteristics of the English Parliament but none of the Scottish 
Parliament’.106 It seems that the English view has dominated in practice, but in truth uncertainties 
remain and it is at the very clear that there is disagreement about the nature of the union at even 
the most fundamental levels.  
 
For Ireland, the picture was different still, yet played an even more considerable role in cementing 
English constitutional theory. It had received populations of Protestants since Elizabeth I, Lords 
of whom attempted to govern portions of the North of the island. Yet, its status remained 
disputed, with Calvin’s Case107 confirming its colonial subordination to England, while Irish 
 
101 The Act of Union 1707 is clear that ‘one kingdom’ had been created. ‘Importantly, and unlike Wales, Scotland was 
not ‘incorporated’ into England, but both England and Scotland were equally incorporated into the new state. 
However, for many this formal equality masked a marked political asymmetry, see only: AI Macinnes, Union and Empire: 
The Making of the United Kingdom (CUP, 2007) esp 5 as well as 316: ‘Scottish representation was less than that for the 
counties of Devon and Cornwall,  a tangible indication that Union marked the culmination of England’s intrusive 
hegemony throughout the seventeenth century.’: Robert Schütze, ‘Introduction: British “Federalism”?’ in Robert 
Schütze and Stephen Tierney (eds), The United Kingdom and the Federal Idea (Hart Publishing 2018) n 17.  
102 [sic] Union with Scotland (Amendment) Act 1707. 
103 ibid. 
104 Elizabeth Wicks, ‘A New Constitution for a New State? The 1707 Union of England and Scotland’ (2001) 117 Law 
Quarterly Review 109, 123. 
105 CR Munro, Studies in Constitutional Law (1st edn, Butterworths 1987) 65. 
106MacCormick v Lord Advocate (n 88) 411 (Lord Cooper). See also HL Deb 1 July 1997, vol 581, cols 117-120. 




thinking cast its relationship with England as more of an executive union of the monarchy, 
supported by the Irish House of Lords.108 England responded with a view that: 
 
Ireland was ‘a distinct kingdom, though a dependent subordinate kingdom’; and this meant, 
with regard to Westminster parliamentary sovereignty, that ‘where Ireland is particularly 
named, or is included under general words, they are bound by such acts of parliament.’ This 
British right to ‘superiority’ was seen to derive from ‘the right of conquest: a right allowed by 
the law of nations, if not by that of nature.’109 
 
And, despite a brief period of recognition of Ireland’s right to govern itself, it eventually joined 
the Union officially in 1800110 but its time there was short and tumultuous. Following persistent 
debates over ‘Irish Home Rule’, a civil war and a revolution, the Irish Free State emerged 
independent of the United Kingdom in 1921.  
 
History, then, has clearly shaped the Union in a number of ways. It is at the very least clear from 
the UK’s history that it has never been the monolithic unitary state some (particularly English) 
constitutional theorists might suggest. Instead, it has been shaped by union, secession, internal 
distinctiveness and competing ideas of what the union is, what it is for and how it should operate. 
Further, it has not remained unchanged since time immemorial, being instead in an almost 
permanent state of flux.111 Although its various Acts of Union have not been of the same pedigree 
as the Articles of Confederation in the United States, with the first Act of Union being born more 
out of political necessity than any idea of constitutionalism, this is not to say its history has been 
the pursuit of homogony. As King William suggested in 1702, the union was, at least for Scotland, 
negotiated.112 It was not solely the result of a conquest or absorption, being instead coordinated 
 
108 Thanks to Professor Schütze for this point: Schütze (n 101) 5; William Molyneux, The Case of Ireland Being Bound by 
Acts of Parliament in England, Stated (1698); MS Flaherty, ‘The Empire Strikes Back: Annesley v Sherlock and the 
Triumph of Imperial Parliamentary Sovereignty’ (1987) 87 Columbia Law Review 593. 
109 Schütze (n 101) 5. 
110 Act of Union 1800. 
111 See Michael Fry, The Union: England, Scotland and the Treaty of 1707 (Birlinn 2006). 
112 Dicey and Rait (n 91) 125. 
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by the Monarch, with the Parliaments each invited to draft Acts of Union and bound together by 
a peculiar combination of treaty and legislation. Scotland especially had its own interests protected 
in the Union: its own legal system, its church, its own educational system; it remained, as did 
Ireland, a distinct element within a larger whole, not dissolved. It must be forgiven, surely, that 
federal divisions of sovereignty did not enter the discourse at this time since it was only by way of 
a war of independence, an experiment in statecraft and a constitution later that The Federalist was 
able to gain persuasive influence in the United States.113 Some, such as Forsyth, have noted that 
there may have been comparative interest in the Helvetic Republic or the United Provinces of the 
Netherlands, but this would not form a template for the union.114 Yet, clearly the unions with 
England, at least of Scotland and Ireland, have been well within the realms of constitutional union, 
and not so extraneous to federal thinking as could be assumed. This presumption, and the 
dissonance between the views of England and the rest of the Union, as well as its insistence of 
avoiding the existential constitutional questions, were to come to heads in the ‘Irish Question’, 
explored next. 
 
THE IRISH QUESTION AND THE FEDERAL AVERSION 
 
As early as the 19th Century, regional governance had become a key question again with self-rule 
finding waves of support in the UK, perhaps in response to the growing centralisation of 
government more generally.115 One of the most significant attempts at institutionalising some kind 
of self-government was the Liberal Party’s divisive policy of giving home rule to Ireland, allowing 
 
113 The current Constitution of the United States is not, it is often forgotten, the first Constitution, but the second. 
The first, ‘The Articles of Confederation’ were more dependent on the consent of the Several States who each had a 
powerful veto. The Federalist, and the Constitution which followed it, by contrast vested some sovereignty in the federal 
Union. 
114 Forsyth (n 19). 
115 Lord Hodge, ‘Legal Implications, Advantages and Disadvantages of Independence, Devolution and Federalism’ 
(British German Jurists’ Association Conference, Edinburgh, 16 May 2014) 5–6. 
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it to govern itself within the United Kingdom. This territorial question was a microcosm for larger 
problems in the UK’s constitutional conscience: 
 
[T]he fierce debate over Irish self-government showed the “chronic weakness” of the British 
imperial centre, constantly dependent upon the unstable balance of local politics, and it also 
underlined the danger of wide-ranging policies based on “rival notions” of power and 
legitimacy, destined to break up the complex system of government put in place during the 
Victorian era.116 
 
It is, as this excerpt implies, naïve to think of the Irish Home Rule question as an isolated incident, 
unconnected to the broader questions surrounding the governance structure of the UK or the 
British Empire. Yet, even just for Ireland, home rule faced considerable opposition.117  Ireland’s 
choice was not necessarily ‘in or out’ in the same way as Scotland’s was to be in 2014; instead, ‘the 
fate of Ireland remained closely intertwined with that of the Empire’, with many in the political 
realm attempting ‘to develop a moderate solution to the problem of Irish self-government, 
integrating Dublin into a projected imperial union between Britain and its main overseas 
Dominions.’118 This was the first time federalism became a real option in constitutional thinking 
in the UK:119 
 
‘This solution was especially founded on a complex notion of “federalism”, inspired by the 
North American experience, which aimed to reorganize the political machinery of the imperial 
 
116 Pelizza (n 16) 1; J Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970 (CUP 2009) 300–
1. 
117 As an example of the virulence of the opposition, consider this quotation: ‘When we have said...that we would not 
have Home Rule, we have been indulging in no mere platform rhetoric, in no empty platitude – we have been 
expressing the deep and innermost conviction that Home Rule in any form would be a danger to the Empire, would 
imperil the growing prosperity of Ireland, and would involve the most cowardly betrayal of a vast number of our 
fellow-subjects, and we have pledged ourselves to resist any attempt to force such a measure upon the country with 
all our power.’: Walter Long, ‘Unionists and Home Rule’ The Times (29 October 1910) 12. 
118 Pelizza (n 16) 2. 
119 ‘[B]efore 1870, as after, the idea was never consistently to the fore, but enjoyed short bursts of popularity.’: Martin 
(n 81) 65. 
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metropolis on a new decentralized basis, capable to deal effectively both with local and 
international affairs’120 
 
The Irish question raised further questions about the UK’s internal territorial dynamics, as well as 
those larger questions about the status of the Empire. Pelizza uses the same label as Dicey does 
for the Westminster legislature: the Imperial Parliament,121 and in many senses the formal structure 
of the Empire as somewhere between state and international organisation seemed to lend itself to 
federal thinking—of course this halfway point is exactly what enabled the American Founding 
Fathers to institutionalise federalism there.122 The idea of an imperial federation was on the rise as 
simultaneously a guarantee of the survival of empire, and a way of formalising its relations.123 It 
was broadly envisaged that the UK would form but one part of the larger federation, but the more 
specific issues of how this would happen or what it might look like were never properly illuminated 
or agreed on.124 For Dicey, however, the federal option was an overt endorsement of Irish Home 
Rule and was therefore incompatible with unionism: ‘there is something shocking to common 
sense and to political morality in any statesman trying to persuade himself that he can remain a 
Unionist while adopting Home Rule under the alias of Federalism.’125 Dicey’s work initially, given 
Westminster’s unlimited legal sovereignty, seemed to provide for the creation of subordinate 
 
120 Pelizza (n 16) 2. 
121 The claim of Westminster as the heart of the Empire mirrored that of London as the imperial capital. See for 
instance, John Eade, Placing London: From Imperial Capital to Global City (Berghahn Books 2001). 
122 An interesting example of the transnational nature of the empire is how migration around the empire developed, 
particularly during its closing stages. For instance, after Kenya’s independence in 1963 and a concerted programme of 
racial discrimination there, many Indian settlers returned home not to India but to Britain. Around 100,000 did so in 
the late 20th century, see Robin Cohen, The Cambridge Survey of World Migration (CUP 1995) 71. The famous (and 
contemporarily important) ‘Windrush Generation’ that resulted from the British Nationality Act 1948—the Act that 
gave British citizenship to all those living in the UK and its colonies—is another pertinent example. 
123 Lord Selborne wrote, for instance, that ‘[i]f we succeed [in this reform] it will mean that there will exist a true 
Imperial Parliament, in which the United Kingdom and the Dominions of the Empire will be represented on some 
basis of population or wealth, and that it will be concerned exclusively...with the Foreign Policy of the Empire, the 
defence of the Empire, the rule of India and the dependencies of the Empire, and possibly at some future stage with 
the trade of the Empire.’ DG Boyce (ed), The Crisis of British Unionism: Lord Selborne’s Domestic Political Papers, 1885-1922 
(The Historians’ Press 1987) 90–1. 
124 Pelizza (n 16) 3–4; Tulloch (n 11) 139: ‘to the Liberals it implied federation—both of the United Kingdom and of 
the British empire—as a solution to an overpowerful and overburdened centralism. Lord Acton was the high priest 
of this liberal ideology, Gladstone its prime implementer, and Ireland its chosen testing ground.’ 




legislatures—indeed he had actually written on them as a demonstration of Parliament’s 
unrestricted remit: 
 
In the vital distinction he drew between sovereign and non-sovereign law-making bodies 
which he developed in chapter 2 of the Law of the Constitution, Dicey placed the American 
congress in the same constitutional class as the legislatures of colonial dominions and the 
Great Western Railway Company as all exemplifying non-sovereign bodies endowed however 
with a degree of self-government. John Morley notes that Gladstone read this chapter with 
particular interest in 1886, for it suggested that Westminster could bestow a substantial degree 
of autonomy on a newly created Dublin parliament without in any way impairing its own 
ultimate sovereignty.126 
 
Of course, Gladstone was right to suggest that Parliament’s sovereignty meant it could not be 
restrained in its desire to establish subordinate institutions,127 though ‘it must have been especially 
galling for such a committed Unionist as Dicey to have his work quoted to justify and legitimise a 
policy he deplored’;128 Dicey was therefore at pains to argue that Irish Home Rule was not to be 
encouraged. He was sympathetic to other constitutional visions but made it clear he did not 
endorse them writing, ‘[i]f I were an Irishman I have little doubt I should be an out-and-out 
Nationalist, and therefore anger and indignation at fair nationalism is out of place in my mind … 
What I am an authority about is the effect of certain lines of action in England’.129 Further, he 
wrote, ‘My knowledge of Ireland is merely the knowledge—perhaps it would be better to say the 
ignorance—of an educated Englishman’.130 This did not, however, deter Dicey from attempting 
to resolve the Irish question from his English perspective. Tulloch suggests that ‘[t]he 
overwhelming primacy of English interests and consequences took precedence over any further 
 
126 Tulloch (n 11) 141–2. 
127 He declared so in a speech on the 8th April 1886: ‘There is nothing that controls us, and nothing that compels us, 
except our conviction of law, of right, and of justice.’ ibid 142. 
128 ibid. 




consideration of Irish grievances… [Dicey] also took it as axiomatic that Ireland’s problems were 
social and agrarian rather than political or nationalist, and hence amenable to English solutions.’131 
Yet, he nonetheless remained undeterred. In order to defeat the ‘fragmenting spirit’ of 
federalism,132 Dicey ‘urg[ed] a Referendum Act which enumerated a variety of bills which 
parliament could not alter without recourse to a referendum … and which he urged every court in 
the empire to endorse should parliament attempt to contravene it…’,133 a truly striking change for 
the Professor. 
 
Ultimately despite enthusiasm for it, the federal solution to the Empire’s problems would never 
amount to anything, held back as it was by poor lexicological clarity, and, though it may have 
always been an aspect of imperial thought,134 it could not overcome attacks from the heavyweight 
advocates of unitary homogeneity, such as Dicey: 
 
[A] last attempt for a federal solution collapsed during the inconclusive Conference on 
Devolution of late 1919… 
… by 1922 it was clear that the federal alternative was useless both for domestic and imperial 
affairs, due to the traumatic conclusion of the Irish question and to the increasing self-
assertion of the Dominions on the international scene. Thus federalism ended up again in the 




132 ibid 143. 
133 ibid 165. He continues: ‘[Dicey] managed at one stroke to define and modify by means of “those feeblest of all 
chains, the restrictions of a paper Constitution” to rigidify the constitution, negate parliament’s legal sovereignty, and 
draw the judiciary substantially into the political area—all those dire consequences in a word which he employed as 
ample hypothetical reasons for rejecting home rule.’ 
134 Martin (n 81) 92. 
135 Pelizza (n 16) 10–11: ‘although it returned briefly to the forefront in 1940, when Winston Churchill offered a sort 
of federal union to France on the eve of Hitler’s decisive victory in the West. However, the so-called “Anglo-French 
Union”—partially inspired by the ideas of the Round Table—never materialized, while the following approaches of 
Britain to ambitious projects of European federation remained always ambivalent, showing a persistent hostility 
toward any serious change of its traditional constitutional structure.’ See also Andrea Bosco, Federal Union and the 
Origins of the ‘Churchill Proposal’: The Federalism Debate in the United Kingdom from Munich to the Fall of France, 1938-1940 




However, this did not put an end to the Empire’s relationship with federal principles; the 
constitutional legacy of much of the Empire fascinatingly remains its export of federalism.136 South 
Africa, India, Australia and Canada and of course the United States all underwent federal 
‘conversions’ during their journeys towards independence; it seems that of all of them the 
experience of Canada may have been most persuasive as a blueprint for British internal 
restructuring.137 The Canadian experience showed how federalism might be compatible with 
traditional ‘British’ constitutional ideas, such as the infamous Westminster-style Parliament system. 
Here federalism’s flexibility became attractive. It was, to some, a way of ‘protecting local autonomy 
in domestic affairs and maintaining a common system of representation in international 
relations’138 and, as such, it was capable of winning supporters on both sides of the debate 
surrounding Ireland’s future. Nationalists could use federalism as a way of promoting divergence 
from the mainland,139 whereas unionists and conservatives could use it as a way of keeping the 
union, along with the Empire, together.140 However, in contrast to advocates of pluralism such as 
Acton,141 Dicey saw what he called ‘unitarianism’ as crucial to effective and efficient government. 
The alternative, he thought, would deprive ‘English’ institutions ‘of their strength, and their life; it 
 
136 Pelizza (n 16) 12: ‘Indeed, it is important to note that similar disruptive patterns developed later into other parts of 
the British Empire, where different ethnic or religious groups refused to follow the unitary or federal options offered 
by their colonial rulers, pushing instead for a violent partition of their own territories along the lines set originally by 
Ireland in 1922. From this point of view, the fate of Muslim Indians in 1947 does not seem too different from that of 
Irish unionists twenty-five years earlier, including the same unfortunate support for a federal solution of their 
respective problems. Therefore it becomes extremely relevant to reassess the federal debate on Ireland and the United 
Kingdom in the early twentieth century through a broader historical prism, acknowledging its permanent legacy for 
the political development of modern Britain and its former colonial empire.’  
137 See ibid 5. 
138 ibid. 
139 For instance, Isaac Butt wrote that ‘[t]he time is come when it is essential to the interests of both countries that 
there should be a re-adjustment or modification of the Union arrangements. I believe that a very large proportion of 
the Irish people are willing to accept such a Federal Union between the countries as would give an Irish Parliament 
control over all the domestic affairs of Ireland, while an Imperial Parliament still preserved the unity and integrity of 
the United Kingdom as a great power among the nations of the world.’ Isaac Butt, Irish Federalism! Its Meaning, Its 
Objects, and Its Hopes (3rd edn, John Falconer, 1871) 17. 
140 See for instance, A Radical [Chamberlain], ‘A Radical View of the Irish Crisis’ (1886) 39 Fortnightly Review 273. 
141 Acton wrote that ‘the combination of different nations in one State is as necessary a condition of civilised life as 
the combination of men in society’: John Dalberg-Acton, ‘Nationality’ in John Neville Figgis (ed), The History of Freedom 
and Other Essays (Macmillan 1909) 291. 
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weakens the Executive at home and lessens the power of the country to resist foreign attack’.142 
Dicey’s concerns about imperial federalism and Home Rule were, therefore, principally about their 
existential consequences for the rest of the Imperial Centre: it was ‘a plan for revolutionizing the 
constitution of the whole of the United Kingdom’ which would (or at least could) ‘be adverse to 
the interests of Great Britain’.143 This inflexion, and the acceptance of the competitive dimension 
has not disappeared: Demands for territorial government in one region have continued to prompt 
changes across the union. Indeed, as soon as Irish Home Rule became a significant question, the 
Scottish Office was founded in London; equally, the day after the ‘No’ vote to Scottish 
independence, the Prime Minister announced plans for English votes for English laws.144 
 
It seems then that Britain’s first collision with federalism was hampered by poor timing, political 
crisis, lack of intellectual appetite (or comprehension) and a desire, particularly from English and 
conservative quarters to avoid the existential questions it gave rise to. It did, however, demonstrate 
an interest in the idea, and a reflection of what it meant for Britain’s place in the world. ‘[T]he 
complex story of federalism in Edwardian Britain shows a certain fascination for this political 
concept, learned in relation with the outside world and later integrated into domestic political discourses.’145 The 
Irish question, when it was restricted to a question about Empire was tolerable but imprecise in 
its requirements; when it became an inflected, existential question about regional identities and 
parliaments within the union, it became an untenable crisis of conscience. Those, such as 
Chamberlain, who began advocating for devolution to all the territories of the UK, did so in line 
with an imprecise definition of ‘federation’ that pursued imperial as well as national unity and were 
not able to overcome the challenge posed by Dicey’s (Anglo-Centric) constitutional orthodoxy. 
 
142 AV Dicey, ‘Home Rule From an English Point of View’ (1882) 42 Contemporary Review 66. See also Michael 
O’Neill, ‘Great Britain: From Dicey to Devolution’ (2000) 53 Parliamentary Affairs 69, 69. 
143 See Arthur Aughey, ‘Fifth Nation: The United Kingdom between Definite and Indefinite Articles’ (2010) 5 British 
Politics 265, 273. 
144 Lord Hodge (n 115) 6; Tierney (n 24) 115. 
145 Pelizza (n 16) 11 (emphasis added), he continues: ‘Of course, this integration was often limited and confused, 
betraying a superficial appreciation of modern federal theories.’ 
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This history seemed set to repeat itself in devolution’s next stage, as a floundering Labour Party 
tried to amass support for devolved legislatures in the 1970s.  
 
DEVOLUTION’S FALSE START 
 
Historically, the fact that government had been conducted so far from the ‘nations’ of the UK had 
not been much of a talking point; although ‘the previous 100 years had been a series of failed 
attempts to do devolution’,146 government had been small and uninvolved, and those policies that 
had local significance and impact were conducted and managed at a sub-state level, like 
management of education,147 though the exception to this is can be found in Northern Ireland, 
which ‘opted out’ of the Free State and had its own Parliament (and Prime Minister) since 1922. 
In Britain, however, along with economic hardship came a need for more welfare support and 
government involvement, making significant the previously unimportant distance between the 
governors and the governed. Following economic problems in the regions and growing 
secessionist sentiment148 a Royal Commission on the Constitution reported in 1973 that there 
might be good cause to create elected legislatures in Scotland and Wales. Its proposals were to be 
implemented by the Labour government in the following way:  
 
Separate devolution Bills for Scotland and Wales (1978), subsequently combined in a Scotland 
and Wales Bill (1979), proposed greater home rule for Scotland than Wales. There were to be 
directly elected assemblies in both countries by first-past-the-post (1978), some legislative 
competence and executive discretion for Scotland over devolved Scottish Office functions 
(local government, social policy and infrastructural matters), but only local government-style 
committees in Wales. Neither assembly was to have fiscal competence. The Secretaries of 
 
146 Institute for Government, Interview with Tony Blair, ‘Tony Blair: Devolution, Brexit and the Future of the Union’ 
(14 April 2019) 3 <https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/tony-blair_0.pdf> 
accessed 30 April 2019.  
147 Lord Sumption (n 90) 19, 21. 
148 DG Boyce, ‘Dicey, Kilbrandon and Devolution’ (1975) 46 The Political Quarterly 280, 283: ‘one of the decisive 




State, likewise, retained formidable powers. Westminster’s sovereignty was underlined by 
retention of the prerogative to legislate on any devolved matter. The judicial committee of the 
Privy Council would arbitrate in any dispute between the centre and the territories.149 
 
There was, of course, political benefit in these reforms,150 but at the more abstract level, the 
foundation of these institutions was in direct opposition to Dicey’s view that ‘there was not, and 
could not be, a halfway-house between Union … and separation’.151 At its core, devolution was 
based on ‘the assumption that it is not necessary to have a uniform system of government in the 
whole United Kingdom.’152  
 
This was the core of the Kilbrandon Report which argued, in frank opposition to Dicey’s claim 
that decentralisation would spell the end of the UK, that ‘a generous measure of devolution … 
would be more likely to strengthen than to weaken the unity of the United Kingdom’.153 It made 
the reasons for devolution plain: there was a need to recognise the diversities within the UK.154 
The communities that were to be represented by their own institutions were apparently not only 
sufficiently distinct but were also sufficiently self-aware to know self-government was the right 
path for them. However, Backbenchers who opposed these proposals ensured that the so-called 
‘Cunningham Amendment’ to the legislation was passed, setting minimum thresholds for 
supporting them at 40% of the registered electorate; in the event, none of these thresholds were 
met. Following the defeat of these proposals the Conservative Party, led by Margaret Thatcher, 
took power with their agenda of small, heavily centralised government.155 Devolution, seen by 
 
149 O’Neill (n 142) 73. These institutions were to have powers ‘transferred’ (as opposed to a reserved powers model). 
150 ibid 72. 
151 Boyce (n 148) 281. 
152 ibid; Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969 – 1973 (Cmnd 5460, 1973) paras 1109–1110. 
153 Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969 – 1973 (n 152) para 1152. 
154 According to the report, Wales was ‘a distinctive community with its own needs and interests, and with a culture 
and language to preserve and foster’ (para 1152, p 343) and devolution ‘would be a response to national feeling in 
Scotland and Wales’ (at para 1102, p 331) 
155 O’Neill (n 142) 73: ‘Motivated by a blend of strident British nationalism and a neo-liberal agenda, Thatcherism set 
about harnessing the machinery of the state to a supply-side, business-led offensive against the postwar bipartisan 




them as an ‘irritating anomaly’,156 was postponed until the New Labour government of 1997. 
Although, therefore, the scheme fell through, ‘Kilbrandon’s proposal for asymmetrical devolution 
set the pattern for future reform of the Kingdom.’157   
 
CONCLUSION: A ‘UNION-STATE’158 
 
This chapter’s aim has been simple: to highlight the turmoil and evolution at the heart of the UK’s 
territorial constitutional history and demonstrate the diversities that have long existed within it. 
This has an equally simple purpose; it demonstrates that the union is not permanent, nor is it 
inflexible. Instead, it is the fragile child of political convenience and organic development. 
Certainly, the United Kingdom has frequently demonstrated a formidable survival instinct, but its 
survival has not been the design of constitutional architects or ‘founding fathers’, it has been the 
result of political pragmatism and flexible approaches to ideas. However, the insistence that the 
UK is immune from major constitutional renewal, that its flexibility makes it uniquely equipped to 
avoid upheaval or crisis is clearly unfounded. Whatever one’s views on the matter, it is clear that 
the UK’s struggles with self-rule have never been handled with the delicacy or competence they 
deserved and, for the people of Ireland at least, this had devastating consequences. The 
fundamental lesson that this chapter hoped to impart is that the territorial constitution matters. The 
union’s governance structures have an impact on nearly every aspect of life here, and these in turn 
are shaped by our perception of the union, its permanence and its fragility. It is not accurate to 
think of the union as eternal or ancient, nor is it wise to think that it can simply be disregarded or 
 
and devolution was staunchly resisted as another tier added to already overblown bureaucracy.’ Interestingly, consider 
how the Labour party’s ‘lurch to the left— an instinctive reaction both to defeat and to Thatcherism—saw a reversion 
instead to a convenient ideological prescription which explained territorial nationalism as a class reflex by the 
economically deprived, socially disadvantaged periphery against the beneficiaries of the core economy.’ 
156 James Mitchell, ‘Conservatives and the Changing Meaning of the Union’ (1996) 6 Regional and Federal Studies 30, 
39. 
157 O’Neill (n 142) 72. There were some adjustments made nonetheless, however: ‘A Scottish Affairs Select Committee 
was added in 1979 as part of UK wide administrative reforms, rationalised by London, in response to nationalist 
stirrings, as proof positive of the special ‘Scottish dimension’ of British government.’: ibid 70. 
158 This term was popularised in Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty (OUP 1999). 
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replaced with some notion that it is ‘one nation’. Rather, it is far more helpful to understand it as 
a consensual union of peoples and nations, whose history and cultures have brought them 
together, but who still retain (and enjoy) diversity. Admitting this is no bad thing and is a far more 
accurate picture of its history. However, the UK’s reticence to internalise the existential question, 
to ask its raison d’être—the ultimate cause of its rejection of federalism—has had consequences 
before and may have more yet. To some, the British attitude towards federalism is ‘neurotic’, 
resulting in a situation where ‘misconceptions and myths blind British political elites to its potential 
benefits’.159 This chapter has argued, in spite of such opposition, that once it is understood that 
federalism is not merely a state-form it is clear that its rejection in the UK is no longer justified. 
The essential claim of the ‘federation’ is that it is a state that applies federalism; however, this 
seems to be unhelpful—it requires us to think about those states that do or do not express a 
particular set of institutional forms, usually legalist in their tradition, that actually tell us very little 
about the constitution or the political community it represents. It also encourages us to demark 
powers and allocate them exclusively to particular branches, rather than encouraging interaction 
between them. The scholarly contribution can very quickly become a taxonomical or categorisation 
exercise that asks us to identify those states that do not meet its contentious definition as ‘unitary’ 
or sui generis. When one understands federalism as a deeper claim, however—the rejection of 
homogony, and the encouragement of dialogue between recognised communities—one can access 
an analysis that is far more insightful. All of these things, it has been suggested, are demonstrated 
in the UK’s history. Although it has demonstrated a great capacity for change, a near-permanent 
state of flux and the constitution’s ability to flex as necessary, its instability and political pragmatism 
have caused as many problems as they have solved. The UK has no untarnished record; sometimes 
it has been successful, sometimes it has not, and it is not possible to extrapolate any formula for 
uniform success. The battle for the UK’s territorial constitution has been long and, it would seem, 
 
159 David Marquand, ‘Federalism and the British: Anatomy of a Neurosis’ (2006) 77 The Political Quarterly 175, 83. 
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remains unfinished. The following chapter interrogates that next stage of the UK’s constitutional 




























It is often suggested that the UK’s territorial arrangements, to their detriment, lack the kinds of 
structured certainty, balance and ‘grand planning’ that would be present in a more purposively far-
reaching and general overarching scheme, of the kind found in federations. Such deliberate 
structured architecture would not easily be tolerant of the asymmetry and imbalance that 
epitomises the UK’s territorial constitution. However, the UK’s constitutional idiosyncrasies—
incrementalism, ‘flexibility’ and its dependence on political realities—make wholesale and 
symmetrical reform unlikely. Further, the UK’s territorial history has not, as has already been 
demonstrated, been marked by equality or a willingness to engage in the broader existential 
questions but rather an inclination to circumvent these by preferring political bargaining and a 
persistent focus on ‘unitarianism’. This chapter will explore the realities of the UK’s contemporary 
territorial government structures; it argues that devolution represents an important transformation 
in architecture that is arguably more constitutional in nature than it may have been intended to be. 
Rather than a purely incremental, political settlement—though it has been anything but settled— 
devolution has significantly changed the fabric of the UK, with much of the progress being 
positive, embracing of subsidiarity and strengthening democratic legitimacy of new and existing 
power structures. However, the full opportunities of devolution as a model for shared government 
 
160 Martin Laffin and Alys Thomas, ‘The United Kingdom: Federalism in Denial?’ (1999) 29 Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism 89, 106. 
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and positive, cooperative intergovernmental interaction are not yet being realised, held back by 
Westminster’s continuing emphasis of hierarchy and unitary parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
Although these elements are arguably restricting devolution’s transformative power, they are a 
natural consequence of its origins. Firstly, its ad hoc, asymmetrical ‘design’ is in line with a desire to 
ensure the devolved arrangements themselves mirror the demand-led nature of devolution itself, 
responding to regional desires for powers and, particularly evident in England, providing no 
devolution where none is demanded. Secondly, it is arguably the result of the focuses on autonomy, 
self-government and subsidiarity, rather than an attempt at implementing a broad scheme of 
shared rule—devolution was intended to only make sense in each instance within the territory 
concerned, not ‘generally’—but it is not clear to what extent this can viably be maintained. The 
challenge of perspective also remains apparent: on one reading, devolution is a way of allowing a 
particular territory a particular set of powers to govern itself in a particular way, with little 
interaction with other territories or adjustment required at the centre. After all, if devolution is a 
method of accommodating difference and encouraging self-rule, then the way the territory in 
question conducts itself is of little interest to the centre that gave it (or restored to it) its powers in 
the first place. On this view, seeking a ‘grand plan’ to devolution is therefore misplaced: each 
territory can govern itself in a different way and has different powers in line with its differing 
needs. The alternative conception is of devolution as a partial reconstitution of the United 
Kingdom, an uneasy middle-ground towards a federal Britain where asymmetry must give way to 
uniformity just as political expediency and short-term ambition must step aside for a more 
considered assessment of the future of the union. On this alternative view, the diversity-
recognition dynamics of devolution must give way to ideas of integrity and symmetry of power 
allocation, though not necessarily in pursuit of uniformity. 
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This chapter will explore how both of these perspectives are balanced in the UK’s contemporary 
territorial constitution. There are examples of the first in the initial allocation of competences and 
institutional designs, and the explicit rejection of some kind of federal settlement in favour of an 
informal arrangement. There are examples of the second in judicial dicta which sees the settlement 
as a broader, more fundamental and ‘coherent’ arrangement, as well as in scholarly attempts to 
make sense of devolution in the round. However, even if this is the direction of travel for 
devolution, there remain significant caveats such as the persisting supremacy of Westminster and 
the often necessary or unavoidable asymmetry between the territories and arrangements.161 It will 
be seen that the constitution has been so obviously affected in all its corners that continuing to 
see devolution as an improvised, unimportant ‘quirk’ of politics is no longer tenable, and that 
policies that pursue this line of disregard are increasingly difficult to justify. For a time, this view 
might have been reasonable; minor powers were transferred (especially for Wales), the sovereignty 
of Parliament at Westminster was unchallenged, and the constitutional character of the devolved 
institutions was either non-existent or clearly subsidiary.162 This is clearly no longer the view of the 
territories who are increasingly powerful, increasingly in search of guaranteed constitutional 
character, and increasingly fundamental to government in the UK. That England may be of a 
different view of the constitution, especially given its socio-political and economic dominance 
within the union (and in Westminster) is becoming a source of tension. These disagreements may 
have always existed, but devolution has institutionalised and, arguably, empowered them through 
the creation of forums for debating and legislating for policy divergence, and the demonstration 
of a territory’s ability to govern itself. If these disintegrative pressures are to be managed, 
Westminster must take note. 
 
 
161 This is, of course, especially pertinent for Northern Ireland. 
162 Though it is considered in depth below, consider Whaley v Watson [2000] SC 340. 
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The following chapter is divided into two parts: the first explores the origins of devolution as the 
political ambition of a ruling party that had long since seen the government benches, and which 
was meant to reflect the desires of each particular territory. This first section explains how 
devolution came about, and how it has evolved into its current form in each of the territories. It 
will be seen that the pace and extent of devolution has varied across the union, with England and 
the ‘centre’ receiving little attention as the full significance of devolution was not properly 
recognised.  
 
The second section explores what these changes mean for the UK’s constitution. This second 
section first undertakes an evaluation of the space ‘between’ the different settlements, considering 
how the different institutions interact and where they (can and do) cooperate. This is undertaken 
in three parts, the first is concerned with how the settlements have been shaped, the second with 
consent and ‘sovereignty’ and the third considers intergovernmental relations. This section then 
goes on to consider how what ‘constitutional space’ devolution now occupies and in the eyes of 
the judiciary, gleaning principles that seek to respect the constitutional significance of devolution 
from the case law. Finally, this chapter looks to a particular case-study—withdrawing from the 
European Union—as a demonstration of a new trend, or perhaps an anomaly, that illuminates the 
extent to which normative hierarchy persists within the UK’s territorial constitution. It also 
highlights how, despite the courts’ willingness to provide institutional respect, and the existence 
of political channels for cooperation, the immense power of Westminster, when coupled with a 
mentality to deploy it, remains able to disregard the fundamentality of the territorial constitution. 
 
ORIGINS, PURPOSES AND IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Before the many facets of devolution can be explored, it is beneficial to consider the context in 
which one of the most significant constitutional reforms in the UK’s history took place, what 
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factors informed its implementation and what its purpose was. Indeed, as will be seen, many of 
the idiosyncrasies of the reforms have their origins in the thinking and processes that led to 
devolution. Of course, the first thing to note is that devolution was not—as it is hopefully already 
clear—the first attempt at institutionalising territorial government in the UK, indeed, Lord Hodge 
has spoken of how ‘[devolution] can be seen as the resumption of the interrupted business of 
1880-1914’.163 However, after a long period of largely centralised government, devolution needed 
more than continuity to be justified. 
 
As with the last attempt at devolution in the 1970s, the years preceding it had led to economic 
decline and neglect for the peripheries of the union as heavy industries collapsed, despite the 
prosperity of financial industry intensely focussed in London and the South East. The 1980s’ 
economic centralisation was also closely entwined with governmental centralisation, with layers of 
government being perceived as unnecessary impediments to growth. This led, as before, to a 
growth in dissatisfaction and in secessionist movements. The Scottish Constitutional Convention 
and the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly served as indicators of this rising sentiment and a desire, 
if not to have more territorial powers, to give those powers more democratic legitimacy. Faced 
with this challenge, not only was there a sense that Westminster was out of touch, there was also 
a sense that it was uninterested: 
 
After years of apparent indifference by London, territorial identity had acquired political 
momentum. The mindset of Scotland, and to a lesser degree in Wales, had irrevocably shifted. 
There was now resistance to gesture politics and to cosmetic attempts to flatter but not 
assuage territorial sensibilities.164 
 
 
163 Lord Hodge (n 115) 6; Linda Colley, Acts of Union and Disunion (Profile Books Ltd 2014). 
164 O’Neill (n 142) 76. 
 
 52 
This ‘indifference’ was epitomised by a conservative, English dominated, unitary vision of 
government. That, infamously, John Redwood——the Secretary of State for Wales—refused to 
sign documents that had been prepared in Welsh, was the embodiment of Westminster’s 
disinterested approach towards the territories.165 The result was a spike in support for nationalism 
in Scotland and Wales. New Labour, by the time it was taking aim at Whitehall,166 was fully aware 
of both the dangers of independence and the need, for its own electoral advantage, to undercut 
the secessionists. Its renewed promise of devolution was intended to be popular with those who 
might otherwise support nationalism. Tony Blair personally was not overly interested in 
constitutional revolution but recognised the danger of independence both on the Union as a 
whole, and on the Labour party’s electoral future, relying as it does on support outside of 
England.167 This was paired with the fact that Labour’s vision is closely aligned with the progressive 
politics of the nationalist parties. According to Tony Blair,  
 
‘The purpose of devolution was to bring about a new settlement between the constituent parts 
of the UK so that decision making was brought closer to the people who felt a strong sense 
of identity. And politically, also, to ward off the bigger threat of secession.’168 
 
It is clear even here that, in stark contrast to the thinking that informs confederation, there was no 
grand constitutional plan, no exercise in constitutional theory akin to the Federalist, instead, 
principle was to be balanced with pragmatism and electoral expediency, as Blair put it ‘essentially, 
I took the view that it was right in principle and necessary politically’.169  
 
165 Roger Masterman and Colin Murray, Constitutional and Administrative Law (2nd edn, Pearson 2018) 366; O’Neill (n 
142) 76. 
166 ‘New’ Labour had made a number of considerable changes in order to make itself electable. It had altered ‘Clause 
IV’ of its Constitution to remove its commitment to socialist nationalisation in 1995, and ‘was prepared to jettison 
excess ideological baggage and rethink its radical mission. It was now more favourable to post-modern notions of 
community politics, cultural pluralism and democratic empowerment.’: O’Neill (n 142) 77. 
167 Institute for Government, ‘Devolution at 20’ (2019) 2. The Conservative Party is far less reliant on voters outside 
of England, in 2015 they were able to form a majority government with just one seat in Scotland. 





Although O’Niell suggests that the intentions behind this second round of Labour-supported 
devolution were informed by some different factors to those that had informed its previous 
attempt,170 there were clearly similarities between the two proposals. At the very least there 
remained the absence of any appetite for wholesale, broad-stroke constitutional reform; instead, 
devolution was to be a system of incremental developments across the territories, responding to 
each of their needs and desires. Lord Falconer was clear, for instance, that ‘the government was 
not concerned about the question of ‘constitutional symmetry’ but was committed to the practical 
accommodation of ‘difference and rough edges’.171  Certainly, devolution was not initially seen as 
part of a grand constitutional reform that would remake the United Kingdom in a new way. 
Instead, as Bagehot noted in the Economist, it was led by no general White Paper.172 The 
fragmentation of the approach to reform was indicated by Lord Irvine of Lairg who found that 
‘[t]he strands [of reform] do not spring from a single master plan, however much that concept 
might appeal to purists,’173 indeed, some have suggested it was therefore not the exercise in 
deferential, collaborative engagement with the territories it might ought to have been.174 The Lord 
Chancellor, however, dismissed the claim that the reforms lacked coherence, suggesting that such 
proposals did not need to be read together in order to be in some way ‘coherent’, the priority was 
on meeting needs, rather than on creating a new constitution:  
 
‘Many of the measures are responses to particular problems which are the product of lengthy 
and complex prehistories of their own… In a sentence: our objective is to put in place an 
integrated programme of measures to decentralise power in the United Kingdom, and to 
enhance the rights of individuals within a more open society.’175 
 
170 O’Neill (n 142) 76. 
171 Aughey (n 143) 274. 
172 Bagehot [Adrian Wooldridge], ‘A Heath Robinson Constitution’ The Economist (18 April 1998) 34. 
173 Lord Irvine, ‘Government’s Programme of Constitutional Reform’, Annual Constitution Unit Lecture (1998) 8. 
174 Kenneth MacKenzie, ‘How the Reforms Came About’ in Andrew McDonald (ed), Reinventing Britain: Constitutional 
Change under New Labour (University of California Press 2007) 116. 




The lack of grand planning was precisely because these proposals were incremental, independent 
and contextual, and of underplayed significance. This has continued to be the view of Westminster 
when it comes to devolution and; as Tierney rightly indicates, ‘[t]he system of devolution since 
1998 can be characterised as ad hoc, reactive and incremental.’176 Many of the flaws in devolution’s 
institutional balance and intergovernmental relations, as well as difficulties for the judiciary when 
it comes to making sense of the settlement(s), stem from this essential claim, that is most popular 
at the constitutional ‘centre’:177 ‘Ministers and the political class generally are treating the 
government’s constitutional reform programme as a restructuring of existing political culture rather 
than seeing it as the cultural transformer it is almost certainly going to be.’178 In fact, devolution 
was laboured under ‘[t]he assumption that a separate political space already existed in Scotland, 
that it merely required a democratic decision-making body’.179 
 
This pursuit of legitimacy is, however, precisely the real significance of devolution.180 There are many 
ways to ‘do’ governmental decentralisation;181 government can be outsourced, or it can be shared 
across institutions and none of this need be done on territorial lines.182 If it is to be done 
territorially, powers can be distributed on an exclusively executive level, with implementation of 
 
176 Tierney (n 24) 104. 
177 For instance, as will be explored further later, Lord Hope’s claim that the settlement was designed to be ‘coherent, 
stable and workable’ is clearly at odds with Lord Falconer’s view that its coherence was never an ambition, nor a 
necessity: Imperial Tobacco Ltd v The Lord Advocate [2012] UKSC 61, [2013] 1 AC 792 [14] (Lord Hope). 
178 Peter Hennessy, ‘Re-Engineering the State in Flight: A Year in the Life of the British Constitution, April 1997-
April 1998’, unpublished lecture at Lloyds TSB Forum (1998); (MacKenzie [n 174] 127). 
179 This ‘suggests that the federal notion of separate but equal authorities might have been palatable to devolution 
campaigners. A different settlement was sought and established in Wales.’: Ailsa Henderson, ‘A Porous and Pragmatic 
Settlement: Asymmetrical Devolution and Democratic Constraint in Scotland and Wales’ in Andrew McDonald (ed), 
Reinventing Britain: Constitutional Change under New Labour (University of California Press 2007) 154. 
180 Others also indicate that federalism, in much the same vein, is not interested in the extent or otherwise of 
divergence or uniformity, but in the devolution of power for legitimacy reasons. See for instance Charlie Jeffery, 
‘Devolution in the United Kingdom: Problems of a Piecemeal Approach to Constitutional Change’ (2009) 39 Publius: 
The Journal of Federalism 289. 
181 For devolution as the democratisation of pre-existing administrative territorial differentiation, see Hennessy (n 
178); (MacKenzie [n 174] 127). 
182 See RAW Rhodes, ‘The Hollowing out of the State: The Changing Nature of the Public Service in Britain’ (1994) 
65 The Political Quarterly 138. 
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centre-made rules being pushed to the fringes.183 Yet, despite a potential (and temporary) caveat 
in the form of early Welsh devolution, this is not what devolution has been about. It is, crucially, 
the decentralisation of democratic authority. However much or little this may have been recognised 
at the outset, it has set in motion a serious constitutional transformation that is, as far as some 
readings go, irreversible and also more closely tied to federalism than its implementation (or 
implementors) might admit.184 Indeed, devolution did, in reality, come to ‘embody’, and enhance 
certain important principles: 
 
Devolution embodied the tendency ‘towards decentralisation as a means of achieving greater 
democratic legitimacy within the component parts of the union state’. It also expressed the 
trend toward ‘a right to self-determination within the UK constitution’ which can be seen as 
‘a modern reconciliation of the need to pay regard to the wishes of the people (as a group as 
well as individually)’.185 
 
These principles came to be represented at a number of levels. For instance, although ‘the 
establishment of the Scottish Parliament would enable necessary reforms to Scottish law to be 
made with more urgency (as well as better scrutiny)’,186 the institutions themselves ‘were designed 
to give expression to the distinct identities of the devolved nations and to foster a more 
collaborative, consensus-based politics than at Westminster’.187 In this way, devolution has, 
arguably, come to embrace a more collaborative, multi-layered constitutional atmosphere than that 
which is nurtured in the ‘sovereign’ Parliament and its primary partner, England. This is 
represented by its inducement by external developments that 
 
 
183 Henderson (n 179) 152; Jeffery also makes the distinction between territorial administration and territorial politics, 
the latter being the real significant change of devolution, one that is not sufficiently recognised at the centre: Charlie 
Jeffery, ‘The Unfinished Business of Devolution’ (2007) 22 Public Policy and Administration 92. 
184 See Mark Elliott, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty in a Changing Constitutional Landscape’ in Jeffrey Jowell and Colm 
O’Cinneide (eds), The Changing Constitution (9th edn, OUP 2019). 
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have facilitated political change. Reorganisation of the EU’s structural funds (1988 and 1992) 
to ensure some compensation for peripheral regions, outwith the mainstream of Single Market 
expansion, favours member states with a concerted regional strategy. The European Union 
offers a fiscal inducement, and provides an increasingly important institutional arena, for 
regional interests. Multi-level governance encourages regions to operate on their own 
initiative, above as much as within member states, with inducements to participate in trans-
European networks, to liaise directly in the Committee of the Regions, and to work directly 
with the Commission.188  
 
Despite the claim that ‘there has never been a clear articulation of the overall purpose of 
devolution’,189 devolution is clearly an attempt at constitutionalising regional variation and allowing 
the different peoples of the UK to govern themselves. In this sense it is clearly an expression of 
subsidiarity and, at least implicitly, recognition that the different parts of the UK want (or need) 
different things. Interestingly, and in contrast to a federal model, the actual implementation of 
devolution varied across the territories. This may itself be an expression at a higher level of policy: 
if the territories are different and need to be able to implement different policies, why should the 
actual structures of decentralisation be uniform? An obvious instance where this has been 
necessary and beneficial, given its unique circumstances, can be found in Northern Ireland, where 
a unique history has made its challenges quite different to those faced in the other ‘parts’190 of the 
UK. In traditional British constitutional fashion devolution has been crafted so as to avoid 
wholesale reform, existential re-evaluation of the role of the union and the shape of the nation, 
and a lack of any genuine commitment to stable long-term change. However, this has created a 
complex system that seems to be in constant flux, and which has often failed to be recognised as 
the constitutional revolution it really is. Further, devolution, though regionally sensitive, seems to 
 
188 O’Neill (n 142) 77.  
189 Tierney (n 24) 120. 
190 This is the terminology of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, see Lady Hale, ‘Devolution and The Supreme 
Court – 20 Years On’ (Scottish Public Law Group 2018, Edinburgh, 14 June 2018) 1. 
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lack any overarching clear message of what the union is for. The asymmetric, idiosyncratic 
approach to decentralisation seems, therefore, to underplay the constitutional importance of the 
new arrangements. In practice, as will be seen, it has arguably amounted to the fundamental 
transformation it was never intended to be. Because of the differentiated, asymmetric settlement 
in place, and the differing nature and pace of the changes that have been undertaken, the different 




It is well known that ‘devolution is a process, not an event’191 and, though it may not be clear 
whether this is to its credit, it is certainly true that devolution has undergone a great deal of change 
in its short life. In Scotland, the system in place has been probably the most stable—the creation 
of a powerful regional Parliament,192 it being bestowed with legislative powers193 and adopting a 
‘reserved powers’ model—have all remained fairly secure from the outset.194 This is probably 
largely because of the amount of thought that went into Scotland’s settlement. A six-year Scottish 
Constitutional Convention195 was able, in light of its history, to draw up provisions for a new/re-
established legislature to be founded. Proposals to (re-)establish a legislature were accepted in a 
referendum held in September 1997 where a decisive majority supported them. The Scotland Act 
1998 which can be conceived as either restoring democracy or building a new democratic 
 
191 Ron Davies, Devolution: A Process Not an Event (Institute of Welsh Affairs 1999). This terminology has been adopted 
elsewhere: David Torrance, ‘“A Process, Not an Event”: Devolution in Wales, 1998-2018’ (House of Commons 
Library 2018) Briefing Paper CBP 08318. 
192 Making it ‘one of the most devolved territories anywhere in Europe’: Tierney (n 24) 104.  
193 Cf this to the position at the beginning of Wales’ devolved life, below. 
194 David Torrance, ‘Reserved Matters in the United Kingdom’ (House of Commons Library 2019) Briefing Paper 
CBP 8544 7. There was prior experience of the ‘reserved’ powers model in British (and imperial) constitutional 
experience, having its genesis in the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865. The Government of India Act 1919 and the 
Malta Constitution Act 1932 are examples of statutes allocating powers in this way. 
195 Many major stakeholders participated, including representatives of different religious groups and all the major 
political parties in Scotland attended apart from the Conservative Party, who, in government at the time, attempted 
to challenge (unsuccessfully) the local authority’s financing of the Convention: Commission for Local Authority Accounts 
in Scotland v Grampian RC [1994] SC 277. The SNP withdrew upon the rejection of independence as an option: Peter 




foundation for a subnational unit, created the Scottish Parliament at Holyrood. Rather than 
‘enumerating’ which powers the institution would have, the 1998 Act listed only those powers 
which were ‘reserved’ to Westminster.196 In Schedule 5 of the Act, these reserved powers are 
divided into categories of ‘general reservations’ and ‘specific reservations’. Inter alia general 
reservations include international relations and aspects of the constitution; specific reservations 
include areas such as energy, employment and home affairs. The 1998 Act’s Explanatory Notes 
provide detail about what is reserved and why and on top of these reservations, Schedule 4 lists 
those ‘protected enactments’ that are beyond the Scottish Parliament’s power to ‘modify’.197 The 
powers that have not been reserved map quite closely onto those powers previously possessed by 
the Secretary of State for Scotland, or those powers that had historically (such as education) been 
regulated without much attention from Westminster. Although in the 1978 legislation the Secretary 
of State retained a powerful influence, being able to step in effectively ‘on the basis that he did not 
like the policy that was being followed by the Scottish Parliament’,198 the 1998 Act created a more 
muted power, with the Secretary of State being able instead to prevent Royal Assent if a Bill’s 
provisions ‘make modifications of the law as it applies to reserved matters and which the Secretary 
of State has reasonable grounds to believe would have an adverse effect on the operation of the 
law as it applies to reserved matters.’199 
 
Although the devolved settlement in Scotland has been largely stable, this does not mean it is 
without flexibility. Section 30 of the 1998 Act allows Orders in Council to make ‘modifications of 
Schedule 4 or 5’ which are ‘necessary or expedient’, subject to approval from both legislatures.200 
This has been used to make some adjustments to the settlement, as has amendment of the Act 
 
196 See The Constitution Unit, Scotland’s Parliament: Fundamentals for a New Scotland Act (UCL 1996) 35–39. 
197 This is because the Scottish Parliament can modify Acts of the Westminster Parliament so far as this is within 
devolved competence, see Elliott (n 184). 
198 HC Deb 12 May 1998, vol 312, col 274. 
199 Scotland Act 1998, s 35 
200 See Torrance, ‘Reserved Matters in the United Kingdom’ (n 194) 14–15. 
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itself by subsequent unilateral legislation from Westminster. The Scotland Act 2012, for instance, 
which devolved certain additional tax-raising powers, permitted the devolved regulation of airguns 
and reserved the issue of Antarctica.201 There is also room for Scottish involvement in some central 
areas of policy, such as granting of foreign aid or encouraging investment from abroad.202 Of 
course, regardless of the extent of devolved competence, Westminster retains the right to legislate 
in devolved areas per s 28(7).203 
 
Following the 2014 independence referendum in Scotland, the Smith Commission was assigned 
with the task of reviewing devolution in Scotland; it recommended an extension of fiscal powers, 
welfare devolution along with an extension of other competences, and enshrining the permanence 
of the Scottish Parliament in legislation. Westminster implemented some of the changes 
recommended by the Smith Commission in the Scotland Act 2016; the Scottish Parliament was 
given powers to legislate for its own elections,204 greater tax powers,205 welfare206 and its 
permanence has been formally codified.207 On top of this, further powers in policy areas relating 
to energy, employment, 208 abortion209 and Tribunals210 have been devolved. Though these reforms 
have certainly increased devolved autonomy, Professor Tierney has suggested that this Act is ‘yet 
another instalment of a process of radical reorganisation of territorial authority carried out on the 
 
201 There were also changes made to reduce the role of the Supreme Court in light of the independence of the Scottish 
legal system, meaning criminal references to the Supreme Court can only be considered there on the compatibility 
issue and then referred back, though this also now excludes Convention or EU law compatibility, adding further 
complication to the ‘already variable geometry formed by the devolution arrangements’: Brice Dickson, ‘Devolution’ 
in Jeffrey Jowell, Dawn Oliver and Colm O’Cinneide (eds), The Changing Constitution (8th edn, OUP 2015) 256. 
202 See David Torrance, ‘“The Settled Will”? Devolution in Scotland,1998-2018’ (House of Commons Library 2018) 
Briefing Paper CBP 08441 16–17.  
203 See below for an extensive analysis of the operation of this provision. 
204 Ss 3-10 
205 Ss 13-19 
206 Ss 22-31 
207 S 1: It is not to be abolished except with a referendum. Statutory recognition of the Sewel convention is given in s 
2. The exact legal value of this enshrined permanence in light of Westminster’s sovereignty is doubtful, but it certainly 
has some constitutional significance. This is discussed below. 
208 SA 2016, Part 4 
209 S 53 




hoof.’211 Although devolution in Scotland has often coincided with further devolution elsewhere, 





The devolved system adopted in Wales was shaped largely, as in Scotland, by the nature and extent 
of the support for territorial differentiation, demonstrated at the referendums held before the 
proposals were implemented. In Wales they were supported, but only marginally, with only 50.3% 
voting ‘yes’ to devolved democracy. Despite it not necessarily being clear that limited support 
indicated a preference for weaker powers, rather than expressing a preference for strong ones, the 
Government of Wales Act 1998 that followed did not devolve nearly the same powers as those 
devolved to Scotland. Instead this Act devolved those powers previously held by the Secretary of 
State to a new, unicameral ‘Welsh Assembly’, which many have suggested functioned more like a 
local authority than a regional legislature.213 The Welsh Assembly had extremely limited powers 
and, rather than being a fully-fledged legislature, it operated exclusively as an executive body, with 
secondary law-making powers and no separate government or cabinet of its own. The source of 
law in Wales after the first wave of devolution there remained unquestionably Westminster. Not 
only was the structural arrangement quite different, but so too was the functional allocation of 
powers; in Wales these powers were ‘conferred’214 to the Assembly, rather than reserved to 
Westminster, clearly representing an institution that was distinctly subordinate to its counterparts 
elsewhere, at least as it was initially created. The limited powers of the Assembly, combined with 
its dependence on Westminster, have meant that since its initial, albeit toothless origins, Welsh 
 
211 Tierney (n 24) 104. 
212 ibid. 
213 Consider Jeffery (n 180). 
214 Aroney has commented on the significance of the power conferral models on the understanding of the institutions 
in question in Nicholas Aroney, ‘A Federal Constitution for the United Kingdom? Constitution-Making within a 
Westminster-Derived Context’ (2013) 9 Jus Politicum 1, 8–9. 
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devolution has been playing ‘catch-up’ with the other devolved institutions, seeing its power 
strengthened and its reliance on Westminster reduced. 
 
Although a de facto ‘Welsh government’ had effectively been developed inside the assembly since 
2002, the Government of Wales Act 2006, the result of cross-party support for a change of 
arrangements,215 formalised the separation of powers between the executive and the legislature. 
The Assembly was thence able to seek ‘legislative competence orders’ to extend its competences 
with the consent of the Secretary of State for Wales and the Westminster Parliament.216 Clearly the 
Assembly was still far more at Westminster’s service than the Scottish equivalent was, with 
legislative competence orders being ‘cumbersome’, unpopular and ultimately short-lived.217 The 
2006 Act, however, also included an alternative approach to legislative devolution, allowing the 
Assembly primary law-making power. This could only be obtained after a confirmatory 
referendum, which was held in March 2011. The result was persuasively in favour of more powers 
being devolved and as a consequence the Assembly was granted legislative competence in over 20 
‘subjects’, conferred in Schedule 7 of the Act. The Silk Commission, which was tasked with 
reviewing the progress and success of Welsh devolution recommended moving to the reserved 
powers model adopted in Scotland218 and its findings were largely implemented in the Wales Act 
2014219 which made provision for a referendum for the devolution of fiscal matters, and a more 
formal separation of the Welsh Government. This referendum was quickly undertaken and 
resulted in the devolution of more fiscal powers.  
 
215 Torrance, ‘Reserved Matters in the United Kingdom’ (n 194) 17. 
216 Government of Wales Act 2006 s 95. 
217 Torrance, ‘Reserved Matters in the United Kingdom’ (n 194) 17. 
218 Commission on Devolution in Wales, ‘Empowerment and Responsibility: Legislative Powers to Strengthen Wales’ 
(2014) ch 4. The same had been recommended by the Richard Commission in 2004: ‘Report of the Richard 
Commission’ (Commission on the Powers and Electoral Arrangements of the National Assembly for Wales 2004) 
250.  
219 The change in language, even in the title of the Act, from ‘Government of Wales’ to simply ‘Wales’ in 2014 is 
notable, arguably reflective of a broader shift in the perceived significance of the institution. Of course, this also added 
to the symmetry of the arrangements, bringing it more into line with Scotland and Northern Ireland, which had both 





In 2015 Westminster accepted that a shift towards the reserved powers model was overdue 220 and 
implemented this change along with the recognition of the Assembly’s permanence, and of a 
separate body of Welsh law, in the Wales Act 2017. The Act also contains provision for a future 
change of the Assembly’s name to ‘Parliament’. The powers reserved to Westminster are broadly 
similar to those in Scotland, generally bringing Wales more into line with the other institutions 
even if some do not consider it finished business.221 Interestingly, the reforms to Welsh devolution 
are the only pieces of Welsh-specific legislation the UK Parliament has passed since devolution222 
and have meant that Welsh devolution has gone from an afterthought to an established, permanent 
part of the territorial constitution. This newfound fundamental importance is clearly not what was 
intended by the original settlement at its inception, mirrored by its lack of electoral support, but 
the forces of symmetry, competition223 and integrity have led to an arrangement which can only 
be regarded as constitutionally significant,224 though still not (yet) on the same level as Scotland or, 




220 HM Government, Powers for a Purpose: Towards a Lasting Devolution Settlement for Wales (Cm 9020, 2015) para 2.1.2. 
221 Torrance, ‘Reserved Matters in the United Kingdom’ (n 194) 19: ‘In October 2016, the National Assembly’s 
Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee concluded that the (then proposed) list of reservations did not 
amount to “a lasting or durable settlement”, predicting that both the UK Parliament and Assembly would “need to 
return to address these matters sooner rather than later”…  The Welsh Government also argued that justice measures 
ought to be removed from Schedule 7A. In September 2017, the then First Minister Carwyn Jones established a 
Commission on Justice in Wales to review the operation of the justice system in Wales, including the prospect of a 
separate jurisdiction. It is scheduled to report in 2019. …In a 2015 report, the Wales Governance Centre suggested 
that: ‘A Welsh legal jurisdiction might be distinct, but need not be separate from that of England, nor need it 
necessarily be established as a devolved matter under the control of the National Assembly. (It might be both separate 
and devolved, but that is a policy choice.) It could remain a ‘reserved’ matter, under Westminster’s control, and 
continue to share judges, legal professions and other institutions with England.’’; Constitutional and Legislative Affairs 
Committee, ‘Report on the UK Government’s Wales Bill’ (National Assembly for Wales 2016). 
222 Institute for Government (n 167) 61. 
223 For instance, Wales’ First Minister said that he saw ‘no reason why the Smith Commission offer in Scotland should 
not be made to Wales’: House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, The Future of Devolution 
after the Scottish Referendum (HC 2014-15, 700) para 29, Evidence Q366. 
224 For an interesting indicator of the significance of the Welsh settlement see: The Supreme Court, ‘UK Supreme 
Court to Sit in Wales This Summer’ (22 July 2019) <https://www.supremecourt.uk/news/uk-supreme-court-to-sit-





Northern Ireland is usually considered somewhat enigmatic within the UK’s constitutional 
arrangements, with devolution being no exception.225 Irish devolution was, of course, marked first 
by the Home Rule debates that caused such trouble for Dicey at the turn of the 20th Century and 
Ireland’s subsequent, protracted and violent detachment from the union.226 Legislation to create a 
single devolved Irish Parliament had been unsuccessful and so The Government of Ireland Act 
1920 had intended to do in two steps what its predecessor had been unable to do in one by 
allocating powers to the Northern and Southern Parliaments, with more to be later transferred to 
a devolved united Ireland. These plans were scuppered, however, when Ireland became 
independent and only the Parliament in the North gained powers from Westminster. 227  However, 
this Parliament was controlled overtly by protestant-unionists, leading to discriminatory policies 
against Catholics and nationalists, and ‘[i]n 1972, the UK Government formally requested that 
control of law and order in Northern Ireland be transferred—or reserved—to Westminster. When 
the Government of Northern Ireland refused, Stormont was at first prorogued and then abolished 
in 1973’228 as a result of ‘the Troubles’.229 The Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 made 
provision for a power-sharing assembly based on the competence allocation arrangements of the 
1920 Act, but (despite remaining law) no assembly was successfully established and so the 
Northern Ireland Act 1974 made provision for the same distribution of power but for devolved 
competences to be held by the Northern Ireland Department under the direction of its Secretary 
of State.230 The challenges that face and divide the island of Ireland are deep and complex, and 
cannot be done adequate justice here, but it is certain at the very least that the ‘Irish Question’ has 
 
225 Lady Hale, for instance, notes the unique complexities of Northern Ireland’s case: Lady Hale (n 190). 
226 See Tulloch (n 11); Lord Sumption (n 90). 
227 For a notable example of the Northern Parliament’s operation, see Gallagher v Lynn [1937] AC 863. 
228 Torrance, ‘Reserved Matters in the United Kingdom’ (n 194) 8; David Torrance, ‘Devolution in Northern Ireland, 
1998-2018’ (House of Commons Library 2018) Briefing Paper CBP 08349 14. See also Schedule 6 of the Northern 
Ireland Constitution Act 1973 
229 ‘The Troubles’ is a sadly unrepresentative name for a conflict that killed more than 3,600 people and injured 
thousands more; yet it remains the most conventional terminology for this period. 
230 Torrance, ‘Reserved Matters in the United Kingdom’ (n 194) 8–9. 
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remains a contentious issue that has been a considerable influence on the devolution arrangements 
in Northern Ireland. 
 
The entire ‘power-sharing’ arrangement currently in place is predicated on the ‘Good Friday 
Agreement’ that ended the Troubles. The result of peace-brokering between Prime Ministers, 
leaders and representatives of the communities and even an American President, the resultant 
agreement relies on the institutionalised sharing of authority between the protestant, unionist; 
nationalist, republican and catholic communities, as well as the cooperation of the Irish Republic 
and the UK governments.231 The system in place in Northern Ireland is, as a consequence of its 
troubled past, unique in a number of ways. Firstly, it depends on the institutional recognition of 
its different communities. For instance, it requires the parties to declare, and therefore maintain, 
their allegiances within the communities since these are important for the formation of the power-
sharing Executive and for various voting requirements. Arguably, though this requirement helps 
ingrain these differences rather than diminish them, it may well be a long-term ambition to diffuse 
the differences between the communities and it is certainly understandable that the initial 
arrangements operated the way they did and, indeed, it was a remarkably successful peace-
brokerage. However, it has led to some unusual systems, such as the ‘petition of concern’ 
procedure, which is helpfully explained in a recent Institute for Government report: 
 
Any 30 members can also create a requirement for a vote to be taken on a cross-community 
basis by tabling a ‘petition of concern’. Thirty members is more than 40% of either the 
unionist or nationalist groups in the Assembly, so the 30 signatories to a petition of concern 
are effectively able to exercise a veto. … The petition of concern process has been used on a 
range of different issues, including votes on issues of symbolic importance to one community 
or the other. For example, in 2001, members used a petition of concern to block a Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP) motion that Easter lilies, a nationalist symbol, should not be displayed 
at Stormont. In other cases, members have used a petition of concern on contested policy 
 
231 The Agreement is also heavily dependent on EU regulation and ECHR adherence, as well as the British Irish 
Council. 
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questions. In November 2015, a majority of Northern Ireland Assembly members voted in 
favour of same-sex marriage, but the DUP used a petition of concern to stop the proposal 
from being approved.232 
 
The second definitive characteristic of the Northern Irish arrangements is the model of power-
allocation there. In Northern Ireland this follows a three-fold system, in contrast to the models 
utilised in Scotland and Wales. There are ‘transferred’ matters, ‘excepted’ matters233 and, finally, 
‘reserved’ maters. The first of these is straightforward, being the list of competences bestowed on 
Stormont. The second are also easily comprehended, being the powers retained at Westminster.234 
These powers are negatively defined, as in Scotland, with everything being transferred but that 
which is not. However, the third category is the most interesting and, confusingly, does not have 
the same meaning as in the other statutes. Here the powers that are envisaged as potential 
candidates for future transfer are listed.235 This threefold system allows for far more flexibility than 
the systems in place elsewhere throughout the union and is in place in order to encourage the 
successful operation of the Northern Ireland Assembly. Reserved matters can be transferred, as 
long as there is cross-community support, by Orders in Council but, as is the case in Scotland and 
Wales, the allocation of competences is ultimately flexible because of Westminster’s technically 
unbridled legislative competence. Under s 4 of the 1998 Act, the Secretary of State can draft an 
Order in Council to move a matter from ‘reserved’ to ‘transferred’ or from ‘transferred’ to 
‘reserved’.236 
 
232 Institute for Government (n 167) 29; Consider also ibid 30: ‘In 2014, Sinn Féin raised objections to [a] bill and 
tabled a number of amendments. The DUP used a petition of concern 47 times to block these amendments. When 
the bill reached the final vote, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) decided to join Sinn Féin in a petition 
of concern. Together, they brought down the whole bill on a cross-community vote. The UK Treasury fined the 
Executive for failing to comply with budgetary rules and the Executive and Assembly eventually agreed that the 
legislation should be taken through Westminster instead.’ The ‘Fresh Start Agreement’ which attempted to improve 
the Petition procedure so it would only be used exceptionally with an explanation has not been fully implemented. 
233 Schedule 2 of the Act. 
234 The terminology here is, confusingly, inconsistent with the other devolution statutes. 
235 Schedule 3 of the Act. 
236 On the 12th April 2010, most policing and justice powers were removed from Schedule 3 (and therefore transferred 
to the Assembly). Because of the sensitive nature of policing and justice, this transfer also needed cross-community 





The third idiosyncrasy of the devolution settlement in Northern Ireland is how frequently the 
power-sharing Executive has collapsed as the communities looked to more extreme 
representatives, though there has seldom been a return to violence. The governance of Northern 
Ireland by direct rule from Westminster through orders in council237 has been controversial, as has 
its ability to legislate in the absence of an Executive since 2017. For instance, if the Executive is 
not restored by 21st October 2019, same-sex marriage (an especially sensitive matter in the region) 
will be extended to Northern Ireland on 13th January 2020 as a result of Westminster passing 
legislation requiring the Government to extend same-sex marriage regulations to include Northern 
Ireland. Self-rule, it seems, has not been a cure-all in the region but it is certainly a channel for 
progress, and a pathway through which solutions might be found.  
 
Northern Ireland paints a unique picture of the power and purpose of devolved government in 
the UK. The adaptability, flexibility and tolerable asymmetry of the system has allowed the 
development of an arrangement which is in tune with its context, rather than being simply pasted 
as part of a more general, less contextually sensitive scheme. Not only has devolution been able to 
respond to local demands in its implementation, but it has itself enabled a community to govern 
itself, and to trust itself to govern, along with concerted support from external forces such as the 
UK and Irish Governments. The resultant ‘ownership’ of governance in the troubled region has 
been a powerful protector of peace there, but the settlement’s technicalities and reliance on 
division in the community have led to stagnation and collapse, with the return of direct rule being 
both unfavourable and frequent. Despite occasional governmental side-lining of Northern 
Ireland’s challenges, the general trend of mutual interest in the restoration and protection of the 
regional government—or at least in peace in the region—is positive and has led to insights that 
 
(Northern Ireland) Act 2015 when it is commenced. This will only occur once the Executive is restored and can 
demonstrate the sustainability of its finances. 
237 These, on average, took 90 minutes to pass through the Commons: Institute for Government (n 167) 61. 
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could be of benefit in other divided regions around the world. Although the benefits and 
challenges of self-government, it can safely be claimed, are epitomised in the experiences of 
Northern Ireland, one part of the UK remains broadly untouched by legislative independence and 
self-government. England, along with the constitutional ‘centre’ at Westminster have been largely 
insulated from the changes that have marked the rest of the UK. 
 
 
England and ‘the Centre’ 
 
England represents yet another enigma, or even a ‘black hole’238 at the core of devolution, having 
no territorial legislature of its own beyond that in Westminster which consists of representatives 
from all corners of the union,239 while being by far the largest of the four countries with 
considerable dominance and influence in those institutions in London. England, through the 
sovereign Parliament it dominates, has ultimate power to remake the entire constitution, even on 
some readings without the support of any of the devolved regions.240 The asymmetry of the UK, 
and the sheer dominance of England, both in terms of its multilateral relations with the other 
nations, and in terms of its bilateral relations with Westminster, have historically proved quite the 
problem for decentralisation. For instance, an English Parliament, it is often suggested, would 
prove a genuine rival to Westminster’s dominance representing almost as many people as the 
latter.241 If England is treated as simply an equal to the other nations—for instance if a national 
veto system were adopted—the people of England would be sorely underrepresented; and if the 
intergovernmental systems in place are only representative of population, the other devolved 
 
238  Dickson (n 201) 268. 
239 Although Sinn Féin, the largest of the Nationalist parties in Northern Ireland, refuse to take up their seats in 
Westminster since to do so would require them to make an oath to the Crown which they, as republicans, do not 
recognise. 
240 This is more plausible when it is remembered that the constitution remains the exclusive competence of 
Westminster, but the persistence of Westminster’s sovereignty is considered in detail below. 
241 Michael Burgess, ‘Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom: New Model or Mere Respray’ (1999) 40 South 
Texas Law Review 715, 730–3. 
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nations will struggle for a voice in policy. In order to circumvent this conundrum, the devolution 
reforms set in motion by New Labour, and developed by successive Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat and Conservative governments have largely avoided the problem, making very few 
changes to English regional government. Yet this approach leaves much to be desired. It is one of 
the great ironies at the heart of devolution that ‘[a]ll is change in the state of the Union except in 
its dominant English Heartland’.242 It is here, both in terms of the English territory/ies, and in 
terms of the constitutional centre at Westminster, that there has been minimal adjustment for 
devolution.243 Ironically, this has meant that the most significant player in the Union has been able 
to maintain its unitary perspective—England only knows one layer of democratic government 
within the UK and has never demonstrated a desire for more than this.244 If England’s role and 
status within the union makes its representation as a nation problematic, there are also problems 
with subnational devolution too: 
 
Social geography complicates the politics of subnational governance. One persistent 
stumbling block to setting up regional authorities is the absence in England of either a distinct 
cultural identity or obvious geographical boundaries demarcating distinct regional entities, in 
marked contrast to the well-defined historic nations.245 
 
This alternative approach of dividing England into composite regions, and governing those 
separately to the ‘nation’, was  piloted in the North East at the outset of devolution but collapsed 
in the wake of comprehensive rejection.246 The trial, which was intended to be replicated across 
the English regions was then abandoned, the lack of any clear, obvious or meaningful territorial 
 
242 O’Neill (n 142) 89. 
243 Institute for Government (n 167) 4: ‘Whitehall and Westminster were also barely affected, at least initially, and the 
UK and devolved governments created few formal mechanisms for joint working between them.’ ibid 6: ‘England has 
largely been ignored in the devolution process’ 
244 Arguably, as was indicated at the outset of this paper, there is an exception in local councils and authorities that 
have elections, but the focus here is on the higher levels of government. 
245 O’Neill (n 142) 90. 
246 See Dickson (n 201) 268. 
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distinctions in England have meant that it has historically been unreceptive, or at best, ambivalent 
towards any kind of large sub-state democracy. The exception to this rule of course being the 
implementation of a mayoral system in some of England’s biggest cities247 and the ‘Northern 
Powerhouse’ which, perhaps, mark a new phase in regional devolution there.  
 
The asymmetry of representation has been significant in the Westminster Parliament where 
English Members were not able to vote on laws affecting exclusively devolved territories (in those 
areas where competence had been devolved) while Members representing devolved territories 
could vote on legislation affecting only England, since no competences had been removed from 
Westminster’s immediate business. This paradox has been called ‘The West-Lothian Question’,248 
and has been the basis of much debate concerning the procedures and systems that are operable 
in that Parliament.249 Opponents suggested that if English MPs were to be granted a veto (or 
equivalent power) the historic equality between MPs would be broken, with some Members having 
powers or voting rights that others did not possess. However, despite these concerns, a system of 
‘English votes for English Laws’ (EVEL) has been put in place so that English-only issues can be 
voted on by only English MPs. This solution, that Tony Blair rejected over his own Party’s more 
‘idiosyncratic British solution’,250 is an example of reactive devolution, where solutions are 
apparently improvised as problems arise. The Institute for Government has made the following 
claim about its operation: 
 
‘… EVEL has not made a significant difference in practice. There have been no cases of 
English MPs voting against a law that the House of Commons as a whole has voted for, and 
the process – for now – is a barely noticed technicality. An academic study found that 
 
247 London and Manchester, for instance, both have Mayors that are checked by a committee. 
248 Named after the constituency of the MP who first noted the problem in the chamber. 
249 For instance, see Roger Masterman and Robert Hazell, ‘Devolution and Westminster’ in Alan Trench (ed), The 
State of the Nations 2001: The Second Year of Devolution in the United Kingdom (Imprint Academic 2001); Vernon Bogdanor, 
‘England May Pay Dearly for Staying United with Scotland’ Financial Times (24 July 2014). 




proceedings on English parts of bills, which take place a new English ‘Legislative Grand 
Committee’, lasted an average of around two minutes… EVEL has “failed to provide 
meaningful English representation at Westminster—particularly in relation to supplying 
England, and its MPs, with an enhanced ‘voice’”… if the parliamentary arithmetic were 
different, for instance if a future Labour-led government had a UK-wide majority but no 
majority in England, then the EVEL process could become more significant, since English 
opposition MPs would hold a veto power over legislation in important areas of domestic 
public policy.’251 
 
This problem has been highlighted in the past, when New Labour were only able to pass legislation 
for foundation hospitals and university tuition fee top-ups in England with support outside of 
England, because a majority of English MPs voted against the policies.252 The effects have been 
relatively minor, but EVEL, used for 35 bills since 2015, represents ‘a rare example of a procedural 
change that the UK Parliament has made as a result of devolution.’253 Indeed, other changes have 
not been forthcoming254 and EVEL represents more the exception than the rule.255 It might be 
argued that the principle role of the centre in light of decentralisation might need to be more 
adhesive than it may have been previously, yet there has been ‘no concentration upon the central 
institutions of the state and their role in binding the union together’.256 There have been other 
changes, but these have largely been ‘reactive and responsive’,257 rather than wholesale and general. 
The enhanced role of the territorial select committees, and the persistence of the territorial 
 
251 Institute for Government (n 167) 63. See also The McKay Commission, ‘Report of the Commission on the 
Consequences of Devolution for the House of Commons’ (2013). 
252 Institute for Government, Interview with Blair (n 146) 9. 
253 Institute for Government (n 167) 63. 
254 Tony Blair himself has subsequently recognised the significance of his Party’s neglect of the English question: ‘one 
of the things when you do devolution is you’ve got to look for ways of binding the UK together. If I have a criticism 
of our own position on this it’s that we didn’t look for enough ways, culturally and socially, of keeping the UK feeling 
we’re part of one nation at the same time as being individual nations within that collective. That’s why I was always 
resistant to more concessions to English nationalism because I think the Union only works if you accept that there is 
an essential imbalance between England, that it is so much more dominant than all the other parts of the UK put 
together.’: Institute for Government, Interview with Blair (n 146) 9. 
255 There have been occasional indications that the House of Lords could be reformed to take on the character of a 
federal territorial chamber, where the territories are more equally represented, the Labour Party Manifesto for 2015 
for instance argued for an ‘elected Senate of the Nations and Regions to replace the House of Lords’ but this has 
never gained significant traction: Labour Party, ‘Britain Can Be Better: Labour Party Manifesto 2015’ 84–85. 
256 Tierney (n 24) 102. 
257 Masterman and Hazell (n 249) 197. 
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Secretaries of State and their departments are examples of central devolutionary dynamics, but 
arguably these changes only scratch the surface of the disintegrative problems posed by 
decentralisation. Although some effort is being made—even in the Supreme Court, devolution has 
left its mark258—the centre must accommodate for the changed constitution, even if it is held back 
by Westminster’s unitary-oriented conception of devolution. Indeed, ‘the focus since 1997 has 
been almost exclusively upon autonomy and not on the role of the devolved territories at the 
centre’.259 EVEL, for instance, does take account of the more fundamental realities of devolved 
government, marking ‘arguably the first, and certainly the most significant, adjustment to the 
central law-making process that takes account of the reality of devolution’ recognising that ‘a more 
formalised categorisation of state-wide legislation on the one hand and ‘devolved’ or sub-state 
legislation on the other—a distinction common to most federal systems—will become part of the 
UK’s constitutional architecture’260 
 
Clearly then the place of England and the ‘constitutional centre’ is complicated.261 England 
operates as a ‘sub-national’ territorial unit of its own, like the other devolved territories, while also 
representing the majority of the ‘unitary’ state; it operates as the ‘union’ level where the centre 
conducts policies on international relations and other typical federal level policies;262 and it also 
operates as a meeting point for the devolved institutions: in the House of Commons, every 
devolved territory is represented and debates on policies that can affect all of them. It might be 
suggested that these problems would be reduced if England could be distinguished in some way 
 
258 Constitutional Reform Act 2005 s 27(8): ‘In making selections for the appointment of judges of the Court the 
commission must ensure that between them the judges will have knowledge of, and experience of practice in, the law 
of each part of the United Kingdom.’ 
259 Tierney (n 24) 105. 
260 ibid 116. 
261 Even this terminology itself is contentious, perhaps demonstrating the difficulties in abandoning on ‘unitary’ 
language. 
262 Locke for instance identified the ‘federative power’ as ‘the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all 
the transactions with all persons and communities without the commonwealth’: John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 




from the ‘centre’ and, though EVEL makes some attempt to do this, broadly this seems 
impossible. Yet, either way, it is clear that insufficient attention has been given to the union as a 
whole, or to the impact of devolution in one region on the others.263 It is England where the unitary 
conception of the UK is most powerful, and it is there that, given the influence of the Westminster 
Parliament, this conception is most problematic. England continues to demonstrate tendencies 
endorsing the incremental non-fundamental approach to devolution, an approach that does not 
seem to require wholesale reform at the centre. The risk, however, is that, as Tierney suggests, the 
pursuit of self-rule without adequate provision for shared-rule, or even any kind of formal 
engagement between the centre and peripheries, risks making ‘the UK state seem, respectively, 
irrelevant and unreachable to the devolved territories’,264 something that, as history demonstrates, 
cannot afford to be unnoticed. The devolution ‘settlement’ is, it has been seen, a complex system 
of variable territorial powers that is applied, for better or worse, differently in each region. There 
are ‘gaps’ in the arrangements—namely in England and the constitutional centre—and there has 
been an evolution of the system towards a more symmetrical, constitutionally fundamental 
approach. In order to justify this claim, and to explore how effective (or not) devolved government 
has been in practice, the reality of devolved government must be unpacked. 
 
DEVOLUTION IN PRACTICE: ‘A PROCESS’ 
 
The role of the previous section was to indicate ‘what’ devolution in the UK is. Broadly, it 
described the various arrangements in each of the regions and emphasised some core features of 
them—asymmetry, territorial sensitivity, and change over time among them—rather than 
analysing how devolution has worked in practice. This latter issue is the function of the following 
section which looks to unpack the ‘how’ of devolution by interrogating its operation, with 
 
263 Tierney (n 24) 104; House of Lords Constitution Committee, Proposals for the Devolution of Further Powers to Scotland 
(HL 2014-15, 145) para 13. 
264 Tierney (n 24) 105. 
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particular focus ‘between’ these institutions. First, the ways in which the institutions interact and 
cooperate will be considered, to review the extent to which hierarchy continues to persist in the 
UK’s territorial constitution and how dependence on political mechanisms alone does, in fact, 
leave room for cooperation to develop, but that the political will to encourage cooperation does 
seem to be lacking. Second, the case-law that has arisen as a consequence devolution must be 
considered to understand how the judiciary—so important in federal systems—makes sense of 
the new constitution and of their role within it. Though the political nature of much of the 
arrangements, and Westminster’s retention (at least as a matter of pure law) of sovereignty might 
seem to warrant a dismissive approach towards devolution, the courts, it will be seen, have taken 
an approach that is far more textured, thorough and nuanced, and which understands the true 
constitutional significance of devolution. However, it will finally be seen that even the judicial, 
protectionist understanding of devolution is not enough to protect it from central institutions that 




Interaction, Cooperation and the Persistence of Hierarchy 
 
Devolution, it has been noted, is asymmetric, ad hoc, and leaves Westminster firmly in a position 
of dominance. Couple this with the politically charged nature of any institutional interaction where 
the leading parties disagree on matters of policy or have political gains to make from maltreatment 
or failed negotiation, and the opportunities for cooperation seem limited. In the event, the power 
of political constitutionalism and its restraints, such as those sourced in convention, on viably 
‘constitutional’ activity, despite Westminster’s retention of legal supremacy, actually have the ability 
to enable effective intergovernmental interactions. There are examples, however, of political 
dependency providing a stumbling block for the effectiveness of intergovernmental relations, as 
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has been the case for the Joint Ministerial Committees which have provided an ungainly, 
temperamental source of intergovernmental engagement. But the shape of the settlements, and 
Westminster’s deference to the territories in terms of both the initial arrangements and their 
development (particularly in Wales) has demonstrated a willingness to understand their problems 
and play a positive role in implementing their solutions. However, departure from the European 
Union—importantly meaning the removal of a fundamental source of law from the UK, upon 
which much of the devolution settlement depends—has demonstrated a willingness in 
Westminster to return to unitary, Anglo-centric ideas of the constitution. This section will consider 
these elements in turn, first briefly addressing Westminster’s shaping of the settlements 
themselves, before secondly considering its retention of ‘sovereignty’ and the impact of the 
concept of legislative consent. Thirdly, extra-legal intergovernmental relations will be considered 
to interrogate what political mechanisms exist to allow for cooperation between the different 
legislatures before the judicial approaches are considered. 
 
1. Shaping the Settlements 
 
Westminster has proven itself as a principally deferential force in the creation and amendment of 
the devolution settlements. Firstly, in legislating for and subsequently adhering to the referendum 
results, Westminster has demonstrated a keen desire to ensure the devolution arrangements are 
not ‘imposed’ but develop where they are needed and in response to the needs of the territory in 
which they operate.265 This is not a point that needs labouring at this stage since it has been made 
already, but, beyond the laudable goals of self-government and subsidiarity inherent in any process 
of devolution, Westminster’s responsiveness to desire and need has demonstrated an impressive 
willingness to cooperate with local communities and stakeholders, if not governments. Secondly, 
 
265 ‘In November 2013 the UK government admitted that it “has not continued pursuit of regional devolution because 
previous efforts have not received popular support”. That is why it abolished Regional Development Agencies and 
Government Offices for the Regions.’: Dickson (n 201) 269. 
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once the settlement was in place, adjustments and modifications, many of which have been 
outlined above, have themselves also been in pursuit of regional need, rather than as a symptom 
of systematised symmetry. For instance, the changes to the Welsh Assembly’s powers from 
secondary to primary legislative authority were led by demands there, and ultimately a referendum. 
The arrangements beforehand were heavily reliant on cooperative interaction between the two 
institutions, but this proved more of an extra hurdle to effective government than an additional 
source of legitimacy. The same can be said for Northern Ireland where police and justice powers 
were only transferred with the consent of the communities represented there (indeed, this is 
something required by the Northern Ireland Act 1998).266  
 
The flexibility of the devolution arrangements, sometimes criticised as making them unstable, has 
actually often led to positive interaction between the different legislatures. For instance, the Order 
in Council used under s 30 of the Scotland Act 1998267 enabled the two legislatures to provide for 
the Scottish independence referendum of 2014 by temporarily extending the powers of the 
Scottish Parliament as they were needed. This also conveniently circumvented the problematic and 
fundamental question of whether Holyrood possessed the competence to legislate for such a 
referendum.268 However, it is significant that the progress of devolution has been in (generally) 
one direction: more powers are incrementally granted with little consideration for how these might 




266 The reservation of Antarctica in 2012 in Scotland may have been more of a correction in hindsight than a needs-
based modification. 
267 Scotland Act 1998 (Modification of Schedule 5) Order 2013. 
268 Essentially there are two lines of thought on this: A referendum might be within competence if its main purpose 
is to gauge public opinion, but it might be beyond competence if its main purpose was to provide for independence 
(since the Union and Constitution are both reserved matters). See Aroney, ‘Reserved Matters, Legislative Purpose and 
the Referendum on Scottish Independence’ (n 1). 




2. Legislative Consent and Sovereignty 
 
While the 1998 Scotland Bill was on its way through the Commons, Tam Dalyell suggested that 
‘[t]he idea that Westminster is the ultimate authority will be little more than a formality’.270 There 
is not sufficient space to expand in great depth on the nature and meaning of parliamentary 
sovereignty in the UK, but it is worth indicating that a number of developments have changed 
how it is understood (at least judicially) in the UK. Firstly, judicial interpretation has, arguably, 
applied various restrictions on the operation of sovereignty. Second, developments since the late 
20th Century such as membership of the EU have led to practical limitations on the operation of 
Parliament’s ability to ‘make or unmake any law whatever’271 and thirdly (and connectedly) 
Parliament has sometimes itself put limitations of some kind on its own legislative omnipotence.272 
These developments, particularly the passing of the devolution legislation, might seem to impinge 
upon Parliament’s sovereignty; for instance, devolved legislation can override aspects of UK 
legislation that resonate in devolved areas: ‘an Act of the [Northern Ireland] Assembly may modify 
any provision made by or under an Act of [the UK] Parliament in so far as it is part of the law of 
Northern Ireland.’273 Westminster has in response gone to lengths to ensure its ‘ultimate authority’ 
is protected and each piece of foundational devolution legislation contains a provision protecting 
its supremacy.274 Such an assurance, though it may seem superfluous under conventional 
 
270 HC Deb 28 January 1998, vol 305, col 367.  
271 These developments, it is worth remembering, have not always been in the direction of ‘juridification’, but instead 
in the direction of ‘constitutionalisation’ as political and even parliamentary oversight of arbitrary power in the 
constitution has grown, rather than merely judicial power. See Roger Masterman, ‘Labour’s “Juridification” of the 
Constitution’ (2009) 62 Parliamentary Affairs 476. 
272 Consider the obiter comments (especially of Lord Hope and Lord Steyn) in R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] 
UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262. 
273 Northern Ireland Act 1998 s 5(6); Mark Elliott, ‘The Principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty in Legal, Constitutional 
and Political Perspective’ in Jeffrey Jowell, Dawn Oliver and Colm O’Cinneide (eds), The Changing Constitution (8th 
edn, OUP 2015) 41: ‘Equivalent propositions hold true in relation to Acts of the Scottish Parliament and Acts of the 
Welsh Assembly: they can modify repeal or replace UK legislation in so far as it affects matters upon which those 
devolved bodies are competent to legislate.’ 
274 Scotland Act 1998 s 28(7); Government of Wales Act s 107(5); Northern Ireland Act s 5(5). 
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constitutional theory, is nothing new.275 It is well known that while the Scotland Bill was being 
passed Lord Sewel, a minister in the Scotland Office, suggested that he ‘would expect a convention 
to be established that Westminster would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters 
in Scotland without the consent of the Scottish Parliament.’276 This convention operates more as 
a restriction on legitimate legislative action, rather than as a limitation of any formal legislative 
competence but, nonetheless, it has caused controversy in legal and political circles. Indeed, there are 
differing views on not only the implications of the convention, but also on what it means.277 
 
The Sewel convention can be seen as a political constraint on the otherwise apparently unbounded 
power of the Westminster Parliament, stipulating that Westminster may only legislate in an area 
within devolved competence with the permission of the legislature concerned.278 However, as 
explored further below, this operates merely in the political sphere, and is not judicially 
 
275 Boyce (n 148) 286: ‘the 1920 Government of Ireland Act explicitly states in section 75 that “the supreme authority 
of the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall remain unaffected and undiminished over all persons, matters and 
things in Ireland and every part thereof.”’ 
276 HL Deb 21 July 1998, vol 592, col 791. 
277 Tierney (n 24) n 51: ‘It is notable that the Sewel convention is set out here in relation to “devolved matters”. This 
is a more narrow definition than that recognised by the UK Government in Devolution Guidance Note 10, which 
suggests that the convention covers a proposed bill which: ‘contains provisions applying to Scotland and which are 
for devolved purposes, or which alter the legislative competence of the Parliament or the executive competence of 
the Scottish Ministers.’ …The UK Government seems to have accepted that the convention covers bills that will 
change the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament either restrictively or in an empowering way. The Scottish 
Government also takes an expansive view of the convention. …These differences in understanding could be a source 
of future disagreement and potentially of legal dispute.’ 
278 The Institute for Government explains the procedure effectively: ‘The normal process followed in cases where 
legislation at Westminster falls within the scope of the convention is that there is consultation between the UK and 
devolved administrations before publication of the legislation. When the bill is introduced, devolved ministers set out 
their view of whether and why consent should be given in a ‘legislative consent memorandum’. In some cases, this 
leads to amendments being made in the UK Parliament to deal with devolved concerns. The devolved legislature then 
votes on a ‘legislative consent motion’, which can either grant or decline to grant consent to the bill. The UK 
Parliament has the power to ignore the denial of devolved consent and to legislate regardless, but has very rarely taken 
this option.’: Institute for Government (n 167) 64. It also explains the operation of the ‘legislative consent motions’ 
(LCMs): ‘… 202 Acts of Parliament (including 17 private members' bills) over the first two decades of devolution 
(until the end of March 2019) had been subject to consent motions in at least one of the three devolved legislatures. 
This includes 155 bills in the case of Scotland, 61 for Wales and 65 for Northern Ireland (a figure that would have 
been significantly higher had it not been for the regular collapses of devolution in Northern Ireland). In 60 cases, 
consent had been voted on in more than one of the devolved legislatures, including 19 where consent had been 




enforceable, even though it has now been codified in statute.279 In political practice, though, the 
Sewel convention has proven quite fertile ground for cooperation: 
[O]n just 10 occasions has consent been denied, in part or in full.  
 
On other occasions, however, concerns raised by devolved ministers have led to amendments 
or other commitments at Westminster to resolve devolved objections. For example, the Public 
Pensions Act 2013 as originally introduced would have applied to certain pension schemes 
under devolved control. The Scottish Government argued that it had not been consulted 
sufficiently and informed the UK Government that it would not recommend consent. The 
bill was amended to take out the Scottish provisions, and no consent motion was ever debated. 
Also in 2013, the UK Government had the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act amended to 
remove Northern Ireland from certain provisions, in light of opposition at the devolved level.  
 
The Scotland Act 2016 and Wales Act 2017 were also held up by threats to withhold consent, 
until agreement was reached on the financial implications of the legislation… The Northern 
Ireland Assembly has only voted against consent once, on the Enterprise Bill in 2016, which 
was then amended to exclude Northern Ireland from the disputed parts. There was a similar 
outcome when the Scottish Parliament withheld consent from parts of the Welfare Reform 
Bill 2011/12: UK ministers agreed to amend the bill and consent was secured… 
 
The normal pattern since 1999 has been for Westminster to respect the Sewel Convention, 
and for the devolved bodies to grant consent to UK bills where required, often after 
concessions by UK ministers over the terms of the legislation.280 
 
Use of the Sewel convention has not always been branded as cooperative,281 but the result of these 
developments in sum is that, as Professor Elliott suggests, although Parliament’s legal powers 
remain technically unfettered the ‘constitutionality’ of its activities is more open to question. As a 
 
279 Section 2 Scotland Act 2016 inserted into the Scotland Act 1998 s 28(8) which reads: ‘But it is recognised that the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of 
the Scottish Parliament.’ Section 2 of the Wales Act 2017 inserted into the Government of Wales Act 2006 s 107(6) 
equivalent, terminologically sensitive terms. 
280 Institute for Government (n 167) 65–6. 
281 Andrea Batey and Alan Page, ‘Scotland’s Other Parliament: Westminster Legislation about Devolved Matters in 
Scotland since Devolution’ [2002] Public Law 501, 501: ‘… in nearly the first three years of its existence the Scottish 
Parliament [had] agreed almost as many Sewel motions as it has enacted bills. This has prompted criticism that it is 
simply abdicating its legislative responsibilities to Westminster. Letting powers drift back to Westminster is the way 
one commentator described it in The Scotsman. “This is Scotland’s Parliament; let Scotland’s Parliament legislate” is 
the nationalist plea.’ 
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result, the position is more one where Westminster ‘shares such competence with devolved 
institutions’,282 than one where exclusive legislative domains are completely insulated, with the 
Sewel convention operating as a more collaborative mechanism in practice than might have been 
first thought, mediating these levels of government. 
 
A further attempt that has been made to limit Westminster’s practical omnipotence, and to 
enhance some element of institutional respect, is the enshrined permanence of the devolved 
legislatures. Following the Scottish independence referendum, as part of a raft of changes made to 
bolster Scotland’s place in the union, s 1 of the Scotland Act 2016 inserted a s 63A into the 
Scotland Act 1998, apparently enshrining the permanence of the Scottish Parliament.283 These 
permanence provisions were also transposed onto the Welsh settlement,284 yet the problem of 
asymmetry continues to be an issue here since, because of the likelihood of direct rule in Northern 
Ireland and because of devolution’s acceptance the self-determination of the Northern Irish 
population (and its provision for unification), permanence clauses are not likely to be forthcoming 
there.285 There is debate over the legal effect of these provisions and there is no need to explore 
all the possible legal implications here: It may be that the Westminster ‘Parliament is seeking to 
limit its own competence in a way that the courts may seek to uphold in future’,286 but even without 
hypothesising about the judiciary’s interpretation of the legislation, especially given their hesitation 
since Jackson287 to challenge Parliament’s view of its own sovereignty, it is at the very least clear 
that these provisions have political—and constitutional—significance. The permanence provisions 
 
282 Elliott (n 273) 40. 
283 Section 63A reads: ‘(1) The Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are a permanent part of the United 
Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements. (2) The purpose of this section is, with due regard to the other provisions of 
this Act, to signify the commitment of the Parliament and Government of the United Kingdom to 
the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government. (3) In view of that commitment it is declared that the Scottish 
Parliament and the Scottish Government are not to be abolished.’ 
284 Wales Act 2017 s 1. 
285 Thanks to Stephen Tierney for this point: Tierney (n 24) 114. 
286  House of Lords Constitution Committee, Scotland Bill Report (HL 2015-16, 59) para 36. 




clearly appear ‘to be moving the United Kingdom in a federal direction, attempting to crystallise 
by way of statute, if not written Constitution, the status and powers of the devolved institutions 
in a way that has hitherto not been the case’.288 Whether these limitations have legal resonance is 
therefore a narrow misrepresentation that conceals the more significant point: 
 
If … the UK Parliament wanted to diminish the powers of the devolved legislatures, or to 
enact legislation overriding laws passed by the devolved legislatures, or even to abolish those 
legislatures, nothing in law prevents it from doing so. However, the binary analysis yielded by 
this sort of exclusively legal analysis must be supplemented by considering the matter in 
broader constitutional terms. When such a perspective is adopted, it becomes clear that the 
devolution schemes both acknowledge and conjure into life a constitutional principle—that 
of devolved autonomy—whose fundamentality is increasingly difficult to dispute. This 
demands, among other things, that the authority of devolved institutions be respected, and 
implies the general impropriety of UK legislation impinging upon self-government within the 
devolved nations.289 
 
If they are to have legal effect then this claim is solidified, amounting to an exceptional step 
towards recognition. It is possible to argue that such political promises are without teeth if such 
provisions were to have no legal effect, but they do in themselves demonstrate a substantial 
commitment to the devolved institutions. What they require, remains however, the political will to 
support devolved autonomy. Statements such as the permanence provisions might encourage this 
mentality, but they cannot (especially if they are of dubious legal effect) protect devolution in its 
absence. It is at the very least unclear what exists in law that would be able to protect devolution 
against a Westminster minded to disregard it. This trend, of political mechanisms to protect 
devolution which are of themselves positive, but remain contingent on attitudes of cooperation, 
is also evident in the nature of intergovernmental relations. 
 
 
288 House of Lords Constitution Committee, Proposals for the Devolution of Further Powers to Scotland (n 263) para 77.  
289 Elliott (n 273) 42–3. For a comparative example (from Canada) of how this might work in legal terms, see ibid 45. 
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3. Intergovernmental Relations and Joint Ministerial Committees 
 
One of the most significant demonstrations of hierarchical element of devolution is in 
intergovernmental relations.290 Here the impact of dependence on political sensibilities and 
pleasantries, the lack of formal (or legal) mechanisms—arguably both the result of devolution’s ad 
hoc implementation—and the immense dominance of Westminster and Whitehall when these 
informalities can be manipulated have all made for a system that is not nearly as effective as it 
could be, even if the creation of the systems themselves is a positive step. A consistent criticism 
of devolution is that there are no avenues for ‘the expression of legitimate political and territorial 
differences, negotiation, dialogue and dispute resolution.’291 However, avenues have from time to 
time existed, but have simply been very ineffective. As O’Neill suggests, ‘[d]evolution has 
undoubtedly unsettled territorial relations. Implicit in this favourable allocation was an incentive 
for these regions to remain committed to the union state. Devolution has undermined that bond, 
weakening loyalties on both sides’292 and there is therefore a real need for intergovernmental 
relationships to develop to counteract these forces. The most notable opportunity for this has 
come in the form of the Joint Ministerial Committees (JMCs), which are set out in Memorandums 
of Understanding, themselves informal political agreements with no legal significance.293 These 
can be convened on a number of issues, or as forum for meetings between the heads of each 
institution. The JMCs have come in and out of use periodically and have proven particularly 
ineffectual when the different institutions have been governed by the same Party. This was the 
case when Labour had control over the devolved institutions in Britain and at Westminster and 
 
290 See generally Nicola McEwen, ‘Still Better Together? Purpose and Power in Intergovernmental Councils in the 
UK’ (2017) 27 Regional and Federal Studies 667. 
291 Justice Committee of the House of Commons, Devolution: A Decade On (HC 2008-9, 529) para 105. 
292 O’Neill (n 142) 85. The recognition of the importance of the union has been distilled throughout devolution, 
though the instruments for making this work have been few: ‘There are many matters which can be more effectively 
and beneficially handled on a United Kingdom basis. By preserving the integrity of the United Kingdom, the Union 
secures for its people participation in an economic unit which benefits business and provides access to wider markets 
and investment and increases prosperity for all. Scotland also benefits from strong and effective defence and foreign 
policies and a sense of belonging to a United Kingdom.’: Scottish Office, Scotland’s Parliament (Cm 3658, 1997).  
293 These were founded by HM Government, Memorandum of Understanding (Cm 4806, July 2000). See also Richard 
Rawlings, ‘Concordats of the Constitution’ 116 Law Quarterly Review 257. 
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preferred to handle disputes internally, rather than through the official forums of the JMC, even 
though these have mostly been informal themselves. However, when the different institutions 
have been led by different parties, the JMCs have provided an effective way for managing disputes, 
cooperating and developing policies. The EU proved to be an avenue of particular utility for JMCs, 
with the JMC (Europe) being convened consistently. Brexit has also proven an opportunity for 
JMC collaboration, being an avenue for policy-exchange, even where the administrations have had 
fundamental disagreement.294  
 
However, the effectiveness of the JMCs has been undermined by inconsistent sittings, a lack of 
transparency or binding weight to their decisions and, because of the asymmetric nature of the 
settlement, it has proved difficult even for JMCs to coordinate multilateral agreements, being 
better suited to individual bilateral relations between Westminster and each devolved institution.295 
As a result, ‘in the eyes of the devolved administrations at least the way the JMC system works at 
present is not satisfactory’;296 indeed the problems with the JMCs are largely illustrative of the 
broader problems with the UK’s intergovernmental arrangements namely because of 
Westminster’s pooling of legal sovereignty and the informality of intergovernmental relationships. 
The temperamentality of the JMCs, their lack of legal oversight or any more fundamental 
constitutional entrenchment is not disconnected to Westminster’s perception of the subordinate 
 
294 Institute for Government (n 167) 69: ‘After an initial flurry of activity, these quickly ceased to meet, suggesting that 
there was little interest in developing common approaches in policy areas that were now the responsibility of the 
devolved institutions After 2008, a new all-purpose JMC (Domestic) was established, although that too met 
infrequently and ceased operation in 2014. A separate ‘Finance Ministers Quadrilateral’ forum also meets occasionally. 
The only ministerial committee that has met regularly through the whole two decades of devolution since 1999 is the 
JMC (Europe)… In October 2016, a new JMC (EU Negotiations) was established, with a remit to “seek to agree a 
UK approach to, and objectives for, Article 50 negotiations” before starting the withdrawal process. However, after 
the governments failed to agree on how to proceed with Brexit, this new body ceased to meet between February and 
October 2017. This marked a low point in relations between the governments. In March of that year, the Prime 
Minister Theresa May invoked Article 50 without having developed a common ‘UK approach’ to Brexit. This 
prompted the Scottish Government to make a renewed push for an independence referendum – only to be rebuffed 
by the Prime Minister.’ House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Devolution 
and Exiting the EU: Reconciling Differences and Building Strong Relationships (HC 2017-19, 1485). 
295 Jim Gallagher, ‘Intergovernmental Relations in the UK: Co-Operation, Competition and Constitutional Change’ 
(2012) 14 British Journal of Politics and International Relations 198. 
296 House of Lords Constitution Committee, Inter-Governmental Relations in the United Kingdom (HL 2014-15, 146) para 
50. 
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nature of the institutions themselves. Though, as will be seen, the judicial position embodies a 
more textured, nuanced approach which sees the devolved institutions as technically subordinate 
to Westminster, but not unimportant; the position in political disputes is very different, with 
Westminster’s supremacy apparently being at the expense of any significance afforded to the 
devolved institutions. This, in turn, is leading to the breakdown of already lacklustre institutional 
collaboration, and the increasing denial of the significance of the devolved legislatures is made 
more problematic by their heightening role in the constitution. For instance:  
 
Since 2016, UK and devolved ministers have disagreed on various aspects of Brexit and its 
impact on devolution arrangements. To resolve these differences, they have created new 
forums involving representatives from the different administrations. But these forums have 
operated in a sporadic fashion, often at the whim of UK ministers, to the frustration of the 
devolved administrations.297 
 
The role of politics in intergovernmental dialogue is not restricted to the JMCs. For instance, there 
is still a dialogue between the territorial Departments of State, but this does not detract from the 
absence of any effective, formal intergovernmental arrangements that are immune from 
Westminster’s manipulation. The problem is exacerbated with political parties themselves playing 
a considerable role in the nature and effectiveness of the UK’s government structures. With an 
SNP Government in Holyrood and a Conservative Government in Westminster, the JMCs have 
become even more important given their differences on policy, but the Conservative Party’s 
unitary, centralising perspective is clearly at odds with the SNPs nationalist one: 
 
One very notable aspect of Conservative thinking about the Union is the dominance of a 
‘unitarist’ understanding of the Union. For many Conservatives uniformity across the whole 
of the UK, underpinned by Westminster parliamentary sovereignty, is seen as essential to 
 




ensuring that the Union remains together. Divergence between the UK’s component parts is 
for many viewed with suspicion.’298 
 
This, coupled with the former’s domination over the instruments of intergovernmental interaction 
does not seem to allow for the coexistence of their competing visions of the union—something 
that will be later demonstrated by the Continuity Reference. 
 
The most significant outcome of all this is the persistence of hierarchy: ‘the informality of the 
system [has] left the devolved territories playing a subordinate role’299 and ‘the UK Government 
has significant control over the outcome of disagreements’300 with Westminster’s approach to 
subordination being what has led to the informality and impermanence of these structures 
themselves. It is not necessarily this ‘control’ that is per se problematic: as has already been seen the 
UK Parliament and Government both retain considerable legal competence, including potentially 
the ability—ultimately—to remake or abolish devolution itself with few legal consequences; what 
protects the settlements is the deeper attitude of Westminster to not actually use these powers. It 
is this attitude that lies at the heart of many of the problems with intergovernmental relations. 
Withdrawal from the European Union has provided the setting for these conflicts of attitudes and 
constitutional visions to come to a head, the ultimate outcome of which may not be known for 
some time. However, this attitude of subordination, informality and unimportance is not a 
perspective shared by the judiciary, who have created a normative space for the devolved 
institutions to enjoy an appropriate degree of institutional respect. 
 
 
298 Jack Sheldon and Michael Kenny, ‘Unionism and the Conservative Brexit Deal Rebellion’ (The Constitution Unit, 1 
February 2019) <https://constitution-unit.com/2019/02/01/unionism-and-the-conservative-brexit-deal-
rebellion/> accessed 9 September 2019. 
299 Tierney (n 24) 118. See also Wilfried Swenden and Nicola McEwen, ‘UK Devolution in the Shadow of Hierarchy? 
Intergovernmental Relations and Party Politics’ (2014) 12 Comparative European Politics 488. 




Judicial Approaches: Towards Constitutional Significance 
 
Devolution was, it might seem trite to point out, designed to accommodate regional variations and 
policy divergence was therefore surely to be expected,301 yet, as has been noted above, it does not 
seem that the has ever been any sense of ‘coherent planning’ and that, instead, devolution appears 
to be ‘decentralisation without direction’, 302 with one consequence being the lack of clarity around 
how policy divergence is to be handled. Not only does this mean the judiciary has had a new and 
difficult constitutional reality to make sense of, but it has also been one that has changed 
throughout its life; for instance, Wales has gone from an obviously subordinate institution to one 
that is more analogous with Scotland and Northern Ireland, although—an additional challenge for 
the judiciary—each remains unique. 
 
‘The amount of devolution-related litigation’, Trench pithily observes, ‘has been modest’.303 
Although it may be on the increase, this fact alone is claimed by some to be illustrative of the 
nature of devolution itself as a political rather than legal creature,304 and it is certainly the case that 
the UK’s territorial constitutional qualms have not reached the heights of federal judicial review, 
but this is not to say that what litigation there has been is insignificant. Differing and, arguably 
 
301 Even if, in some instances there has actually been policy convergence; for instance: ‘The Scottish Government 
brought in legislation to ban smoking in enclosed public places from 2006. The UK Parliament and the Welsh and 
Northern Ireland Assemblies subsequently passed similar legislation… The Labour–Plaid Cymru coalition in Wales 
introduced a levy on plastic carrier bags in 2011 and the other governments followed suit. The minority Labour 
Government in Wales introduced a soft opt-out system for organ donation in 2015. Similar legislation will come into 
effect in England in 2020 The Scottish Government introduced proportional representation for local elections in 
2004, which was already in place in Northern Ireland. Scotland also introduced votes for 16- and 17-year-olds in 2015 
The Welsh Assembly is now considering legislation to lower the voting age to 16 for Assembly and local elections.’: 
Institute for Government (n 167) 22. 
302 Tierney (n 24) 102; House of Lords Constitution Committee, The Union and Devolution (HL 2015-16, 149); Bingham 
Centre for the Rule of Law, ‘A Constitutional Crossroads: Ways Forward for the United Kingdom’ (British Institute 
of International and Comparative Law 2015). 
303 Alan Trench, ‘The Courts and Devolution in the UK’ (2012) 14 British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations 303, 303. Though, he continues that ‘there has been no intergovernmental litigation whatever to date’, which 
is no longer the case. There has been no litigative challenge to Northern Irish legislation since the successful challenge 
in Ulster Transport Authority v James Brown & Sons Ltd [1953] NI 79.  
304 Trench (n 303) 303: ‘its silence tells us a good deal about devolution in the UK’. 
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changing, legal perspectives on the nature of the devolution settlement(s) are demonstrated in the 
case law and clear positions have can be gleaned from their analysis. The Bingham Centre for the 
Rule of Law at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, for instance, has 
analysed the litigation that had taken place before May 2015 in pursuit of identifying the positions 
of judges and courts in litigation: 
 
The devolution case law reveals three strands of authorities, or three different judicial 
approaches. First, there are those that interpret devolution, its constitutional innovation and 
its consequences narrowly (e.g. Whaley v Watson; aspects of Lord Mance in Medical Costs for 
Asbestos Reference). Secondly, there are those that go furthest in the opposite direction (eg, the 
majority in Robinson). Thirdly, there are those that strike a balance (AXA, Imperial Tabacco, 
Lord Thomas in the Medical Costs for Asbestos Reference). In our view, it would be preferable for 
the courts’ devolution case law to be clearly and consistently based on this third approach.305 
 
However, the case law has more to offer than merely demonstrating judicial comprehension of 
‘devolution, its constitutional innovation and its consequences’.306 It also offers insights about the 
relationships and differences between the various institutions, their own constitutional significance 
and even ideas about the nature of the union and the role of the courts within it. It is best, however, 
not to think of devolution litigation as a distinct, insulated corner of the constitutional system, but 
as intricately entwined with these political realities. Indeed, this has shown itself in cases where 
litigation has been used pre-emptively, such as in the Medical Costs for Asbestos Reference.307 This case 
was brought because, despite the Counsel General thinking it was within competence, he thought 
 
305 Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law (n 302) 66. 
306 ibid. 
307 Re Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill [2015] UKSC 3, [2015] 2 WLR 481. A thorough case 
analysis is available in Frankie McCarthy, ‘Human Rights, Property and the Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos 
Diseases (Wales) Bill in the Supreme Court’ (2015) 19 Edinburgh Law Review 373. 
 
 87 
that its vires might be challenged by insurance companies and so challenged it before they had a 
chance to.308 
 
The asymmetry of the devolution Acts and the insistence within them of the normative 
subordination of the institutions to the Westminster Parliament have been key actors in the 
litigation, being particularly dominant informers of the early ‘minimalist’ case law. In Whaley v 
Watson309 this was coupled with difficulties posed by the political conditions that underlined the 
matters of the case. The Lord Ordinary held that the matter, which concerned the application of 
Article 6 of the Scotland Act 1998 (Transitory and Transitional Provisions) (Members’ Interests) 
Order 1999, was for the Parliament itself to decide. It was held there that a member’s entitlement 
to present a Bill was not, therefore, a question for the court. However, colouring the differing 
opinion of the Lord President in the Inner House was ‘the fundamental character of the Parliament 
as a body which—however important its role—has been created by statute and derives its powers 
from statute.’310 This claim, that the Parliament was a ‘statutory body’,311 informed the court’s 
ability to intervene (or lack thereof): 
 
[counsel’s argument] seemed to rest upon some broad view that since the Scottish Parliament 
was a Parliament, rather than for example a local authority, the jurisdiction of the courts must 
be seen as excluded, as an unacceptable intrusion upon the legislative function which belonged 
to Parliament alone… [I]nsofar as a Parliament and its powers have been defined, and thus 
limited, by law, it is in my opinion self-evident that the courts have jurisdiction in relation to 
these legal definitions and limits, just as they would have for any other body created by law. If 
anything, the need for such a jurisdiction is in my opinion all the greater where a body has wide powers, as the 
Scottish Parliament has: the greater the powers, the greater the need to ensure that they are not exceeded.312 
 
308 This pre-emptive, poltico-legal dimension to the caselaw has been repeated and will be considered later in The UK 
Withdrawal from the European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill – A Reference by the Attorney General and the Advocate 
General for Scotland [2018] UKSC 64, [2019] 2 WLR 1. 
309 Whaley v Watson (n 162). 
310 ibid 348 (Lord Rodger). 
311 ibid (Lord Rodger). 




This demonstrates how the perception of the fundamental character of the institutions can be used 
to either permit or forbid judicial interference, depending on the interpretation. But the 
fundamental character of the Parliament does not need to be denied in order to protect the court’s 
jurisdiction; admitting that the Parliament is more than a statutory body does not necessarily lead 
to a claim that whatever it does is within its competence. The Scottish Parliament remains both a 
Parliament, and a body with limited powers. This might seem paradoxical in orthodox English 
constitutional circles that prefer one or the other, but it remains the case.  
 
This is not, however, something that the courts were quick to recognise, preferring instead to lurch 
to the opposite extreme. In Robinson313 the constitutional nature of the settlement was embraced, 
with Lords Bingham and Hoffmann taking a broad approach, the former suggesting that the 
Northern Ireland Act 1998 is ‘in effect a constitution’ to be interpreted ‘generously and 
purposively’.314 Lord Hutton’s words, by contrast, echoed those of Lord Prosser in Whaley: ‘the 
Northern Ireland Assembly is a body created by a Westminster statute and it has no powers other 
than those given to it by statute’.315 This case does seem to stand as something of a unique incident, 
confined to its facts and not followed in the Supreme Court since316 and, as is often emphasised, 
Northern Ireland is a unique settlement to resolve a unique set of challenges. The case of AXA317 
then is perhaps a more easily transposed decision. This case concerned the applicability of Acts of 
the Scottish Parliament to common law judicial review.318 In holding that common law judicial 
 
313 Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] UKHL 32. 
314 ibid [11] (Lord Bingham). 
315 ibid [54] (Lord Hutton). 
316 Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law (n 302) 60. 
317 AXA General Insurance Limited v The Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, [2012] 1 AC 868. 
318 The Bingham Institute explains the issues thus: ‘[S]ection 29 of the Scotland Act 1998 limits the legislative 
competence of the Scottish Parliament: but is section 29 an exhaustive list of the grounds on which an ASP [(Act of 
the Scottish Parliament)] may be challenged, or could a petitioner also argue that an Act of the Scottish Parliament is 
unreasonable or irrational? The Supreme Court ruled than an ASP could not be challenged as if it were the decision 
of an ordinary public body… but that if an ASP was violative of the rule of law, the courts would step in to rule it 
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review could not be deployed against Acts of the Scottish Parliament, Lord Hope suggested that 
the Parliament was ‘self-standing’ and that its Acts enjoyed ‘the highest legal authority’ where they 
were within competence,319 something that has been described as placing ‘Holyrood legislation and 
Westminster statutes on the same constitutional plane’.320 Though he cited no authority, Lord 
Hope’s dicta do make sense: that the competences themselves are limited does not mean that the 
status of that legislation within competence should be reduced. It might mean that the status of the 
institution itself is subordinate—it is clearly not a supreme Parliament with unlimited, 
‘unreviewable’ legislative powers—but it is a body with a realm of powers that are beyond some 
kinds of review. Lord Reed simply suggested that since the Scottish Parliament was not obliged to 
point to reasons for a particular decision, and that nor are there ‘any specific matters to which it is 
to have regard’,321 these forms of review were inapplicable, observing that in these areas, its 
electorate was to be what held the Parliament to account, not the court.322 
 
Lord Reed also looked to separation of powers and the respective role of legislatures and courts 
within the constitution, suggesting that,  
 
‘[l]aw-making by a democratically elected legislature is the paradigm of a political activity… In 
my opinion it would not be constitutionally appropriate for the courts to review such decisions 
on the ground of irrationality. Such review would fail to recognise that courts and legislatures 
each have their own particular role to play in our constitution, and that each must be careful 
to respect the sphere of action of the other.’323 
 
 
unlawful (even if it was otherwise within competence under section 29).’: Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law (n 302) 
60–61. 
319 AXA General Insurance Limited v The Lord Advocate (n 317) [46] (Lord Hope). 
320 Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law (n 302) 61. 
321 AXA General Insurance Limited v The Lord Advocate (n 317) [146] (Lord Reed). 
322 Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law (n 302) 61. 
323  AXA General Insurance Limited v The Lord Advocate (n 317) [148] (Lord Reed). 
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However even in these dicta, nestled in the language of deference, the emphasis is clearly on the 
Scottish Parliament’s credentials as a ‘legislature’ rather than a ‘local authority’. It seems that these 
‘fundamental character’ questions are difficult to avoid, even if they pin more on deference to 
democratic credentials than on the ideas of a constitutionally significant national representative. 
The limits placed on the legislature when it is operating within its competences seem to mirror 
those limits on the Westminster Parliament recognised in Simms324 by Lord Hoffmann, namely that 
the Westminster ‘Parliament cannot itself override fundamental rights or the rule of law by general 
or ambiguous words, but also that it cannot confer on another body, by general or ambiguous 
words, the power to do so.’325 However, the Scottish Parliament in AXA was being held account 
in the courts to the European Convention (ECHR) in a form of review that has very different legal 
implications than those applicable to Westminster.326 Indeed, if legislation of the Scottish 
Parliament is incompatible with Convention rights, it is outside of competence—it is not law.327 
This distinction led to much discussion in the case about whether Acts of the Scottish Parliament 
were primary or secondary legislation and, in pursuit of a third path, Lord Hope held that ‘we are 
in uncharted territory’, the issue being more of principle than of precedent.328 Again, Lord Hope 
placed the emphasis on the Parliament’s democratic credentials which warranted a degree of judicial 
hesitation, thus: 
 
For the Supreme Court, the Scottish Parliament is plainly not an ordinary public body “like 
any other”, but a legislature, democratically elected, with plenary powers, which produces 
legislation that the courts may review on common law grounds only in the most exceptional 
 
324 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [1999] UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115. 
325 AXA General Insurance Limited v The Lord Advocate (n 317) [152] (Lord Reed); I am grateful to the Bingham Centre 
for highlighting this similarity: Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law (n 302) 61. 
326 Review of Westminster legislation under the Human Rights Act 1998 can only result in the legislation being read 
compatibly with the ECHR under section 3, or a ‘declaration of incompatibility’ under section 4. Despite some 
academic commentary to the contrary, the Act is very clear that this does not amount to a challenge to the validity of 
the legislation found to be incompatible: ‘A declaration under this section (“a declaration of incompatibility”) does 
not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is given’: Human 
Rights Act 1998 s 4(6)(a). 
327 Scotland Act s 29(d). 
328 AXA General Insurance Limited v The Lord Advocate (n 317) [205] (Lord Hope). 
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circumstances… this is precisely how the Scottish Parliament – and indeed all the UK’s 
devolved legislatures – should be understood.’329 
 
But this does highlight further problems: Firstly, just because the Scottish Parliament is seen by 
the judiciary as a democratic legislature, or even a constitutionally significant one, does not mean it 
is in political practice; as was emphasised above, the law is only one part of a vast and complex 
picture. Secondly, and pertinent for the asymmetry of the devolution arrangements, equating ‘all 
the UK’s devolved legislatures’ when they exist in quite different legal, political and historical 
contexts needs justification, especially when this expresses itself (as it has done) in the differences 
between the legal powers each legislature possesses. 
 
As has been noted, devolution did not at its inception create one uniform settlement for the UK. 
Instead each territory received its own unique arrangement in light of its own context. This seemed 
to decentralise the very process of decentralisation, allowing the degree of regional responsiveness 
permitted to be, itself, regionally responsive. This might appear to be a rejection of the 
fundamentality of the changes that were being made, suggesting perhaps that it amounted to 
piecemeal redistribution of authority rather than wholesale constitutional change. In turn this has 
meant that the task of making sense of the very nature of the devolution arrangements as 
independent arrangements for each territory, while simultaneously being something more 
significant for the United Kingdom as a whole, has led to confirmation of a ‘middle way’ in judicial 
thinking. Under this view, each of the devolved legislatures is constitutionally significant, but 
within the bounds of their (unique) foundational legislation. For example, in the Inner House, 
Lords Reed and Brodie in Imperial Tobacco were quick to point out, in contrast to Lords Bingham 
and Hoffman in Robinson, that the Scotland Act is ‘not a constitution’.330 In the Supreme Court, 
Lord Hope sought to bring clarity to the issue: rather than embarking on an overly-expansive, or 
 
329 Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law (n 302) 62. 
330 Imperial Tobacco Ltd v The Lord Advocate [2012] CSIH 9 [71] (Lord Reed), [181] (Lord Brodie). 
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overly-reductionist reading based on the constitutional significance (or otherwise) of the 
settlement, it was His Lordship’s view that each case should be handled using the terms of the 
devolution statute in question, and that these should be interpreted ‘in the same way as any other 
rules that are found in a UK statute’.331 It should be noted that one way in which the ‘constitutional’ 
status of the devolution legislation has been overtly recognised, however, is in the dicta of Laws 
LJ in Thoburn where the Scotland Act was directly referred to as a ‘constitutional statute’.332 But 
this only sounded in terms of its repeal, a fact that has since been affirmed by Lord Hope in H v 
Lord Advocate: ‘because of the fundamental constitutional nature of the settlement that was 
achieved by the Scotland Act . This in itself must be held to render it incapable of being altered 
otherwise than by an express enactment.’333 Despite this, the idea that the legislation’s ‘fundamental 
constitutional nature’ might in some way affect its interpretation has been overtly rejected by Lord 
Hope in Imperial Tobacco: ‘the description of the Act as a constitutional statute cannot be taken, in 
itself, to be a guide to its interpretation.’334 
 
Demonstrative of the differences between the legal arrangements, in Wales the circumstances 
surrounding the case law have been different, being more intergovernmental than the 
public/private litigation prevalent in Scotland.335 Despite this, and despite the differing nature of 
that legislature compared to its Scottish counterpart, ‘the principles governing the interpretation 
of ASPs set out in Imperial Tobacco apply equally to the interpretation [of] Bills passed by the Welsh 
 
331 Imperial Tobacco Ltd v The Lord Advocate (n 177) [14] (Lord Hope). 
332 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin) [62] (Laws LJ): ‘We should recognise a hierarchy of 
Acts of Parliament: as it were “ordinary” statutes and “constitutional” statutes. The two categories must be 
distinguished on a principled basis. In my opinion a constitutional statute is one which (a) conditions the legal 
relationship between citizen and State in some general, overarching manner, or (b) enlarges or diminishes the scope 
of what we would now regard as fundamental constitutional rights. (a) and (b) are of necessity closely related: it is 
difficult to think of an instance of (a) that is not also an instance of (b). The special status of constitutional statutes 
follows the special status of constitutional rights. Examples are the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights 1689, the Act of 
Union, the Reform Acts which distributed and enlarged the franchise, the HRA, the Scotland Act 1998 and the 
Government of Wales Act 1998.’ 
333 H v Lord Advocate [2012] UKSC 24, [2012] 3 WLR 151 [30] (Lord Hope). 
334 Imperial Tobacco Ltd v The Lord Advocate (n 177) [15] (Lord Hope). 
335 Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law (n 302) 63. 
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Assembly.’336 Arguably, however, Wales has produced the most ‘federal’ litigative problems of all 
of the legislatures. Rather than questions primarily about Convention violation and cases that 
depend on the comprehension of the status of the legislature, in Wales legislation has come under 
scrutiny for coming under categories of legislation that are both within and beyond competence 
depending, as a federation does, on the judiciary to demark the boundaries. The question in this 
instance becomes not about how broadly to interpret the competences against convention rights 
or in vacuo, but against a list of forbidden areas which also need to be interpreted. This is where the 
reserved or conferred powers models become of tangible significance, and the key case in question 
is the Agricultural Wages Reference.337 When one is alert to the fact that agriculture was devolved and 
remuneration for employment was reserved, the interpretive issue at play becomes clear. The 
Attorney General argued that a Bill which made provision for agricultural wages was outwith 
competence, whereas the Counsel General argued that since it concerned agriculture it was within 
competence.338 Under the Government of Wales Act 2006, if a Bill relates to a subject under 
Schedule 7, such as agriculture, it is within competence. Therefore, the Supreme Court, which 
thought the Bill could be interpreted in either direction, ruled it was within competence. It might 
seem prima facie that a conferred powers model where the legislation lists the powers devolved, 
rather than those reserved, is more restrictive because it assumes that powers are, by default 
reserved to Westminster. An analogy can easily be located in federal jurisdictions, where the federal 
level has its powers ‘enumerated’, meaning the ‘residual’ competence remains with the States, 
suggesting they lead in the hierarchy of authority. This is something of a controversial point among 
scholars who might prefer to suggest that there is no ‘hierarchy’,339 but it is easy to see how an 
interpretive presumption that powers exist unless they are reserved might lead, ultimately, to a 
broader conferral than a finite list of devolved powers. However, despite this forgivable 
 
336 ibid; Re Local Government Byelaws (Wales) Bill 2012 [2012] UKSC 53, [2013] 1 AC 792 [79]-[81] (Lord Neuberger). 
337 Re Agricultural Sector (Wales) Bill [2014] UKSC 43, [2014] 1 WLR 2622. 
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assumption, the Agricultural Wages Reference suggests the opposite. That the Bill ‘related’ to a 
reserved matter was acceptable, since it also, more importantly ‘related’ to a devolved matter.  The 
Silk Commission’s (adopted) recommendation of a shift to the ‘reserved’ powers model therefore 
has retrospective implications for the Agricultural Wages Reference. Since the court did not find the 
Attorney General’s suggestion that the Bill related to a reserved matter to be misplaced, under the 
reserved powers model this would be enough to find the Bill to be outside of competence.340 This 
seems to invert the logic of enumerated and reserved powers, but it does not refute that in general 
more power is usually conferred under the reserved model.341 It also, more significantly, indicates 
a desire on the courts’ part to interpret the powers of the devolved legislatures as broadly as 
possible. 
 
The more recent decision of the Medical Costs for Asbestos Reference has been noted above for the 
fact that it was a pre-emptive legal challenge in light of foreseeable private litigation, but for present 
purposes the interpretation of competences is the key element of the case.342 ‘Organisation and 
funding’ of the NHS in Wales is listed in Schedule 7 of the Government of Wales Act 2006—the 
then-key devolution legislation conferring powers to the Welsh Assembly.343 Lord Thomas in the 
minority noted that funding meant the raising of funds, rather than merely the allocation of funds 
and that, therefore, the Assembly possessed ‘competence to enact legislation that makes provision 
for charging for services by way of the treatment and long-term care of those with asbestos-related 
 
340 Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law (n 302) 64. 
341 ‘[N]o matter what the original intent, language used to seek to delimit the differences between reserved and 
devolved powers… is always open to judicial interpretation, with courts able to construe it more or less generously 
depending on the needs of the times.’: Adam Tomkins, ‘Shared Rule: What the UK Could Learn from Federalism’ in 
Robert Schütze and Stephen Tierney (eds), The United Kingdom and the Federal Idea (Hart Publishing 2018) 79. 
342 Another core element of the case was whether the Bill was outwith competence because it was incompatible with 
the ECHR. Lord Thomas and Lady Hale held that one section was ‘drafted with unnecessary breadth that made it 
incompatible with [Article 1 of the 1st Protocol].’ Lords Mance and Neuberger found that two sections of the Bill 
were incompatible with the same provision and that the Bill in general was outwith competence: Bingham Centre for 
the Rule of Law (n 302) 64. 
343 Section 108 of the Act made provision that the Assembly had competence when a Bill related to one or more of 
the subjects in Schedule 7. 
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diseases provided that the moneys so raised are used exclusively for the Welsh NHS’.344 The degree 
of deference that was to be given to the legislature was emphasised only in terms of the rights 
abrogation: whether the legislation pursued a legitimate aim was ‘in every respect pre-eminently a 
political judgement… on which it is for the legislative branch of the State to reach a judgement’;345 
whether the interference was proportional was also a question that could be answered only by 
giving ‘great weight’ to the views of the legislature.346 Further, His Lordship also suggested that 
each legislature ‘must be entitled to form its own judgement about public interest and social justice 
in matters of social and economic policy within a field where, under the structure of devolution, it 
has sole primary legislative competence.’347 This not only distinguishes the legislatures from local 
authorities,348 but also went some way to indicating the nature of the relationships between the 
legislatures. ‘Sole primary legislative competence’ suggests very clearly a dual federal model where 
each legislature has its own ‘exclusive sphere’.349 It is at least clear that Lord Thomas did not think 
it was the court’s, nor any other body’s place to second-guess the primary legislation of the Welsh 
Assembly. 
 
Lord Mance in the majority, however, took a different view on both the rights and competence 
issues. His Lordship’s test for the legislative term ‘relates to’ was that it be ‘more than a loose or 
consequential connection’.350 There is difficulty in importing this test, however, from Lord 
Walker’s dictum in the Scottish case of Martin v Most351since, as has been explained, Scotland’s 
settlement at that time depended on a different logic of conferral. This demonstrates the problems, 
at least historically, with seeing the settlement as one coherent system, or that ‘the essential nature 
 
344 Re Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill (n 307) [95] (Lord Thomas). 
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of the legislatures that the devolution statutes have created in each case is the same’.352 Lord 
Neuberger for instance has regarded them as ‘different statutes’, and that judges must be ‘wary of 
assuming that they have precisely the same effect, as context is so crucially important when 
interpreting any expression’.353 There is (or at least was) clearly some disagreement about how to 
understand the fundamental questions of competence allocation. The point has been made thus: 
 
The effect of interpreting “relates to” as indicating “more than a loose or consequential 
connection in Scotland is that the competence of the Scottish Parliament is treated generously: 
an ASP must have more than a loose connection with a reserved matter before it may be held 
on that ground to be out with competence. However, the effect of interpreting “relates to” in 
this way in Wales is the opposite and diminishes the legislative competence of the Assembly: 
an Act of the Assembly risks being held ultra vires unless the Assembly can show that it has 
more than a loose or consequential connection with a subject listed in Schedule 7.354 
 
The familiar challenge of exactly what normative status the Welsh Assembly possesses is clearly 
an undercurrent here, shaped by the logic of conferral, as is the Court’s understanding of its own 
role. Though Lord Thomas was keen for the Court to give ‘great weight’ to the judgement of the 
Assembly,355 deferring to it as though it were the Westminster Parliament was too much for Lord 
Mance who was less persuaded. Further, Lord Mance stated that ‘it is the Court’s function, under 
[the Government of Wales Act], to evaluate the relevant considerations and to form its own 
judgement’,356 and that there is ‘perhaps… a relevant distinction between cases concerning primary 
legislation by the United Kingdom Parliament and other legislative and executive decisions.’357 The 
majority therefore put Westminster on a pedestal and saw the other legislative and administrative 
 
352 Re Local Government Byelaws (Wales) Bill 2012 (n 336) [81] (Lord Hope). 
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354 Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law (n 302) 65: Interestingly, and again thanks must be given to the Bingham 
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organs in the UK as more analogous in their subordination, and deserving of a different degree of 
deference.358 There is clearly some confusion (or at least disagreement) within judicial circles as to 
how much deference these institutions are to be accorded, the kind of normative status they 
possess and how the judiciary should police the boundaries between them. Now the settlement 
for Wales is not only more in keeping with the arrangements in the other corners of the union, 
creating an element of uniformity and consistency that devolution arguably attempted to avoid at 
its inception, but it also possesses powers and institutional characteristics that are a far cry from 
its beginnings as a small, weakly empowered afterthought that resulted from a meagre showing of 
popular support. The courts’ approach to each legislature since ‘has been to adopt a generous—
and pragmatic—approach to the legislative competence of the devolved legislature’.359  
 
The inconsistency of the case law can, it is suggested, be forgiven: the settlements themselves have 
not only posed new, complex and fundamental questions for the courts to solve, but have also had 
within them inconsistencies and, crucially, asymmetries which the courts have needed to make 
sense of amongst a divisive political backdrop, all while the arrangements themselves continue to 
change. However, it is at the very least clear that the courts have begun to recognise the increasingly 
constitutional status of the devolution settlements and, indeed, are forming a coherent view of the 
position and significant status of devolution. This recognition does not suggest that the devolved 
legislatures are all the same, or that they all solve the same problems in each of the territories, but 
it does suggest that territorial constitutionalism is beginning to be seen as a common solution to 
different problems. The differences in these problems shows itself in the different powers 
devolved and even the different names of the institutions, but they are not different enough to 
justify the claim that devolution is not a single coherent issue in the UK. Further, the trend of 
 
358 Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law (n 302) 66. 





recognition seems to have settled on a far more constitutional status for the legislatures than might 
have been expected in 1998 making rejection of their significance untenable.360 Now, the 
arrangements have converged to the extent that there is a ‘relevant commonality in the devolution 
settlements in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.’361 They share similarities in structure, 
process and purpose. As a result, the judicial position, noting that ‘there cannot always be hard 
and fast lines between devolved and reserved matters’,362 accepts that the devolved legislatures are 
not like local authorities but that they are bound by some principles (such as the rule of law) that 
are not codified in their statutes. The four elements of the test were drawn together in Christian 
Institute and unified for each of the settlements, it can be explained thus:363  
 
First, ‘relates to’ indicates more than a loose or consequential connection…Secondly…it is 
necessary to look at more than what be discerned from an objective consideration of the effect 
of [a provision’s] terms…Thirdly…if one of its purposes does [relate to a reserved matter], 
then unless that can be regarded as consequential and of no real significance in the overall 
scheme of things, it will be outside competence. Finally, this is not the same as the ‘pith and 
substance’ test and these cases should be dealt with according to the terms of the devolution 
statutes in question and not otherwise.364 
 
The status and operation of the devolved legislatures and their relationship with Westminster is 
not, however, a solely legal question. The interaction between law and politics remains hugely 
important in the devolution settlement; its dependence on politics ensures crises are avoided and 
 
360 For instance, the petition ‘Hold a referendum to scrap the Welsh Assembly’ currently has 15 signatures: ‘Hold a 
Referendum to Scrap the Welsh Assembly’ <https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/262868> accessed 29 
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that legislative power by reference to particular subjects and, more generally and regardless of subject-matter, to 
compliance with EU law and Convention rights. Accordingly, all are now based on a reserved powers model: that is 
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and Convention rights.’ 
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stability ensured, yet it also enables the system to maintain flexibility and indeterminacy, with the 
potential for the constitution to be rewritten overnight looming large in the minds of the 
‘subordinate’ legislatures. These political factors, as Trench notes, not only mean that the 
devolution arrangements can be easily amended, but also that much of the ‘work’ of the territorial 
constitution can happen behind the scenes: ‘The key issue becomes the political one of whether 
the parties will agree, rather than the legal one of whether they are able to agree or to implement 
their agreement.’365 This means that litigation itself is often avoided, perhaps somewhat to blame 
for its sparseness to date. In some ways this is positive: as has been noted, decentralisation’s added 
layer of ‘red tape’ and the legalisation assumed by some to be inherent in federalism is avoided if 
the debates around the allocation of competence can remain a political rather than legal issue. 
However, the collision of an only recently settled legal position with a political appetite for 
informality and subordination has had dangerous results. 
 
Cracks Emerge: Withdrawal from the European Union 
 
So far, a dissonance has been revealed. In the courts, the unique constitutional significance of 
devolution has been understood. The judiciary have given the devolved institutions normative 
status below Westminster, but above local authorities; partly on the grounds of their innate 
significance as representatives of different parts of the union, and partly on democratic grounds. 
This has shown itself in the deference the courts show to their decisions, the expansive 
interpretation of their powers and their willingness to state in strong terms their view of the 
importance of the institutions. In the political realm, despite some attempts—such as the 
permanence provisions and the Sewel convention—to enshrine some institutional respect, 
Westminster and Whitehall’s approach has never been to conceive of devolution as a fundamental 
shift in the constitution, preferring to see it as ‘business as usual’. Although the centre has shown 
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a willingness to defer to the devolved institutions in order to shape the settlements, and legislative 
consent has often been an effective mechanism for cooperation, both of these instances have 
depended on political sensibilities. When these political sensibilities are not of institutional respect 
but of disregard and subordination, intergovernmental cooperation has suffered. This has shown 
itself in the lack of formally instituted intergovernmental arrangements where the entire system 
has operated at London’s whim, leading to a hierarchy that excludes the devolved institutions from 
areas of importance to them. The ad hoc implementation of devolution may bear some 
responsibility for this, and for doing little to combat the perspective that prefers to disregard rather 
than bolster the devolution arrangements; yet, the courts have demonstrated that this 
incrementality need be no barrier to constitutional significance. However, a recent case-study will 
demonstrate the interplay between politics and law, that even judicial recognition of significance 
is not enough to protect the territorial constitution from a Westminster, backed by its place in the 
‘hierarchy’, bent on asserting its unitary constitutional vision. The chief example of this in action 
has been the UK’s withdrawal from the EU; it is demonstrated by two key sagas of litigation and 
illustrates the fractious persistence of unitary thinking in England. 
 
Before the 2016 EU referendum Nicola Sturgeon, Scotland’s First Minister, had argued that there 
should be a territorial veto on the referendum result such that the UK, as a consensual union, 
would need to vote in all of its constituent ‘parts’ to leave the EU for it to take place.366 David 
Cameron, then Prime Minister, rejected the proposal, arguing instead that ‘we are one United 
Kingdom’.367 In the event, the UK as a whole voted 51.9% to leave the EU but only England and 
Wales voted as territories in favour of that outcome, with Scotland and Northern Ireland 
preferring ‘remain’. This referendum tested conceptions of the union: on the one hand the UK’s 
 
366 HC Deb 16 June 2015, vol 597, cols 192–193. 
367 Reuters, ‘Cameron Rejects Giving Scotland Veto in EU Referendum’ (30 October 2014) 
<https://www.euractiv.com/section/uk-europe/news/cameron-rejects-giving-scotland-veto-in-eu-referendum/> 
accessed 29 September 2019. 
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will could be expressed through the voice of one ‘people’, on the other, it could be expressed as 
the voice of four distinct ‘peoples’. Not only did Holyrood and Westminster’s views of the union 
differ with one another, but membership of and departure from the European Union also has 
different implications in each of the territories. As a result, the litigation challenging the 
government’s ability to use the royal prerogative to activate Article 50 of the Treaty on European 
Union (the provision actualising the UK’s departure) was joined by a separate challenge on 
territorial consent. The primary contention of the challenge was that notification of withdrawal 
under Article 50 could not take place without the consent of the devolved territories, but it was 
unsuccessful since the Sewel convention remains merely a political rule, unenforceable in the 
courts: 
 
The Sewel Convention has an important role in facilitating harmonious relationships between 
the UK Parliament and the devolved legislatures. But the policing of its scope and the manner 
of its operation does not lie within the constitutional remit of the judiciary, which is to protect 
the rule of law.368 
 
This is, of course, the precedent that was set in the Privy Council decision of Madzimbamuto369 but 
the enshrinement of the convention in statute did little to change things, even nested as it is 
amongst the permanence provisions: 
 
[T]he UK Parliament is not seeking to convert the Sewel Convention into a rule which can be 
interpreted, let alone enforced, by the courts; rather, it is recognising the convention for what 
it is, namely a political convention, and is effectively declaring that it is a permanent feature 
of the relevant devolution settlement. That follows from the nature of the content, and is 
acknowledged by the words (“it is recognised” and “will not normally”), of the relevant 
subsection. We would have expected UK Parliament to have used other words if it were 
seeking to convert a convention into a legal rule justiciable by the courts.370 
 
368 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (n 4) [151]. 
369 Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke [1969] 1 AC 645 (PC). 




However, although the Court’s view of the legal implications was predictable, it might not have 
been expected to take such a deferential stance towards the convention (and its codification)’s 
constitutional significance. For instance, in the famous Re Constitutional Amendment case371 in Canada, 
a convention’s legal insignificance did not deter the Court from suggesting disapplication of it 
would be unconstitutional, eventually inviting the Government to adhere to it. Courts need not, 
this case suggests, be merely a voice of legality and nothing more.372 However, there is utility in the 
conclusions the Court reached. Arguably, in a constitution shaped largely by political rules and 
practices, the moving of questions like territorial consent away from legal fora (and protecting 
judicial independence in the process) means that political debate is not replaced by litigation. 
Alternatively, the flagrant disregard of the interests of the territories is enabled by a settlement 
that, in instances such as this, demonstrates its subservience to Westminster. Either way the 
reliance on these political mechanisms, and the dominance of Westminster throughout devolution 
is clearly problematic for those territories whose views can so easily be circumvented. 
 
Even when the issues at hand remain firmly within the realm of the courts as matters of law, 
Westminster remains able to reshape the arrangements to its advantage; as was importantly the 
case in the European Withdrawal Bill Reference (Continuity Reference).373 Set against the backdrop of 
Scotland’s majority ‘remain’ vote and the SNP’s own position on the matter, it is not a great stretch 
to appreciate that the Scottish Parliament desired to pass its own withdrawal legislation: the UK 
Withdrawal from the European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill; and refused consent to 
Westminster’s own European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. The UK Government swiftly 
challenged the Scottish Continuity Bill on three grounds: First, that it was incompatible with EU 
 
371 Re Resolution to amend the Constitution [1981] 1 SCR 753. 
372 Consider the non-legal effects of s 4 HRA as well as Elliott (n 184); Elliott (n 273). 
373 The UK Withdrawal from the European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill – A Reference by the Attorney General and the 
Advocate General for Scotland (n 308). 
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law; second, that it related to the reserved matter of foreign affairs and third that it modified 
protected enactments listed in Schedule 4. It was the Supreme Court’s view that the Scottish 
Continuity Bill did not relate to international relations (even including those with the EU), but that 
it did, specifically in Section 17, ‘affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to 
make laws for Scotland’, meaning it was outwith competence. However, it was the UK 
Government’s response to the passing of the Scottish Bill that most demonstrates Westminster’s 
ability to manipulate the devolution settlement. When the UK Government passed its own Act in 
2018, it included an amendment to Schedule 4 of the Scotland Act 1998 such that it itself became 
a protected enactment, immune from modification. Because of this, at the time the Scottish Bill 
would be enacted, it, in making modifications to the UK’s Act, would be outside of competence. 
Here the UK Parliament was able to manipulate the core devolution legislation so that Holyrood’s 
activity was without doubt ultra vires. This is neither an example of positive cooperation, nor is it 
in keeping with the institutional respect devolution clearly warrants; instead it demonstrates the 
dangers of a flexible arrangement in the hands of a powerful institution with a unitary mindset. 
Historically, relations between the two institutions have not been so abrasive,374 yet clearly ‘[t]he 
UK and devolved governments do not agree on the rules governing their relationship’,375 and this 
is problematic when one has the formal power to rewrite the rules. 
 
Devolution has posed plenty of opportunities for cooperation. It has also seen governments, at 
least sporadically, take many of those opportunities. The central problem remains Westminster’s 
perspective of the devolved institutions and its preparedness to flex its sovereign muscles—legally 
entitled as it is to do so—to subordinate or circumvent the territories on matters that concern 
them. Despite Professor Elliott’s claim that to do so would arguably be unconstitutional, the 
 
374 Lady Hale (n 190) 8: ‘There is a long history of the UK Parliament legislating separately for Scotland, so there are 
established channels of communication between London and Edinburgh enabling things to be sorted out at official 
level. Following devolution, it had become customary for Scottish Bills to be notified in advance to the Advocate 
General. The Continuity Bill was the first where this had not been done.’ 
375 Institute for Government (n 167) 6. 
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courts—as their treatment of the Sewel convention suggests—are in truth unlikely to find any 
remedy, though this is not to say it is without political consequences. Certainly, Dicey’s fear that 
Parliament’s ability to legislate for a devolved territory would be ‘not only impaired but 
destroyed’376 was misplaced in practice, but unfortunately this has been demonstrated through an 
exercise that suggests the UK Government may be failing to recognise the constitutional 
significance of devolution. Whereas the perspectives of the regions have been altered by 
devolution, the centre’s has remained unchanged and it, in this instance at least, operated as if 
devolution does not exist or, possibly worse, as if it does not matter. When devolution has worked 
at its best, it has provided a means to ensure peace and allow governments to work together. At 
times this has been effective, with Westminster being cooperative on issues from legislative 
conferral to the Welsh Assembly, to Scottish independence and mechanisms do exist to encourage 
multi-lateral involvement in shared issues. The Sewel convention, for instance, protects the 
legislative freedom of the devolved institutions without requiring an apparently impossible 
restriction on Westminster’s legal competence. Yet there is still a debate over what the constitution 
requires, and what devolution’s place within it is. Douglas-Scott indicates, for example, that ‘[f]rom 
the perspective of the UK Government, the British constitution is unitary in nature’.377 This 
perspective, she suggests, ‘views the UK as a unified, centralised state, with an omnicompetent 
Parliament.’378 She goes on to consider an alternative view of the UK constitution which 
 
identifies other traditions and interpretations as key to an understanding of the British 
constitution, and views the UK as a union state rather than a unitary state. It interprets the 
UK as a union founded on treaties (such as the Treaty of Union 1706) and reliant on ongoing 
consent, as well as on constitutional practice which involves much (ie constitutional 
conventions) that is not strictly speaking law.379 
 
376 Boyce (n 148) 287. Dicey was, of course, writing about Ireland at that time. 
377 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, ‘Brexit, Article 50 and the Contested British Constitution’ 79 Modern Law Review 1019, 
1035. 
378 ibid. 
379 ibid 1036. 
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This more textured, pluralist account of the constitution is persuasive. It has historical 
reinforcement and is an encouraging way of making sense of the valuable role played by the 
devolved institutions and the nations they represent, especially since it is more recognising of the 
impact of devolution on the constitution itself.380 
 
However, arguably this account only becomes useful when the central government at Westminster 
views the constitution as a shared endeavour. Douglas-Scott suggests that viewing Brexit as an 
expression of parliamentary sovereignty is unjustified because it is on the decline as a core principle 
of the constitution,381 yet this is far from the conventional view, at least in the case law.382 Far more 
persuasive is Professor Elliott’s claim that, rather than parliamentary sovereignty being on the 
decline, it is instead the instances when Parliament might deploy its sovereignty that are 
diminishing. The argument here is that a more textured understanding is on the rise of what 
constitutes valid action, not in legal terms, but in constitutional terms:  
 
‘Parliament might or might not be sovereign, but that is largely beside the point—for the 
constitutional system demands and expects that Parliament will desist from exercising the full 
width of the extravagant powers which it would possess if it were sovereign.’383  
 
It is not that Parliament is no longer legally competent in certain areas—this is difficult to justify—
but that it might be less willing to use the full-extent of its competences after taking account of 
the broader constitutional picture. This account is a far more accurate picture of constitutional 
practice itself and is helpful in prescribing the kinds of institutional relationships that might be 
 
380 ‘This alternative interpretation of the British Constitution also recognises that the UK has been transformed, or 
even revolutionised, by external developments and memberships (such as the EU and Council of Europe) and 
recalibrated internally by devolution arrangements since 1998 (but also by the Human Rights Act, and a desire for a 
more principled constitutional development than parliamentary sovereignty allows)’: ibid 1036–7. 
381 ibid 1037. 
382 See R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (n 4); R (Miller) v The Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41, 
[2019] 9 WLUK 256. 
383 Elliott (n 273) 65. 
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possible in the shadow of parliamentary sovereignty, rather than incorrectly asserting it no longer 
operates practicably. However, even with this contention accepted, it remains important to 
consider the perspectives of the territories and their views of their relationship with Westminster. 
It might be simply that there are plural views of the constitution from different angles and that 
these can peacefully coexist, but, as recent history suggests, these views are often in conflict.384 
Perhaps it could be suggested that Westminster, with its own view of the constitution, should be 
tolerant towards those institutions that have different views. Yet this discussion highlights the 
paradox at the core of the UK’s territorial constitution: Devolution is the acceptance that 
government is best when it is closest to citizens, but the operation of the centre is increasingly to 
disregard the views of those closest because they are ‘inferior’ institutions. It is increasingly 
necessary for central government to accept that superiority does not beckon from legal possibility, 
but also from political plausibility: Parliament might well be sovereign, but often the territorial 
institutions’ word should be the last. This is especially significant because of the lack of institutions 
of shared rule: the constitution remains—for better or worse—solely Westminster’s domain and 
any failure on its part to take account of different visions may have significant ramifications.385 As 
has been demonstrated above, there are mechanisms for cooperation and interaction, but they 
must be enhanced and protected; if devolution is to work effectively the disregard that the 
Continuity Reference illustrated should be avoided. There are idiosyncrasies to devolution as well as 
some outright flaws in its design, but these are only problematic when the attitude to exploit them 
is allowed to prosper. O’Neill makes the point thus: ‘Outcomes will depend on the capacity of 
elites at every level to construct procedures, and adopt habits that make cooperation rather than 
conflict the prevailing standard of inter-governmental relations. There is a new political culture to 
be learned by all sides.’386 
 
 
384 Douglas-Scott (n 377). 
385 The constitution is a reserved matter in each of the devolution statutes. 
386 O’Neill (n 142) 80. 
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CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A ‘RELEVANT COMMONALITY’ 
 
This chapter has explored the UK’s territorial constitution beyond 1998. It outlined the changes 
that have taken place (and those that have not), why they took place and the ‘state of play’ as it 
stands today. It then went on to interrogate how it operated in practice, considering mechanisms 
for interaction, cooperation and the persistence of hierarchy before considering judicial 
approaches and, finally, what happens when the two collide. The argument throughout has been 
that devolution, despite its incremental and piecemeal development, represents a fundamental 
change in the territorial constitution. This is something recognised by the courts who have 
grappled with the settlements to accommodate a normative space for the institutions as 
subordinate to Westminster but by no means insignificant. The unique ‘Britishness’ of the 
settlement—that is to say its dependence on political stability, ideas of a largely flexible 
constitutionalism, and the dominance of short-sighted pragmatism over long-term existential re-
evaluation of constitutional norms or requirements—have not themselves posed anything more 
than stumbling blocks for the successes of devolution; in some ways, such as the political guarantee 
of legislative consent, it has even enabled easy and successful cooperation. It may have been the 
case at its inception that the ad hoc implementation of devolution was never intended to be a 
constitutional ‘moment’ for the UK but it is quickly becoming one; the territorial constitution has 
changed and evolved to the extent that the constitutionally fundamental nature of devolution is 
becoming increasingly difficult to reject. 
 
England and the ‘Centre’ are both proving slow to realise this change, being the least affected by 
devolution and the most willing to harken to unitary policies when it is convenient, as the Continuity 
Reference demonstrates. Not only is this out of step with the contemporary constitution, it is the 
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result of misguided assumptions about the stability and permanence of the union.387 Westminster 
needs to see its role in the UK as part—albeit a hugely important part—of a constitution which 
now, irreversibly, hears the views of many, some of which differ from its own. The responsibility 
of governing is clearly more shared than ever before, and this should be embraced, though it is 
most obviously rejected at Westminster where parliamentary sovereignty retains its most adoring 
fandom. Although it was seen that parliamentary sovereignty is not inherently incompatible with 
decentralisation, an attitude towards the constitution that continues to believe ‘Parliament can 
make or unmake any law whatever’388 is increasingly problematic. The settlement, and judicial 
understandings of it, both continue to push towards symmetry, significance, and elements that 
commentators would often regard as ‘federal’ characteristics. Indeed, as Burgess rightly indicates, 
devolution means that ‘the federal elements which have always existed in the UK state structure 
will be reinforced’.389 The picture is little different regarding institutional interaction. Although the 
influence of politics on devolution in practice is problematic—particularly with the 
implementation of any effective intergovernmental arrangements—it is not beyond 
accommodation: the usual operation of the Sewel convention is demonstrative of how the political 
constitution can make decentralisation work. Although the UK’s withdrawal from the European 
Union demonstrates the cracks in this political approach to decentralisation, the real problems 
only arise when, as in that case, those cracks are exploited. The central issue for devolution then 
is the mentality that warrants this exploitation—a mentality that prefers unitary (parliamentary) 
sovereignty to a divided sovereignty, or that prefers hierarchy to cooperation and one that is, for 
the most part, centred on Westminster.  
 
 
387 ‘To some extent complacency within the pro-union camp was understandable… but it surely also reflected a 
fundamental assumption that unravelling the Union was almost unthinkable.’: Dickson (n 201) 253. 
388 Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (n 27) 39–40. 
389 Burgess, ‘Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom: New Model or Mere Respray’ (n 241) 725–6. 
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Devolution contains many opportunities for cooperation, and where attitudes have encouraged it, 
these opportunities have often been grasped effectively, but there is still more to be done, 
especially as Brexit looms.390 Disagreements are, of course, unavoidable, but because of the lack 
of attention to the union itself, what it is for and how it should operate in the round it is proving 
difficult for the UK’s various legislatures to make sense of their place in their constitution.391 ‘Yet,’ 
as O’Neill indicates, ‘the onus is not entirely on Westminster, regional legislatures also have 
responsibility, too, for facilitating smooth inter-governmental relations, ensuring that legislation 
does not incur central government’s wrath.’392 This is very much a collaborative enterprise, and it 
should be seen by all participants as exactly that; the continued existence of the systems themselves 
pins very firmly on the attitudes of its participants.393 Exactly what kind of ‘attitude’ might 
recognise, or even endorse, cooperation in this way? O’Neill suggests a possible answer: 
 
‘The need is for, on the one hand, satisfying demands for meaningful self-government and, 
on the other, sustaining an abiding sense of a shared endeavour. The equivalent is what is widely 
understood elsewhere as a ‘federalist culture’—those habits of mutual tolerance and cooperation between levels 
of government indispensable to stable power-sharing arrangements. Goodwill is a necessary but by no 
means a sufficient resource for carrying this off.’394 
 
 
390 Institute for Government (n 167) 70: ‘In October 2017, the JMC (EU Negotiations) was reconvened and, for the 
first time, agreement was reached on a substantive Brexit issue – the contested question of what should happen to 
powers repatriated from the EU. The devolved governments and the UK Government reached a compromise: the 
overall effect of Brexit would be an expansion of devolved policy autonomy, but new ‘common frameworks’ would 
be required in some areas to limit policy divergence within the UK… But while meetings between the UK and 
devolved governments are taking place more regularly than was previously the case, the key test is whether such 
interactions help to bring the governments to agreement both on the Brexit legislation discussed above and on the 
scope and content of new common frameworks to replace EU law in devolved areas. The evidence suggests that there 
is a long way to go to reach this point.’ 
391 See, for instance, ibid 6:‘The overarching problem is that there has been too little consideration of the future of 
the UK as a whole. Instead, there have been separate devolution processes in each part of the country. This approach 
has its advantages. The UK constitution has shown an impressive ability to adapt to pressures in each nation as they 
have arisen. But the downside is the absence of guiding principles, which has led to disagreement about the nature of 
the post-devolution constitution. The 2016 referendum and its aftermath have made it more urgent that these big 
questions be considered by the governments, by political parties and potentially through a deliberative exercise 
involving citizens from across the UK.’ 
392 O’Neill (n 142) 82. 
393 ibid 79:‘Any constitutional arrangement where there is power-sharing between discrete levels of governance 
depends both on constant vigilance by the central authorities and mutual goodwill to sustain the bargain.’ 
394 ibid 83–4 (emphasis added). 
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What exactly ‘federalist culture’, or federalism in general, might be able to offer the UK’s territorial 


















FEDERALISM, COOPERATION AND THE 
PURSUIT OF SHARED-RULE 
‘I did not invent it, or dig it up. I found it in common use, and I have endeavoured to get at its meaning, and to 
some extent to work out its consequences... The term “federal” is a loose designation, and is not to be subjected to 




It was seen in the first chapter that assumptions about the stability—and even ‘unitarianism’—of 
the UK constitution are not completely immune from challenge, being further from historical 
reality than might first be thought. Constitutional traditions of adaptability and incremental 
development do find historical support, but none of this, it was seen, need be out of step with 
federalism. The second chapter demonstrated that, although devolution is progress and amounts 
to a fundamental change in the structure of the UK, it does not benefit from the ‘federal’ mindset 
present in other multi-layered constitutions, though it does offer mechanisms (such as the Sewel 
convention) through which this might develop. These kinds of opportunities for cooperation enjoy 
only a sedentary and inferior position in the discourse and in light of the Westminster Parliament’s 
grip on the constitution it is necessary for its views to evolve in line with the needs of the people 
it represents.  Much of the scholarly work on devolution compares or contrasts it to federalism396 
and this work requires an exploration of what federalism is, and how the UK’s internal structures 
relate to it as a concept. Federalism is, of course, distinct from ideas such as the separation of 
 
395 FS Oliver, What Federalism Is Not (John Murray 1914) vii–viii. 
396 For extra-judicial commentary on the two, which sees them as sharing crucial values, see Sandra Day O’Connor, 




powers in that it is a theory for understanding the territorial structures of states, but precisely what 
it requires—or demands—is hotly disputed. It is also an idea that has undergone a great deal of 
evolution in its relatively short life with its evolution being set amongst the changing national and 
international contexts that it seeks to make sense of. This chapter’s suggestion is that the context 
the UK now provides makes federalism not only relevant but overtly useful. It will be seen that 
recognition of pluralism at its core, and the pursuit of shared-rule so fundamental to it, allow it to 
provide concepts that can help advance the progress of devolution, and minimise its flaws, 
encouraging institutions to cooperate in the work of government. It has already been suggested 
that federalism should be detached from a mere state-form, and this chapter looks at those 
elements of federalism that, it is suggested, provide most utility for the UK. First, the concept of 
shared rule is explored. It will be seen that, once it is accepted that there should be multiple layers 
of government, they can be encouraged to work in a positive, collaborative way. Secondly how 
federalism is compatible with multi-layered constitutionalism will be considered, to demonstrate 
that its insights are useful in light of the realities of contemporary government, and in order to 
enable the aims of constitutionalism to be properly obtained. 
 
As was noted at the outset, federalism has, for some time, been something of a ‘dirty’ word in 
political and legal discourse in the UK, being overtly rejected at numerous junctures.397 The UK 
constitution has evolved largely in (sometimes conscious) contradiction to federalist ideals, yet the 
UK-fashioned alternative—piecemeal, demand-led decentralisation—has led to an uncomfortable 
middle-ground where asymmetry, uncertainty and hierarchy prevail. Some, as a result of this 
discomfort, see ‘federation’ as a plausible and welcome destination for the UK.398 However, as has 
been seen, federalism does not necessitate a particular state-form. Rather, it is a kind of 
 
397 A federal solution would be ‘a strange and artificial system’: Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969 – 
1973 (n 152) 152–4. 
398 Parliamentary committees have often considered federalism to be a viable destination for the union: House of 
Lords Constitution Committee, Inter-Governmental Relations in the United Kingdom (n 296); House of Commons Political 
and Constitutional Reform Committee (n 223). 
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constitutional thinking, flexible in its requirements and beneficial because it welcomes active 
cooperation rather than rejection of institutional exchange. Federalism also warrants intrusions 
and interactions, it prefers shared, rather than solely self-rule, and provides for ways of 
institutionalising it. It suggests that there need be no definite hierarchy of institutions, and 
therefore—crucially to the UK—that all their voices are constitutionally important. It further 
proposes that conflict, coercion, and political tension are better managed when channelled by state 
architecture than by being simply left in the political domain. To federalists, conflict is no less 
ubiquitous, but is capable of being kept respectful and principled, rather than one party using its 
(considerable) powers at the expense of its partners. Federalism is not, as it has sometimes been 
perceived to be, simply a touchstone for deciding what the UK is—these debates often end with 
some claim that it is somehow unhelpfully sui generis—but rather, it is a way of thinking about 
power dynamics and the structures of governance such that the broader aims of constitutionalism 
can be pursued. Federal principles and ideas have evolved to make sense of the context within 
which they sit, and have a very real relationship with other norms, standards and changes in the 
constitutional landscape. In a constitution revolutionised by devolution, its contribution on this 
front is surely welcome. 
 
 
THE LESSON OF SHARED RULE 
 
Debates over sovereignty in the UK are usually those concerning Westminster’s parliamentary 
sovereignty and what it might have come to mean. This has already been explored to an extent 
regarding devolution and suffice it to say here that, although parliamentary sovereignty is not in 
and of itself incompatible with federalism, a sovereignty-unitarist outlook which sees Westminster 
at the pinnacle of a hierarchy and disregards the devolved institutions does not allow fruitful 
institutional interaction or sharing of governance, and may even prove dangerous for the union. 
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The structure of devolution it was also seen, is quite disintegrative: It allocates competences away 
from a centre that has seldom changed to keep pace and to justify its continued existence. It has 
been seen that a federal ‘mentality’ might have utility here to encourage the different legislatures 
to collaborate in the activity of government, but, although the territories now have powers of ‘self-
rule’, as Professor Tierney puts it, there is a ‘lack of any formalisation of the shared rule dimension 
of the UK territorial Constitution, and a general lack of any encompassing vision of the union as 
a system with a federal mentality or spirit’ whereby this dimension might develop.399  The UK does 
have some institutions that exhibit what might accurately be called shared rule, but these are 
exceptions to a general trend. Arguably Northern Ireland is the most comprehensive example of 
cooperative, federal style arrangement in the UK. Containing provisions for engaging with self-
government while balancing the integrity of the union,400 it overtly operates a system of shared rule 
across competences and between institutions.401 Northern Ireland also operates an interesting 
system where if it is successful, it gains more competences, and even those it does not have are 
flexible402 as well as, of course, its reliance on cross-community support. Northern Ireland depicts 
a complex picture of the potential of inter-dependence between devolved and central legislatures 
but is also likely to be most fragile in the face of a disinterested or insensitive central government. 
It is here where the centripetal force of undivided sovereignty has been clear as a force for division 
in communities, sounding most strongly when direct rule has been implemented. There are other 
examples too, such as the fact that international treaty obligations are shared between the many 
different legislatures,403 and the application of legislative consent motions and conventions. 
 
399 Tierney (n 24) 103. 
400 Consider, for instance: ‘Social security is a devolved matter in Northern Ireland, unlike in Scotland and Wales, but 
there is a statutory provision requiring the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland Minister 
having responsibility for social security to ‘from time to time consult one another with a view to securing that, to the 
extent agreed between them, the legislation to which this section applies provides single systems of social security, 
child support and pensions for the United Kingdom’: Dickson (n 201) 265. 
401 Henderson (n 179) 154. 
402 Lady Hale (n 190) 2: ‘[The Northern Ireland] Act does not say that the Northern Ireland Assembly cannot legislate 
for reserved matters. It can do so, but only with the prior consent of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. It 
can also legislate, with consent, for excepted matters if this is ancillary to provisions dealing with a reserved or 
transferred matter (s 8)’. 
403 ibid 1–2. 
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However, the crucial element of shared rule, especially as it is exhibited in obviously federal 
constitutions, is the sharing of competences and the existence of legislative ‘overlaps’, both of 
which are largely absent from the UK’s decentralisation experience which usually prefers a ‘dual’ 
system of competence allocation: 
 
‘the guiding approach to devolution has been to draw a clear division between what is 
devolved and what is ‘reserved’ to Westminster. Few functions are formally shared between 
central and devolved governments. As a result, the UK Government did not create systems 
or processes for joint working with the devolved administrations.’404 
 
This is not unlike the earliest federal experiences, which preferred a similar ‘dual’ model of power 
allocation. Madison expressed the separation, and the initial primacy of the several States in the 
following way: ‘The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, 
are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and 
indefinite.’405 However, as times changed, so too did the interpretation of the federal enumerated 
powers. In the post-war years, the advance in civil rights and the growth of the economy meant 
that the federal balance began to be reset.406 Despite the US Supreme Court, in cases such as 
Lopez407ruling that the congressional power under the Commerce Clause had been exceeded when 
it made it an offence to possess a firearm at or near a school,408 demonstrating the persistence of 
the ‘dual federal’ approach, more significant for present purposes are those cases that demonstrate 
cooperative federalism. Dual federalism, Tomkins suggests, ‘is a thin and, experience would show, 
weak form of federalism ... Of course, delimiting the powers of central government and regional 
government is a necessary component of federal and quasi-federal orders but, on its own, it is far 
 
404 Institute for Government (n 167) 59. 
405 James Madison, ‘No. 45’ in Terence Ball (ed), Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist 
(CUP 2003). 
406 Tomkins (n 341) 79. 
407 United States v Lopez 514 US 549 (1995). 
408 A similar example can be found in United States v Morrison 529 US 598 (2000); where the effect of the legislation 




from sufficient.’409 Indeed, not only is dual federalism an inadequate picture of federalism, it also 
does not do justice to its real purposes. For instance, to Elazar it is ‘self rule plus shared rule’410 
that defines federalism and to Tierney ‘[t]hese two components are needed to give the state 
balance, coherence and the mutual or multiple interdependence upon which the very idea of union 
rests.’411 Federalism warrants, by virtue of its acceptance of multiple levels of authority, active 
cooperation between legislatures and governments to add this element of shared rule. This is 
something that modern federal jurisprudence, especially in the US, has come to recognise. 
 
There are two elements of US constitutional law that are significant here. Firstly, the anti-
commandeering rule and the way Congress can use its broad spending powers and, secondly, there 
is the concept of ‘pre-emption’. As Tomkins notes, ‘Congress’ power to spend is far wider than its 
power to legislate… [it] may spend money even in areas over which it has no legislative 
competence’.412 Congress may even, as the case of South Dakota v Dole413demonstrates, attach 
conditions to its funding. In that case, it withheld some highways funding from States with a 
minimum drinking age of less than 21. The attachment of conditions has long been accepted,414 
and is treated with more judicial deference than legislative powers, but these conditions must 
nonetheless be ‘reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure’.415 The Court found that this 
test had been met, although Justice O’Connor found that drinking age was not sufficiently 
connected to highways funding. This power, clearly, is not unlimited. In New York v United States416 
Justice O’Conner held, speaking for the Court, that Congress may not ‘commandeer’ the States. 
This meant ‘directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory programme.’417 
 
409 Tomkins (n 341) 81. 
410 Daniel J Elazar, Exploring Federalism (University of Alabama Press 1987) 12. 
411 Tierney (n 24) 108. 
412 Tomkins (n 341) 81. 
413 South Dakota v Dole 483 US 293 (1987). 
414 Since the case of United States v Butler 291 US 1 (1936). 
415 South Dakota v Dole (n 413) 213 (O’Connor J); Massachusetts v United States US 435 444 (1978), 461. 
416 New York v United States 505 US 144 (1992). 
417  ibid 176; Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association Incorporated 452 US 264 (1981), 288. 
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‘While Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate 
concern to the States, the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the 
ability to require States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.’418 It is clearly a fine line 
between incentivising and requiring compliance, and where this line stands may be up for debate. 
Justice O’Conner suggested that this regime, where legislation ‘anticipates a partnership between 
the State and the federal government, animated by a shared objective’,419 epitomised ‘co-operative 
federalism’; significantly, the crucial element in demarking this line is whether or not the State has 
any choice as to whether to cooperate or not.420 This partnership exists primarily in the field of 
funding and is a dynamic virtually unheard of in the UK’s block-grant system. 
 
The second element depends more than non-commandeering on the supremacy of federal law. 
Pre-emption is the name given to the displacing or setting aside of State law where it ‘stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’421 
It is also possible for a State’s competence to be displaced in a field more generally if ‘Congress, 
acting within its proper authority, has determined it must be regulated by federal law exclusively.’422 
In the case of Arizona v United States,423 when the State enacted supplementary migration laws—an 
area that, of course, greatly involves both levels of government—it was held that Arizona’s 
provisions had been pre-empted by pre-existing federal law on alien registration. The same was 
the case for aliens seeking work; ‘Congress [had] made a deliberate choice not to impose criminal 
penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorised employment’424 and that Arizonan law 
which was at odds with this had been pre-empted. Equally, a proposed increase in arrest powers 
 
418 New York v United States (n 416) 162; Tomkins (n 341) 82. 
419 New York v United States (n 416) 167; Arkansas v Oklahoma 503 US 91 (1992), 101. 
420 Tomkins (n 341) 83. Equally, in Printz v United States 521 US 898 (1997) it was held that State officers could not be 
commandeered to implement federal regimes. 
421 Hines v Davidowitz 312 US 52 (1941), 67; Tomkins (n 341) 85. 
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had been pre-empted in the same way. Tomkins suggests this case, and others concerning pre-
emption, are unhelpful for shared rule since they deter rather than encourage both levels of 
government from engaging in the same areas. Yet even if the legacy of dual federalism remains 
present, the broader context of concurrent jurisdiction and of non-commandeering represents ‘a 
sharing of regulatory authority between the federal government and the states’;425 this is a system 
very similar to the EU’s directive system, which leaves ‘the choice of form and methods’ open to 
Member States.426 
 
The Canadian experience of federalism is the most explicit about the room the judiciary is 
comfortable with granting for joint regulation of the same competence areas, in fact ‘courts should 
allow both levels of government to jointly regulate areas that fall within their jurisdiction’.427 Here, 
the threshold is much higher: ‘It will hold legislation to be unconstitutional not where it merely 
affects the jurisdiction of the other layer of government but only where it impairs that jurisdiction.’428 
This is clearly a very positive, encouraging approach to cooperative federalism, in fact it may be 
the case that modern federalism ‘demands cooperation between the federal government and the 
Provinces’.429 This approach reaches such a level that it has been suggested in court that ‘the 
principle of co-operative federalism prevents Canada and the Provinces from acting or legislating 
in a way that would hinder co-operation between both orders of government.’430 It can therefore 
be claimed that cooperative federalism is a way of encouraging both layers of authority to engage 
in a policy area. One may be granted scope and choice in its implementation, or it may be used as 
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a ‘pawn’ of the other to ensure its own policies are implemented.431 Importantly, cooperative 
federalism is not a one-way street; it is not the tool of the higher level of authority to manipulate 
the lower, rather it is a tool that both layers can use to ensure policy goals are met and, if necessary, 
to challenge one another. Territories are in fact able to be ‘uncooperative’ and challenge the ‘higher’ 
authority’s policy ambitions. As the anti-commandeering litigation has suggested, it is this choice 
that distinguishes cooperation from coercion, but it is also a tool that can be used by territories to 
reject, challenge or at least test public opinion against particular federal strategies. This has been 
the case for various aspects of immigration law, college tuition fees and fractious terrorism policies 
and is as much a tool of cooperative federalism as active or passive collaboration is.432 It can even 
be strategically deployed such that, despite apparent pre-emption of an area, the anti-
commandeering rule can be used to negate any federal attempts at regulation: ‘the anti-
commandeering cases have established that States have no obligation to implement or enforce 
federal law unless they voluntarily agree to do so’.433 This means that the federal government is 
powerless to enforce regulation that depends on States for their enforcement, even though it 
disapproves of the State’s approach. 
 
Despite the principle of cooperative federalism on some readings (though not all) being incapable 
of ‘impos[ing] a positive obligation to facilitate co-operation where the constitutional division of 
powers authorises unilateral action’,434 normative weight can in fact be attached to the concept. 
 
431 Both of these are mechanisms familiar in the European Union where subsidiarity allows for a degree territorial 
discretion and diversity, and directives leave a Member State’s options open for how it sees fit to implement policy. 
They are also present in the margin of appreciation at Strasbourg. 
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Importantly—and to the likely pleasure of those of a political constitutionalist persuasion—this is 
taking place on the political as well as legal fora. This idea is that of ‘mutual respect’. Each sphere 
of government should, it suggests, take account of the interests of the other: 
 
It ought to be the case in Canada and the UK alike that, in sharing power, governments may 
not act unilaterally without taking into account the impact of their actions on the other level 
of government. To adopt this as a legal principle in the UK would be a welcome addition to 
our public law.435 
 
This might be implicit in the non-commandeering rule, and in the Canadian experience of 
cooperative federalism more generally,436 but it is most explicit, especially as a political principle, 
in the experience of South Africa. In the South African Constitution, all the spheres of government 
(local, provincial and national) must, among other things,  
 
‘respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of government in the 
other spheres; [and] exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does 
not encroach on the… integrity of government in another sphere; and co-operate with one 
another in mutual trust and good faith.’437  
 
This is a provision not intended to spark litigation but is rather ‘designed to facilitate political 
solutions’.438 When the Constitutional Court has (rarely) interpreted this section, it has noted that 
the spheres are ‘distinctive, inter-dependent and inter-related’.439 Even if this made little material 
difference to the conclusion of the case, it does represent an example of enshrining even political 
cooperative mechanisms in constitutional principle.440 
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The fact that the UK does not yet possess fully developed cooperative federal institutional 
structures is something of a weakness in its current constitutional arrangements. Cooperative 
federalism may provide a way to strengthen those shared-rule elements of the constitution that 
currently exist and push for more where none are present. The way devolution operates in the 
UK, especially with its rejection of legal limits on Westminster’s ‘sovereign’ authority, does not, as 
some have suggested, equate to a rejection of federalism;441 through the lens of cooperative 
federalism, it is possible for the two to be reconciled. As Professor Elliott indicates, and as noted 
above, ‘[o]ne of the hallmarks of devolution is that the national legislature, far from transferring 
legislative competence, merely shares such competence with devolved institutions.’442 This sharing 
of competence is, it must be accepted, a far cry from the dual federalism envisaged by Wheare, but 
it is not entirely incompatible with cooperative federalism as far as the constitutional realities of 
devolution extend (when one is mindful of the political—and possibly constitutional—limits on 
Westminster, as well as its ability to legislate for the devolved territories, especially with consent). 
Although, of course, as a point of or pure law the institutions and their laws can all be reversed 
and abolished by Westminster,443 in terms of constitutional reality, this is not possible444 and 
viewing this relationship as purely subordinate does not do justice to its complexities where ‘[t]he 
better view … is that Parliament’s legislative freedom is restrained—even if it not unambiguously 
restricted—by values that are genuinely constitutional in nature.’445  Legislative cooperation is 
already a reality in some areas, namely in those of taxation and welfare; the Scotland Act 2016 has 
 
441 ‘Parliamentary sovereignty is flatly incompatible with any conventional understanding of the federal model…’: Elliott (n 
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made provision for these areas of competence to be distributed among both of Scotland’s 
legislatures, and, in some cases, shared between them. These provisions ‘will require co-operation 
between UK and Scottish Governments across a range of new areas’446 with the effect that ‘[t]he 
hitherto fairly straightforward demarcation between reserved powers and those devolved to the 
Scottish Parliament will become considerably less clear.’447 As Tomkins suggests, progress towards 
‘shared rule’ is welcome: ‘thinking about cooperation between governments may be a more 




MAKING SENSE OF A MULTI-LAYERED CONSTITUTION 
 
Cooperative federalism in other jurisdictions is primarily animated by a single factor: it is the result 
of reality.449 It has been recognised in Canada that a dual model, where each sphere of government 
is insulated or ‘watertight’ is simply unrealistic—and, significantly, this is recognised in the nature 
of the legislation and jurisprudence on competence delineation. For instance, ‘the pith and 
substance doctrine is founded on the recognition that it is in practice impossible for a legislature 
to exercise its jurisdiction over a matter effectively without incidentally affecting matters within 
the jurisdiction of another level of government’.450 The fact that legislation often has qualities or 
effects that sound on both levels is a reality that the UK has wrestled with, but that cooperative 
federalism can easily make sense of: ‘some matters are by their very nature impossible to categorise 
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under a single head of power’,451 and therefore beyond the dual federal model’s remit. Further, as 
the New Deal and the shift in American federalism at least illustrates, there is real advantage to 
this legislative and executive ‘overlap’—policies not achievable by one sphere alone may be 
achieved by both acting in concert; it is the inevitability of this reality that requires the flexibility 
of the theory.452  
 
Cooperative federalism is not merely about accepting this reality, it is about encouraging it; in fact 
‘co-operative federalism reflects the realities of an increasingly complex society that requires the 
enactment of co-ordinated federal and provincial legislative schemes to better deal with the local 
needs of unity and diversity’.453 Indeed it also possesses a strong normative gravity towards 
institutional collaboration, not only because the jurisprudence will accept it and there is therefore 
room to use it to achieve policy goals, but also by providing a normative framework through which 
it can operate most effectively. This is increasingly important as constitutional structures become 
ever-more interconnected. O’Neill suggests that ‘[t]he classic Westphalian state system is under 
stress across the Continent and beyond. These trends reflect a global phenomenon, a structural 
shift in governance in response to unparalleled changes in the international political economy’454 
and if this is so, federal experiences demonstrate that the realities of contemporary government 
make cooperative federalism a hugely useful tool for modern constitutional thought, both as a 
scholarly pursuit, and in the minds of the lawyers and politicians who make the constitution tick. 
The idiosyncrasies of devolution do little to detract from its utility, but rather make it all the more 
important: 
 
‘British devolution does not conform to the neat separation of powers usually found in formal 
federalism. Rather than ceding outright authority, central government accommodates 
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territorial interests, agreeing to share its competencies in a restricted list of legislative and 
administrative matters. Boundary disputes are certain to arise in these areas of concurrent or 
overlapping power. Again, there is nothing untoward in this, though a culture of common 
sense inter-governmental cooperation is indispensable if these conflicts of interpretation are 
to be contained, let alone resolved.’455 
 
The recognition of plurality is a challenge facing many constitutional systems; indeed ‘[t]he rise of 
powerful internal nationalisms within the territory of ancient states is a worldwide phenomenon. 
It raises some fundamental questions about the identity of nations’.456 Further, the challenge faced 
by the UK, ‘of how to unite different regions and people with different histories and identities[,] 
is one common to many modern governments’.457 With disintegrative unitary conceptions of 
sovereignty preferring secession to union, it is clear that constitutional theory needs to quickly 
catch up with the realities of contemporary government. The absence of adequate theories or their 
rejection in pursuit of political ambition is clearly to the detriment of both scholarly understanding 
of constitutions, and their operation.  
 
Shared rule and the avoidance of hierarchy are crucial elements of this458 and multi-layered 
constitutionalism has its own innate advantages. For instance, it creates an opportunity for policy 
experimentation: Devolution has frequently led the way in endorsing constitutional ideas that 
might otherwise be less obvious in the UK: each settlement has an obvious separation of powers, 
enables judicial protection of the rule of law through strike-down powers, EU and ECHR norms 
are protected; as well as power-sharing, proportional representation and super-majorities459 all 
being present in the settlements. Multi-layered constitutionalism also amounts to a recognition of 
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the interrelationship between governance structures within and without the State. This was 
apparent in the UK as early as the Irish question and, as it was with Irish Home Rule, questions 
of the UK’s internal constitutional dynamics are intricately (and delicately) entangled with 
questions of its external ones: 
 
[T]he subject of British federalism should also be seen in its broader imperial and international 
context, putting the Irish crisis beyond its conventional dimension of a limited “domestic 
affair.” After all, it was the political development of Canada and the other self-governing 
Dominions which stimulated the imagination of British constitutional reformers… [along] 
with constant references to the contemporary experience of Switzerland, Germany, and 
Austria-Hungary. And the United States remained the ideal model for a federal “Greater 
Britain” at the centre of global politics, reuniting different nations into a solid political and 
military union.460 
 
This is not something that has changed and it reflects an understanding of the interconnectedness 
of modern government; for instance, it is interesting that Tony Blair suggests ‘the arguments of 
the Brexiteers are very similar to the arguments of the Scottish nationalists ultimately. It’s just a 
misunderstanding of what nationhood really entails in the 21st century.’461 The mixing of power 
structures and the sharing of competences is therefore an increasingly significant reality, made 
increasingly problematic by Brexit.462 Brexit might be seen as a rejection of this approach to 
modern constitutionalism, but it retains its importance in at least some parts of the Union, and it 
marks an increased interest in assessing (or reassessing) the layers of constitutional structures: 
 
‘in this era of globalized economics and increased international interdependence the prevailing 
mood within other parts of the United Kingdom seems to have been that a supra-national 
identity, one which stresses cooperation and harmony between the countries in the Union, is 
 
460 Pelizza (n 16) 12. 
461 Institute for Government, Interview with Blair (n 146) 10. 
462 Institute for Government (n 167) 71: ‘Analysis published by the UK Government in April 2019 shows there are 
160 areas of EU law that intersect with devolution in at least one of the three devolved nations, meaning that powers 




an even more inspirational model. In the United States, a classic federal state within which 
substantial power is vested in 50 state governments, it is collaboration between those states 
which gives the country as a whole its resilience and the people of the various states their 
national pride.’463 
 
The fundamental claim of multi-layered constitutionalism is that it is far more desirable to embrace 
this interconnected ‘marble-cake’ reality than to reject it. Cooperative federalism then becomes a 
useful tool to ensure this works and maintains its legitimacy.  Once the ‘layer-cake’, dual federalist 
idea is abandoned, with it the ‘zero-sum metaphor for institutional relationships’464 can also be 
lost. This means that the conception of growth of some competences at the cost of other 
institutions,465 a flawed way to make sense of institutional relationships, can be replaced with an 
understanding that better reflects the interconnecting network of sovereignties and the necessary 
conflicts and collaboration that are fundamental to multilevel governance, with its own positive 
ramifications.466 That ‘[t]he expanding competence of the European Union is, according to some, 
realised at the expense of ‘the role that is left for national parliaments’’467 is partly the result of this 
‘dualist’ conception of both sovereignty and competence allocation. If government is seen as an 
overlapping, shared enterprise suspicion over increased institutional interaction in policy areas can 
be reduced, and the need for disintegrational territorialism can be minimised. Instead, the real 
benefit of multilevel governance—the increase of institutional exchange and interaction—can be 
realised. It is also possible to suggest that the problems evidenced with viewing federalism merely 
as a threshold of function allocation are the fruit of the dualist/layer-cake model:  
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…the clear attribution of functions to different levels of government [as opposed to a ‘mixed’ 
analogy] seems to have an irresistible allure to anyone charged with codifying or understanding 
constitutional arrangements whether or not they satisfy what are taken to be the defining 
criteria of federalism.468 
 
In this sense, the ‘clear attribution of functions’ may itself be seen as ‘the defining criteria of 
federalism’, leading at least in part to the linguistic and migratory problems faced by the concept.469 
Page suggests that the layer-cake is a better descriptive analogy of multilevel governance,470 but the 
work undertaken in the US and EU alone surely suggests this is not the case,471 yet it continues to 
be an attractive model, with some regarding cooperative federalism ‘faux-federalism’.472 Perhaps 
then, it has normative power not possessed by the cooperative model of federalism, perhaps the 
lack of clearly defined boundaries, the imprecision of its competence allocation and its ability to 
catch any institutional arrangement that features ‘overlaps’ makes it normatively vacuous. Yet it 
remains, as experience shows, the most effective (or possibly only) way of making sense of multi-
layered constitutions, being both reflective of their reality, and pursuant of their advantages. 
Tomkins reiterates the benefits of a perspective that encourages shared rule: 
 
That we should think of devolution and federalism in terms of spending powers as well as 
law-making competences. That shared rule can empower governments both through 
cooperation and non-cooperation. That principles of mutual respect and recognition can be 
given judicial expression and do not have to be mere platitudes. And that shared rule can be 
pushed yet further to embrace formal ideas of federal loyalty.473 
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It has been seen that the preference for a hierarchical, exclusive and dismissive approach has far 
more disadvantages for intergovernmental relationships, particularly in the shadow of 
parliamentary sovereignty which, it has been suggested, is far more a warrant for engagement of 
other institutions than suspicion from them. Uncertainty does have its own problems, but this may 
be a necessary expense in pursuit of improved institutional interaction. Further, it can operate as 
a fountainhead for other principles. The question ‘who has this power?’, can become the question 
‘who should use the power’, the answer to which will be more useful. In answering it, recourse will 
need to be had to other principles—subsidiarity, the rule of law and democracy among other core 
principles of constitutionalism—but this conversation is not possible if the institutions are 
excluded at the point of competence allocation. Federalism is often conflated with legalisation,474 
yet the cooperative model clearly pushes competence and governance back into the political 
sphere. This model of federalism suggests that the normative-constitutional problem of who 
should wield a certain power may not be resolved by recourse to legal principle alone, since the law 
may simply place it in the hands of many institutions. Which institution is best placed to use that 
power is therefore the produce of political debate, something that has been embraced in South 
Africa. The result of this kind of federalism is that, rather than talking about whether to devolve,475 
the question becomes which institution(s) are best placed to handle tasks, and how they should 
coordinate their responses to challenges that transcend those obvious boundaries; the advantage 




474 See above discussion of Dicey’s understanding of the concept, where it is suggested that his fault is the conflation 
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The problems that federalism seeks to solve are clearly deeply imbedded in the devolution 
settlement. At its core, federalism is a way of framing constitutional questions, of accepting 
plurality, both in terms of peoples and of perspectives, and also as a means of balancing autonomy 
and integrity: finding unity in diversity. Federalism need not be ruled out because of the blocks in 
the way of the UK’s claims to federation, federalism clearly has more to offer than mere 
classification. The UK, certainly, is more ‘constitutional’ than ever before in its history: the 
protection of rights, constitutional statutes, decentralisation and ever-growing judicial review 
jurisdiction are all beginning to qualify the Westminster Parliament’s claim as the salient voice on 
constitutional matters. Clearly the UK’s constitution is not only more ‘constitutional’, but also 
more ‘federal’:  
[F]ederalisation is in a state of becoming, but the very flexibility in the term suggests that a 
federal Britain may well emerge without a full blown written Constitution, without a fully 
formalised symmetry of powers involving a model of regional government for England in any 
way comparable to Scottish devolution, and also with only a modest tampering with 
Parliament’s supremacy or its institutional architecture. In fact, from certain angles it probably 
will continue to look not very federal at all.476 
 
It is clear that many other institutions have valid—and often different—views on the constitution. 
Some, for instance the courts, are often informed by their institutional characteristics as arbiters 
of disputes and protectors of minorities, insulated from the magnetism of political expediency; 
while others, such as the devolved legislatures, are mandated by their representation of forgotten 
peoples who seek a voice in a larger union or separation from it. This must also be seen in the 
shadow of the UK’s own constitutional history as, though it is often forgotten, a young, unstable 
union that has had to battle with conflicting constitutional visions since it was first conceived. The 
devolution settlement has enshrined these differing perspectives and it is no longer tenable for 
Westminster to ignore them—they are not going anywhere. Federal thinking might, it is suggested, 
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be a way for the UK to balance these views, to seek compromise between autonomy and integrity, 
and properly share its government. 
 
 
CONCLUSION: WHAT CAN FEDERALISM DO FOR US? 
 
When federalism is properly understood it is clear that communities and institutional forms 
themselves can exhibit certain federal qualities, many of which the UK is already home to: 
Northern Ireland, the Sewel convention, constitutional restraints on parliamentary sovereignty 
such as the principle of devolved autonomy, and the very devolved institutions themselves (as well 
as the process through which they have come about and developed) are all examples of federal 
elements in the UK constitution. In one way or another these institutions recognise discrete 
political communities and encourage (to some extent) dialogue and cooperation between them. 
Devolution does, however, have problems: the politicisation and infrequency of formal 
intergovernmental arrangements, the lack of English home rule, the absence of cooperative capital 
allocation systems, and, most significantly, the absence of a desire in England to break from the 
homogenous, unitary conception of the UK.  When the UK’s federal qualities are appreciated, 
these challenges can be (and some suggest, would inevitably be) overcome.477 Once it is accepted 
that the UK is in a club of systems that have ‘federal’ problems, these can be understood with 
reference to other systems that experience similar ones to see, for instance, how South Africa 
constitutionalises a ‘federal loyalty’, or how Canada understands the impossibility of ‘watertight 
legislative compartments’, and these insights offer solutions for the UK. The UK can review the 
flaws in its territorial constitution and find federal solutions to them, the most significant of which 
is arguably the idea of cooperative federalism. This concept, it has been seen, is the result of the 
 
477 See Livingstone’s claim above about the reciprocal relationship between federal sensibility and federal architecture: 
Livingstone (n 61). 
 131 
realities of territorial government, but it also encourages the shared rule that literature on 
devolution broadly accepts is the most regrettable absence from UK constitutional thought.  
 
None of this is, as chapter 1 explained, at odds with the UK’s history. Rather than being 
understood as an homogenous unitary state, the UK should be recognised as perpetually wrestling 
with distinct communities and their desire for self-rule, something that unitary thinking has never 
been able to come to terms with. Whether the UK is a federation or not is, bluntly, irrelevant; the 
most important question is how its federal characteristics can be understood and its government 
made more effective. A mindset that endorses these qualities is essential, and, in light of the 
fundamental nature of the changes that have resulted from devolution (whether they were desired 
at implementation or not), a mindset that rejects them is clearly out of step with reality. The 
problems with the UK’s territorial governance can be solved by federal thinking, a thinking that, 
in turn, can make sense of a world that is, hesitantly, increasingly interconnected and multi-layered, 
or at least in the process of reimagining constitutional structures. Only when this is accepted, can 
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS  
‘UNCHARTED TERRITORY’? 
‘Differences, however, of words must not conceal from us essential similarity of things’ 479 
 
If one thing is gleaned from this thesis, it should be that the territorial constitution matters. The 
UK’s past, present and, in all likelihood, its future are all shaped by the way the UK as a state is 
understood, and how authority and power is distributed within it. It is essential to the study of 
constitutionalism to remain cognisant of the importance of architecture in shaping 
intergovernmental relations, constitutional theory and the legitimacy of law-making institutions. It 
is far too easy to remain ignorant of these factors, to suggest that constitutions can be studied as 
documents without context, immune from their history and that the only principles that matter 
are those that operate at the highest orders of constitutionalism, such as the rule of law and the 
separation of powers. It is, as the UK’s experience clearly demonstrates, crucially important to 
remain aware of those structures that exist within the state and be prepared to make sense of their 
symbiotic relationship with other constitutional principles. In so doing, it is important that theories 
are not neglected now purely because they have been before, and that sight is not lost of how 
much structures change and how, though for instance devolution may once have been quite 
different from federalism, this claim can no longer be sustained. And indeed federalism itself has 
far more to offer than simple identification. 
 
The essential claim of this thesis can be put in quite simple terms: The UK’s rejection of federalism 
is no longer, if it ever was, justified. Federalism, when properly understood, does not prescribe a 
state-form that is extraneous to the UK’s past, nor does it have certain inflexible institutional 
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requirements that are unobtainable. Instead, it provides for a way of thinking about the roles played 
by the institutions in the constitution and warranting positive interactions between them. As 
chapter 1 discovered, the UK has historically rejected federalism as an inappropriate theory; with 
the UK’s home-grown constitutional theories being far too focussed on ideas of monolithic, 
indivisible sovereignty to have room for a theory that overtly divides sovereignty, power and 
authority between political communities. This rejection has sometimes been justified: the theory 
for a long time lacked a clear, agreed meaning, it was analogised with legalisation, limited legislative 
authority and a particular history (namely that of a pact or fœdus). It is true that it has been marred 
by poor ideological clarity and imprecision, but surely it is true that ‘[t]he human understanding 
more easily invents new things than new words, and we are hence constrained to employ many 
improper and inadequate expressions.’480 Opponents might suggest that federalism may not be the 
best way to think about the constitution, but its accommodation of diversity makes it more suited 
to the UK—and the ‘cracks’ in the devolution arrangement make it more important—now than 
ever before. 
 
The UK’s own constitutional history has not been the homogenising mission its rejection of 
federalism would suggest. Instead, as the first chapter also outlined, it has been shaped by union 
and disunion as much as any ‘federation’. However, the dominance of English constitutional 
traditions meant that the prospect of an existential moment—which first arose in the form of Irish 
Home Rule—had to be avoided. In the first chapter it was also seen that, ‘[t]his Anglo-centric 
outlook, betraying a self-regarding account of history, and of governance as centralised authority, 
set the standard for succeeding generations.’481 This held true both in terms of the English 
dominance of the union, and its dominance of its constitutional theory: the preferences for 
incrementalism over existentialism, the sovereignty of parliament and the subordination of 
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territory are all very ‘English’ ideas, themselves shaping the way the union formed and the way it 
functioned even into the 21st Century. And yet the second chapter suggested that this existential 
moment is exactly what devolution has amounted to, however much it also was intended to avoid 
it. Devolution has not been a perfect system, it is asymmetrical, often improvised and ‘[c]ontinues 
to be extended with no vision of the state as a union of peoples’,482 with only limited institutions 
for institutional respect and mutual collaboration. Yet both devolution and federalism have 
morphed into something more mature and more similar. Devolution has become more 
symmetrical, principled and constitutionally significant, and, even though a hierarchical and dual 
model of power allocation persists, there are mechanisms that allow for cooperation and shared 
government. It has now become an arguably permanent part of the UK’s constitution and 
Westminster would do well to treat it as such, and those weaknesses that it does have—such as in 
the temperamentality of intergovernmental relations—can often be seen as the result of the 
absence of a cooperative mindset in the centre. Federalism, in turn, has also matured, becoming 
more about normative claims of divided legislative power and shared government, and more 
accepting of the peculiarities of different systems.  
 
Rather than prescribing a particular state-form, federalism provides access to a useful mentality, 
of considerable benefit to the UK. It was seen that progress on decentralisation has been, largely, 
good(, long overdue) and, even with its idiosyncrasies, asymmetries and political dependence, 
devolution has proved an effective tool to achieve self rule. It even possesses the ability to obtain 
shared rule because of functional overlaps and political mechanisms to protect cooperation, but it 
is here that the ‘federal mentality’ is able to step in. It was seen that the biggest hindrance for 
devolution was a mindset that was happy to subordinate or dismiss devolution as insignificant. 
Even though this is a view no longer shared by the judiciary, they have not been capable of quelling 
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it. The federal mindset is the antidote to this, encouraging the significance of different power 
structures and even prescribing for their interaction by harnessing those functional overlaps, 
spending powers and using ‘federal loyalty’ to bind together the aspects of the modern union that 
devolution has apparently driven apart. 
 
This was the purpose of the final chapter which suggested that, not only are there benefits to be 
obtained in the form of shared rule now resoundingly encouraged by federalism, ‘cooperative 
federalism’ is also a far better way of allowing the UK to come to terms with its own reality. A 
sovereignty-oriented approach, one which can only recognise Westminster as the site of truly 
legitimate law-making authority, cannot hope to make sense of the contemporary constitution in 
its full richness, and cannot prescribe for any pathways that might help resolve the current 
difficulties facing devolution. It is ideas of sovereignty, particularly that it is ‘indivisible’, that 
diminish the application of shared rule, of cooperative government and of recognition from the 
centre of the constitutional status of the devolved institutions which is, clearly, overdue. Pluralism 
and unitarist sovereignty conceptions are not compatible, but whereas the former is the reality in 
the UK, the latter is only the case in England. In fact history shows that ‘[t]he unitarism of the 
unitary state has really been English not British.’483  It is certainly the case that, historically, politics 
and convention have ‘moderated the strict legal position’,484 but this does not mean the federal 
principle is out of place in the UK, far from it. It might mean that the more legalist interpretations 
of federalism are not well-suited, but this misses ‘the presence of the federal principle in the British 
constitution’,485 crucially that ‘the “federal idea” of “reconcil[ing] national unity with the right of 
local self-government” was, as Clement said, part of British imperial constitutional law long before 
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American federalism was established.’486 It is this reconciliation that might be possible now under 
the guise of federal thinking, which is in fact necessitated by devolution’s dependence on political 
‘trust’ over legal protections. Crucial to this reconciliation is acceptance of the legitimacy of both 
layers of authority and, importantly for those aware of federalism’s recent developments, that they 
may both legitimately govern over the same area. 
 
However, the benefits of this new, uncharted territory, reach out even beyond the state’s borders 
as ‘rising regional tensions within the United Kingdom, tied with the difficult relation of the 
country with the European Union, still underline the importance of federalist thought for the 
British constitutional system’.487 It is certainly true that the British relationship with federalism has 
always been to think of it as an external as much as an internal concept and, if it is true that 
‘[a]lthough devolution is not federalism, there is no doubt that it is likely to accentuate the spirit 
of federalism in the UK’,488 then this spirit may not have come too late. But, if Westminster 
continues to reject the fundamentality of devolution, or fails embrace a mentality that stays its 
hand and respects the other institutions, it may be that federalism becomes the UK’s great ‘what 
if’? 
 
The crucial challenge facing the modern statist system of government is two-fold. Firstly, how can 
it make sense of the clearly ubiquitous reality of multi-layered government. Secondly, how can 
states balance the competing needs of autonomy and integrity. Competing centrifugal and 
centripetal forces have shaped the histories and politics of states; there is no harm in engaging with 
the effect they might have on constitutionalism. For the UK, it seems that it is accurate to say, as 
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Bogdanor does, that ‘devolution introduces, for the first time, the federal spirit into the British 
constitution’,489 but this may not be enough. ‘Introducing’ that spirit is a long way from cementing 
it, and yet this is exactly what must happen, indeed, ‘[p]olitical authority in a democracy is 
sustained… by a public philosophy; and a country’s constitutional arrangement are bound to be 
deeply affected by this public philosophy’.490 If this political philosophy is not sufficiently 
developed—sufficiently ‘federal’—the surely noble project of devolution may be little more than 
a missed opportunity. The constitution’s ‘internal and uneasy tension between its unitary and union 
state identities’491 has not been resolved by devolution, indeed some might suggest it has only been 
exposed by it; but devolution does invite the (federal) kinds of thinking that UK constitution 
clearly needs. It has thrust questions of legitimacy, of power structures, and of the very nature of 
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